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ABSTRACT

Gendering Flexicurity：The Effects of Flexicurity on Gender Equality
by
Szu-Ying Ho

Advisor: Professor Janet C. Gornick

Flexicurity is a major labor market strategy that the European Union (EU) Commission
has adopted; it aims to simultaneously enhance flexibility in response to rapid changes
and strengthen security in the labor market. Although EU Commission staff have firmly
asserted that flexicurity will enhance gender equality, a number of feminist scholars have
expressed doubts that this is the case. However, these academic detractors have thus far
not proposed any practical quantitative indicators or methods to examine the exact
relationship between flexicurity and gender equality. Therefore, the major purpose of this
study is to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative
methods. It utilizes micro data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data waves and
the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) 2005 survey as well as an OECD
dataset for macro-level flexicurity policy indices. It uses hierarchical modeling to
estimate the effects of flexicurity policies on (1) on five components of males’ and
females’ labor market outcomes (i.e., the probability of being employed, of working
part-time, of being in a female-type occupation, of having a managerial position, or of
being afforded probabilities for advancement); (2) earnings; and (3) subjective job
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security and employment security. Taken together, this research can shed light on
flexicurity policies’ effects on different aspects of gender equality: employment
protection legislation (EPL) does not necessarily exert negative influence on female
workers’ employment prospects but yields to negative effects on female workers’
subjective job security perceptions. At the same time, the effects of active labor market
policies (ALMPs) seem more inconsistent in regard to female employment prospects,
while passive labor market policies (PLMPs) do not significantly influence job-loss
worries for either gender. In other words, the labor institution’s “flexibility” side has more
negative effects on female workers’ security perceptions, whereas its “security” side still
does not function well enough to improve workers’ perceptions of security.

v

Table of Contents

Title Page ……………………………………………………………………….….…i
Copyright Page………………………………………………………………….…....ii
Approval Page…………………………………………………………………..……iii
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………..…...iv
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………….……vi
List of Tables……………………………………………………………..………......vii
List of Figures………..…………………………………………………..………........ix
List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………..……..…x
Chapter 1. Background: Flexicurity Policy and Gender Equality ............................... 1
I. The Emergence of Flexicurity as an EU Employment Strategy .............................. 1
II. Flexicurity and Gender Equality ............................................................................ 6
III. Feminist Critiques of Flexicurity ........................................................................... 8
Chapter 2. Origins, Operations, and Effects: A Critical Review of Flexicurity ........ 16
I. Preface: The Partial Deregulation of Labor Markets in the 1990s ....................... 16
II. The Origins and the Debate: The Concept of Flexicurity .................................... 20
III. Effects of Flexicurity ........................................................................................... 41
IV. The Welfare State Paradox: The Welfare State Facilitates Women’s Not Only
Labor Force Participation but Also Gender Occupational Inequality……………60
V. Wage Structure: An Alternative Explanation for the Gender Wage Gap .............. 65
VI. Flexicurity and Job Security Perception ............................................................. 68
Chapter 3. Methodology: Research Questions and Methods ...................................... 87
I. Data and Sources ................................................................................................... 87
II. Measures............................................................................................................... 89
III. Analysis Strategy ................................................................................................ 96
Chapter 4: The Effects of Flexicurity on Women’s Employment Probabilities in 19
Countries........................................................................................................................ 103
I. Correlations between Macro Level Factors and Labor Market Outcomes .......... 103
II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Five Labor Market
Outcomes………………………………………………………………………..106
III. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 124
Chapter 5. Gendered Flexicurity: The effects of Flexicurity on Gender Wage Gaps in
18 countries .................................................................................................................... 127
I. Correlation between important institutional factors and the gender earnings ratio
............................................................................................................................. 127
II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’ Earnings and Earning
Percentile ............................................................................................................. 133
III. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 142
Chapter 6. Flexicurity, Gender and Job Security: Determinants of Job Security in 19
Countries........................................................................................................................ 145
I. Correlation between important institutional factors and job security perception 145
II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’ Security Perceptions151
III. Discussion ........................................................................................................ 168
Chapter 7. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 171
I. The Classification of Flexicurity………………………………………………. 171
II. A Summary of Findings………………………………………………………...172
III. Concluding Remarks and Future Research……………………………………177
Reference…………………………………………………………………………….179
vi

List of Tables
Table 2-1. Flexibility versus Security Trade-Offs……………………………………21
Table 2-2. EES indicators and indicators proposed by the EMCO-indicators Group
(2008, 2009) ...…………………………………………………………………...37
Table 2-3. Transitions Matrix ETS (Employment Transition Security) ...………….40
Table 2-4. The Effects of Flexibility (EPL): A Summary of Empirical Findings…...80
Table 2-5. The Effects of PLMP: A Summary of Empirical Findings……...……….83
Table 2-6. The Effects of ALMP: A Summary of Empirical Findings .....…………..85
Table 4-1. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Employed Probabilities with Individualand Country-Level Variables…………………………………………………108
Table 4-2. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Part-Time Employment Probabilities with
Individual-and Country-Level Variables…………………………………….112
Table 4-3. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Temporary Job Probabilities with
Individual-and Country-Level Variables…………………………………….114
Table 4-4. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Temporary Employment Probabilities
with Individual-and Country-Level Variables………………………………115
Table 4-5. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Female-type Job Probabilities with
Individual-and Country-Level Variables…………………………………….116
Table 4-6. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Managerial Positions Probabilities with
Individual-and Country-Level Variable………………………………….….119
Table 4-7. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment
Probabilities by Gender………………………………………………...……..120
Table 4-8. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Part-time Job
Probabilities by Gender………………...……………………………….…….121
Table 4-9. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Temporary
Job Probabilities by Gender…………………………………………………..122
Table 4-10. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Female-type
Job Probabilities by Gender…………………………………………………..122
Table 4-11. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Managerial
Position Probabilities by Gender……………………………………………..123
Table 5-1. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Natural Log of Earnings with Individualand Country-Level Variables…………………………………………………136
Table 5-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Earnings Percentiles with Individual-and
Country-Level Variables………………………………………………….…..137
Table 5-3. Distribution of MWSI and Gender Earnings Gaps…………….……….140
Table 5-4. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Log Wage by
Gender…………………………………………………………………..……...140
Table 5-5. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Wage
Percentile by Gender………………………………………….…………...…..141

vii

Table 6-1. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job Security Perception with Individual
and Country-Level Variables………………………………………………....153
Table 6-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Employment Security Perception with
Individual and Country-Level Variables……………… ……………..……..156
Table 6-3. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job Loss Worry with Individual and
Country-Level Variables………………………………………………..…….161
Table 6-4. Three Types of Country Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job Security
by Gender…………………………………………………………………..…..166
Table 6-5. Three Types of Country Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment
Security by Gender……………………………………………..……………...166
Table 6-6. Two Types of Country Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job Loss Worry
by Gender…………………………………..…………………………………..167
Table 7-1. Flexicurity Matrix by the Level of Flexibility and Security ……..……..171

viii

List of Figures
Figure 1-1. Timeline of Flexicurity…………………………………...………………….3
Figure 1-2. Employment Rates by Gender in the 2000s………………………...……...9
Figure 1-3. Part-Time Employment Rates by Gender in the1990s and the 2000s…..10
Figure 1-4. Female Full-Time and Part-Time Employment Rates in the 1990s….....10
Figure 1-5. Female Full-Time and Part-Time Employment Rates in the 2000s….....11
Figure 2-1. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Input Indicators…………………………...38
Figure 2-2. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Process Indicators…………………………39
Figure 2-3. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Output Indicators…………………………39
Figure 2-4. Employment Transition Security (ETS) by country EU26, 2005-2006…40
Figure 4-1. Overall EPL and Female Employment Rates.…………………………..103
Figure 4-2. Regular EPL and Female Part-time Employment Rates……….…..….104
Figure 4-3. ALMP and Female Employment Rates………………………………….105
Figure 4-4. MWSI and % of Worker in Female-Type Work…………………..……106
Figure 5-1. 90/10 Earning Ratios by Overall EPL………….…….….………………128
Figure 5-2. Gender Earnings Ratios (All Employed Labor Force) ...……...……….129
Figure 5-3. Female Median Earning in Males’ n’s Earning Distribution
Percentile ………………………………………………………………...…….129
Figure 5-4. Gender Earning Ratios by Overall EPL…………………………...……131
Figure 5-5. Gender Earning Ratios by ALMP………………………...……..………131
Figure 5-6. Gender Earning Ratios by MWSI ………………………………………133
Figure 5-7. Differences in Rank by MWSI………………...……………………..…..139
Figure 6-1. Overall EPL and Job Security Perception………...…………………….145
Figure 6-2. Overall EPL and Employment Security Perception………...………….145
Figure 6-3. Regular EPL and Employment Security Perception………...…………146
Figure 6-4. ALMP and Employment Security Perception………...………………...146
Figure 6-5 Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by Overall EPL ……….147
Figure 6-6 Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by ALMP ……………...148
Figure 6-7 Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by PLMP ………..…….149
Figure 6-8 Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by MWSI………………149
Figure 6-9. The Effects of Overall EPL on Job Security by Gender……....……….152

ix

List of Acronyms
ALMP
CEC
EES
EMCO
EMU
EPCs
EPL
ESC
ESM
ETUC
ETS
EU
ICC
ILO
ISSP
LIS
LMP
MWSI
OECD
OMC
PLMP
SFO
UB
WEEP
WSII

Active Labor Market Policies
Commission of the European Communities
European Employment Strategy
The Council’s Employment Committee of European Union
Economic and Monetary Union
Employment-Promotion Contracts
Employment Protection Legislation
Effort-State-Challenges approach
European Social Model
European Trade Union Confederation
Employment Transition Security
European Union
Interclass Correlation
International Labor Organization
International Social Survey Programme
Luxembourg Income Study
Labor Market Policies
Modified Welfare State Intervention Index
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Open Methods of Coordination
Passive Labor Market Policies
Stock-Flow-Outcome approach
Unemployment Benefit
Welfare State Exit Entry Project
Welfare State Intervention Index

x

Chapter 1. Background: Flexicurity Policy and Gender
Equality
I. The Emergence of Flexicurity as an EU Employment Strategy
While employers have pursued greater flexibility in the postwar European labor
market and neoliberal governments have intentionally enhanced the flexibility of labor
market employment restrictions to attack the high unemployment rate, most European
countries with long traditions of labor movements have also strongly defended labor rights.
Consequently, the concept of flexicurity was proposed to reconcile more flexible
employment1 relationships and declining job security (Tangian, 2007). Although several
scholars contend that flexicurity is only a special Dutch and Danish phenomenon, it is also
addressed as the EU-level employment strategy. For example, the EU proposed this
concept at the Lisbon summit in 2000, and the European Commission adopted flexicurity
as a top theme after the 2006 meeting in Villach (European Commission 2006a, 2006b).
Dutch sociologist Hans Adriaansens, a member of the Dutch Scientific Council of
Government Policy, first proposed the concept of flexicurity. In 1997 the Dutch parliament
passed the Flexibility and Security Act, which was enacted two years later. This act’s
specific goal is to allow employers to make greater use of temporary work while
simultaneously guaranteeing atypical workers2 and typical workers more equal status as

Flexible employment indicates that workers can have more freedom to arrange when, where, and how to
work. However, it also means decreasing job security (by loosening employment protection legislation) and
enhancing employment security (via more active labor market policies) as compensation.
2
Atypical workers are workers not on permanent contracts or in full-time jobs.

1

1

well as similar levels of social protection. Generally, the Dutch and Danish labor market
models are praised as two realistic and successful examples of flexicurity (European
Commission, 2006b; Viebrock and Clasen, 2009).
Several studies suggest that the term flexicurity was first employed in the 1990s by
Danish Social Democratic prime minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Danish flexicurity
differs markedly from the Dutch form, emphasizing three crucial elements: low
employment protection, extensive unemployment benefits, and active labor market policies.
These are collectively known in Denmark as the “golden triangle.”
The successful labor market performance of the Netherlands and Denmark in the
1990s aroused interest in flexicurity in academic circles as well as in the political
community and among policymakers (Keune and Jepsen, 2007). In 1997, an EU
Commission green paper made explicit reference to flexicurity, saying it aims “to strike the
right balance between flexibility and security in the field of modernizing work organization”
(European Commission, 1997). In 2006, the pathways to flexicurity were the main theme
of the green paper Modernising Labor Law, and in 2007, the EU Council endorsed the
publication Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity, which had been issued by the EU
Commission, and pledged to assist member states “in the establishment and
implementation of flexicurity strategies which fully take into account their own respective
specific challenges, probabilities and circumstances” (European Commission, 2007, p.9).
The following year, the commission launched a public initiative called the Mission for
Flexicurity, which officially advocates for flexicurity as European labor market policy.
(Figure 1-1 provides a concise history and timeline of flexicurity’s development.)

2

Figure 1-1. Timeline of Flexicurity

Flexicurity must be understood within the broader economic and political contexts
of the European social model (ESM) and the European employment strategy (EES) if we
are to understand why it was accepted so quickly as part of the EU-level policy agenda.
Keune and Jepsen (2007) argue that, in addition to the fact that implementations of
flexicurity in Denmark and the Netherlands were widely hailed as successful, many
perceived the concept as an alternative to the neoliberal discourse of the labor market that
dominated debate during the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, the EU accepted flexicurity
so quickly because it “falls into the realm of the . . . EES” (Keune and Jepsen 2007, p.9).
Though a positive consensus regarding the merits of flexicurity was arrived at relatively
quickly, further implementation of the strategy is still the subject of dynamic interactions
between the EU Commission, Council, Parliament, member states, and social partners (e.g.,
3

trade unions and employers’ associations).
The EES is a prime example of EU soft regulation, including the open methods of
coordination (OMC)—for example, guidelines and recommendations, sets of indicators for
monitoring, and policy-learning processes—monitored in large part via member states’
peer review (Ashiagbor, 2004). The most crucial drawback of this soft regulation is the
lack of clear sanctions, and the EES is usually contrasted unfavorably with the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), which sets out clear sanctions of 0.2% of GDP as “noninterest-bearing deposit[s]” to the EU Commission as a type of fine (Mortensen, 2013). It
is through soft regulation that member states are asked to translate EU-level policy into
national labor law. For example, the European Part-Time Work Directive was agreed upon
in 1997, the Fixed-Term Work Directive in 1999, and the Temporary Agency Work
Directive in 2008. The main ideas behind these directives are to ensure that atypical
workers have the same rights and benefits as regular workers and to redress the labor
market segmentation associated with a multiplicity of different contract types (Fudge,
2013). Because directives have vertical direct effects but lack horizontal direct effects, 3
Fudge argues that these measures can be viewed as existing between the traditional
definitions of soft and hard law.
Several critiques note a tricky situation: that there is no official definition and are
no concrete standards to inspect the effects of flexicurity. Despite the lack of official
standards, several scholars still attempt to develop an analytical scheme to explore the
balance between flexibility and security. Wilthagen and Tros (2004) propose a flexicurity

In European law, vertical direct effects protect individuals’ rights against the power of the state, which
means that individuals can invoke a European provision in relation to the state. Horizontal direct effects are
consequences of the relations between individuals (Europa Summaries of EU legislation,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14547_en.htm).

3

4

matrix to trace this policy: in regard to flexibility, there are external numerical flexibility,
internal numerical flexibility, functional flexibility, and wage flexibility. The four aspects
of security, however, include job security, employment security, income (social) security,
and combination security. 4 Job security means the extent of worry about losing one’s
current job, and employment security means the extent of worry about finding a new job
that is at least as good as the current one. These researchers contend this matrix can be used
as “a heuristic tool empirically to trace flexicurity policies as specific trade-offs or at least
interconnections between flexibility and security.”
In this project, I choose job security and employment security as my analytical
targets because the main idea behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to
employment security by enhancing active labor market policies (ALMP) (Origo and Pagani,
2009). ALMP refers to training, lifelong learning, job creation programs and job-search
assistance.
The concept of combination security refers to “the certainty of being able to
combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations”; Tros (2004) further
explains it as a type of work-family balance. But it seems that only Wilthagen and Tros
stress the importance of combination security and the relationship between gender equality
and combination security. Interestingly, even Wilthagen and Tros (2004) acknowledge that
“flexicurity strategies and policies are usually not referred to as such by policy makers and
legislators” (my emphasis). This finding means that combination security and gender
equality may not be a priority in the policymakers’ blueprint, but these remain core values
that many scholars care about. To address this lacuna, I consciously adopt a welfare state

4

The definitions of each kind of flexibility and security will be introduced in Chapter 2.
5

intervention index 5 as the index of combination security, which illustrates specific
countries’ efforts regarding welfare family policies.

II. Flexicurity and Gender Equality
When the flexicurity strategy was developed as EU-level policy, the four key foci
were (1) ALMP, (2) lifelong learning, (3) reformed, modern social security systems, and
(4) flexible and reliable contractual arrangements. These four principles, however, seem
only to support the ultimate goal of full employment (Lewis and Plomien, 2009). In
addition, while the goal of gender equality focuses only on the female employment rate,
the EU 2007 annual report views the Lisbon target of 60 percent for women’s labor market
participation by 2010 as having been “achieved.” As a result, researchers have begun to
pay more attention to young and older people’s employment issues (CEC, 2007b).6
Official EU statements have firmly stated that flexicurity will enhance gender
equality. For instance, one of the EU’s eight common principles of flexicurity is that it
“should support gender equality, by promoting equal access to quality employment for
women and men and offering measures to reconcile work, family and private life”
(European Commission, 2007). The same document added that this goal should be
implemented “by extending provisions on parental leave for fathers [and] providing better
access to childcare facilities” (30), indicating the Commission’s recognition that familyrelated policies are vital for enhancing female employment with the wider goal of

The definitions of this welfare state intervention index will be discussed in Chapter 2.
According this article, after the Lisbon target of 60 percent for women’s employment rate is achieved,
they (EU) will start to focus on other new target groups, such as young and older people.

5

6

6

“reducing gender segregation and improving the situation as regards employment and
social security and transitions” (34). Regarding flexicurity in particular, EU Commission
staffers contended that the strategy would not only improve the situation of women on
fixed-term contracts and in part-time jobs but also promote women’s participation in
“lifelong learning policies and active labor market policies” (p.21). Finally, these
researchers suggested that flexicurity will “reduce gender gaps in employment,
unemployment and pay.”
To judge from this announcement, it would seem that women had been carefully
integrated into the four main flexicurity strategies. But the European Parliament has
continually proposed the lack of gender equality concerns in flexicurity, and they have
doubted that “the Commission communication on flexicurity sets out the principle of
equality between women and men; its formulation is weak as it does not challenge the
fundamental inequality between women and men encountered with regard to access to
participation in the labor market and equal sharing of unpaid work” (European Parliament,
2007). In addition, Smith and Villa (2010) note the ever-declining role of gender equality
in the EES, suggesting that while the EES is largely based on soft law, it lacks the longevity
of hard law when priorities change. These researchers also observe that the Europe 2020
strategy still accentuates the quantity of jobs rather than their quality.
Furthermore, a number of feminist scholars contend that these claims of gender
equality were mere rhetoric that may have pushed women into the labor market without
due consideration of the quality of the jobs they obtained.

III. Feminist Critiques of Flexicurity
Women are usually overrepresented in flexible work but tend not to be entitled to
7

unemployment benefits or other work security benefits. As Figure 1-3 shows, women’s
part-time employment rates are much higher than men’s, and women with children report
even higher levels of part-time employment than men do. Men with children under the age
of six, by contrast, report somewhat lower part-time employment rates than do women with
children under the age of six. This phenomenon is at the crux of Cipollone et al.’s (2014)
argument that the liabilities inherent in flexible employment are increasingly borne by
women and that women who do flexible work are less likely to have access to benefits and
active employment security policies. Fredman (2004) notes that women are
overrepresented in nonstandard work, which restricts their access to many important
worker entitlements, such as unemployment benefits, which full-time workers regularly
receive. Furthermore, Fredman describes this phenomenon as “the broken promise of
flexicurity.” Lewis and Plomien (2009) contend that gendered patterns in flexible
employment tend to exacerbate sexual segregation and gender inequality and that
flexicurity has not addressed men’s and women’s fundamentally different experiences of
the labor market. Therefore, many feminists contend that flexicurity strategy has not
addressed the unequal distribution of unpaid care work, which is mostly performed by
women. As Lewis (2001) notes, the flexicurity strategy assumes an “individualized adult
worker model family,” but this assumption ignores the distribution of unpaid care work.
Additionally, most flexicurity documents seem to assume that security is achieved
through employment or wages and that part-time work is therefore a benign pathway to
reconciling family and work responsibilities. Consequently, flexicurity strategies
emphasize improving the female employment rate rather than job security or work quality.
Critics of flexicurity have challenged this assumption, arguing that gender equality cannot

8

be guaranteed solely by securing employment for women. Lewis (2001) further argues that
most work-family policies were adopted to support the goal of bringing more women into
the workforce, but insufficient attention has been paid to the quality of work and the
working conditions women endure. For example, the EU Commission’s job-quality
indicators are “access and participation” (CEC, 2003).
Similarly to Lewis and Plomien (2009), Fredman (2004) notes that women are
overrepresented in nonstandard work. From the figures, we can observe the patterns for
male and female employment in the 1990s and 2000s. Although female employment rates
have increased considerably over the postwar period (OECD, 2002), in most countries, as
Figure 1-2 shows, male employment rates are still higher than those of females.

Figure 1-2. Employment Rates by Gender in the 2000s7 (Source: LIS)8

All the tables and figures presented here are assumed in the 2000s. Some captions consciously mention in
the 1990s and 2000s, and it is because there are the same topics in this research for two different times.
8
These years’ data are also used in subsequent chapters, which means that I chose these years’ data to link
with the empirical work that comes in later chapters.

7
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Figure 1-3. Part-Time Employment Rates by Gender in the 1990s and 2000s (Source:
LIS)

Figure 1-4. Female Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates in the 1990s (Source: LIS)

10

Figure 1-5. Female Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates in the 2000s (Source:
LIS)9
Figure 1-3 shows part-time employment rates for males and females in the 1990s and
2000s. Female part-time employment was highest in the Netherlands, where it reached
almost 60 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, while the female part-time
employment rate decreased slightly in several countries, there was a marked increase in
Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy.
Compared to women, men’s share of part-time work in total male employment is
quite low. In both the 1990s and the 2000s, men’s part-time employment rates were below
10 percent in all countries. The most important phenomenon is that the female-to-male
ratio in part-time employment increased greatly from the 1990s into the 2000s in some
countries; in the Netherlands, for instance, it increased from 6.6 to 11.2.

Part-time employment rate in Norway, Denmark, Sweden are from the OECD database (Labour Market
Statistics).

9
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Figures 1-4 and 1-5 show the full- and part-time female employment rates in the
1990s and 2000s. In most countries, full-time employment rates increased. Part-time
employment rates increased in certain countries, however, while in others they did not
change notably. In the Netherlands, the part-time employment rate increased from 30
percent to 43 percent, while full-time employment increased from 20 percent to 31 percent.
By contrast, in Spain, full-time employment increased from 26 percent to 54 percent, and
part-time employment increased only from 3 percent to 7 percent. These patterns varied
among countries; therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to further analyze these changes,
particularly how flexicurity policies have affected them.
Many important worker entitlements, including unemployment benefits, are
provided regularly to full-time workers and not offered to nonstandard workers. As
mentioned before, a number of feminist scholars have addressed the ramifications of
flexicurity (Lewis, 2001; Fredman, 2004) and the failure to acknowledge the unequal
distribution of unpaid care work that primarily women do for children, the disabled, and
the olderly. Although some EU-level documents mention childcare systems, they often
seem to portray such systems merely as instruments for achieving female employment
goals. For example, the Joint Employment Report argued that expansion of affordable,
accessible, high-quality childcare provisions was needed specifically “to allow both
parents to work” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a). To the extent that
the goal of gender equality is seen narrowly as increasing women’s employment
possibilities, women may take on more precarious work so that they can also assume (or
persist in) major unpaid caregiving responsibilities. For example, the Dutch “one-and-ahalf” earner model allows women to accept both work and family responsibilities but yields

12

a large share of female part-time workers. Although some scholars contend that this policy
was built from the bottom up and is well accepted (Visser, 2002), Lewis and Plomien (2009)
question whether governments should acquiesce to or even applaud this “voluntary”
inequality. These researchers’ answer appears to be a resounding no: within flexicurity
strategy, gender equality should not be regarded as a mere stepping-stone on the path to
full employment but rather as an end in itself. As a result, I argue that gender equality
cannot be only an instrument for full employment but needs to be an individual goal in the
flexicurity strategy.
Flexicurity has also been criticized for promoting strategies that reduce women’s
benefits from ALMP, at least relative to men’s benefits. Lewis and Plomien (2009) suggest
that men benefit somewhat more from employment activation measures than women do,
and Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008) note that, although certain ALMP have more
positive effects for women than for men, such effects are discernible only in areas with low
female labor participation rates.
To date, such critiques have not proposed practical quantitative indicators that
would help us examine the relationship between flexicurity and gender equality (Fredman
2004; Hansen, 2007; Jepsen, 2004; Lewis and Plomien, 2009). Thus, while the research
discussed above reminds us that the relationship between flexicurity and gender equality
cannot be taken for granted, it addresses this issue only theoretically. Although some
scholars have employed descriptive statistics to illustrate women’s overrepresentation in
temporary or fixed-term work, none have analyzed this phenomenon more deeply or
examined other labor market outcomes, including but not limited to female labor force
participation rates and gender wage gaps. Thus, the major purpose of the proposed research
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is to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative methods.
Finally, the research cited above pays little attention to workers’ subjective sense of
employment security. Cheng and Chan (2008) found that job insecurity correlates with low
job satisfaction, low organizational commitment, inferior work performance, and even poor
health. Green (2009) found that workers in transitional and developing economies worry
the most about insecurity and that minority groups—including female, less-educated, and
older workers—suffer more from job insecurity than others. As Origo and Pagani (2009)
argue, the main idea behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to employment
security, but whether this has been achieved in practice remains an open question. For
example, in Denmark’s style of flexicurity, low employment protection may result in lower
job security (i.e., a greater risk of losing one’s job), even as strong ALMP guarantees higher
employment security in the form of greater probability that a person will find another job.
Conventional wisdom holds that longer tenure leads to improved job and employment
security. According to Auer and Cazes (2003), however, the relationship between tenure
and perceived security still requires further exploration. For example, these researchers
observe that Denmark’s workers had lower average employment tenures than those in other
EU countries but that a greater share of Danish workers perceived their employment as
secure. In other words, the relatively lower employment protection legislation (EPL) may
have caused them to lose jobs more easily, but the more developed ALMP also allowed
them more easily to find new jobs, which suggests greater employment security. By
contrast, workers in Japan enjoyed a high average tenure but reported greater insecurity,
probably due to their country’s lower levels of social protection. In contrast to both Auer
and Cazes’s (2003) work, which analyzes only average tenure and average subjective
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security, and Green’s (2009) research, which focuses only on how individual factors
influence workers’ subjective security, this dissertation will analyze macro and micro data
together to explore how these two levels may influence individual workers’ job security,
employment security, and job satisfaction, with special reference to gender differences,
gender equality, and flexicurity policy.
Consequently, it is important to be sensitive to the effects of these two different
types of EPL (regular job EPL and temporary job EPL)10 and to the asymmetry, trade-off,
or balance between them, particularly the effects for different genders. The second chapter
will provide a more detailed discussion regarding the origins, effects, and debates of the
concept flexicurity. The third chapter will introduce the dissertation’s methodology,
including the methods, data, and indicators. The effects of flexicurity on labor market
outcomes, gender earning gaps, and subjective job security perception will be explored
separately in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Finally, the seventh chapter will present a discussion and
the study’s conclusions.

EPL is a composite index, and it measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or
groups of workers. A more detailed definition of EPL will be introduced in Chapter 3, footnote 31.
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Chapter 2. Origins, Operations, and Effects: A Critical Review
of Flexicurity

I. Preface: The Partial Deregulation of Labor Markets in the 1990s
Flexicurity generally means enhancing flexibility in response to rapid changes
while simultaneously strengthening security for minority groups in the labor market. To
trace the development of flexicurity more completely requires starting from the partial
deregulation of labor markets in the 1990s.
Whereas in the 1970s the discussion of unemployment focused on shocks, the
persistence of high unemployment for another two decades shifted the discussion from
shocks to labor market institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). There is a rough
consensus that in Europe since the 1970s, labor market rigidities (due to the EPL and a
strong unionization tradition) and less competitive product markets have contributed to
high unemployment rates and a low capacity to create jobs (Lodovici, 2000). EPL is a
composite indicator that can measure the “procedural inconveniences” for firing in regular
contracts, including the period of notice and severance pay for individual dismissals and
the difficulty of individual and massive dismissals. It is argued that tight regulations on
firing may deter hiring, thereby reducing labor demand, and hamper a firm’s ability to
address market uncertainty and economic structural fluctuation. In particular, after the
OECD’s Jobs Study (1994) was published, most economists and experts recommended
enhancing labor market flexibility and easing employment protection provisions, as this
report’s conclusions suggest (Lodovici, 2000; Noelke, 2015; Saint-Paul, 1996).
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The OECD (2004) report suggests that a process of convergence across OECD
countries has occurred regarding EPL, but this progress has been driven largely by an
easing of regulation in countries where EPL was relatively strict at the end of the 1980s.
While time-series data on the EPL indicators show an overall decline in the stringency of
dismissal regulations, most of the changes that occurred in the 1990s focused on temporary
rather than regular employment. In other words, these reforms combined eased temporary
job regulations while leaving existing job security provisions for regular or open-ended
jobs’ regulations unaltered (OECD 2004, p.63). However, it is interesting that the OECD
report also indicates that the relative position of countries across the spectrum of EPL has
not changed notably since the 1980s. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada remain the least-regulated countries, whereas southern European countries are
still characterized by the most stringent provisions. Two countries are exceptions worth
noting: France, which originally ranked in the middle of the spectrum, has become among
the most regulated nations; Italy presents an example of the opposite end in changing
regulations.
At the same time, the major differences of overall EPL across those countries
should be attributed to the different EPL regulations for temporary employment. As the
OECD (2004) report suggests, France, Greece, Spain, Mexico, and Turkey present the most
stringent overall EPL among OECD countries while not having particularly rigid
provisions for regular contracts. In other words, the variation of overall EPL is highly
influenced by the variation in temporary job regulations, and the most prevalent means of
reform are easing the use of fixed-term contracts or facilitating the use of workers hired
from temp agencies. Generally, in the 1990s, the changes in provisions for temporary
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employment accounted for changes in overall EPL in two-thirds of countries. There
remained several exceptions, however, among them low-regulated countries adding
restrictions on temporary employment, such as France in the late 1980s and Hungary,
Poland, and New Zealand.
Furthermore, it is argued that the loosening of temporary contract regulations serves
as a way to circumvent stringent rules on regular contracts, particularly in countries that
face political deadlocks for loosening EPL for regular jobs. In other words, the deregulation
of employment protection legislation is a partial reform that eases the use of temporary
contracts but maintains existing provisions for regular jobs (OECD, 2004; European
Commission, 2006). As Saint-Paul (1996) explains, incumbent employees are more
numerous and better organized than the unemployed, meaning that the former usually exert
greater political influence and power on labor market policy reforms. Furthermore, twotiered reforms are particularly achieved when unemployment rises, because these reforms
do not increase employees’ exposure risk to unemployment. By contrast, across-the-board
reductions in firing costs will be strongly opposed in times of rising unemployment or sharp
recession because such reforms threaten incumbent employees’ job security. In other words,
the need to maintain social consensus or obtain political support is a crucial determinant
for labor market reforms. Bentolila et al. (2008) even propose a useful indicator of political
viability of labor reforms, the ratio of the number of workers under permanent contracts,
to the sum of total employees (permanent and temporary) and the unemployed. If the ratio
is greater than 0.5, it means that the workers under permanent contracts (or the “insiders”)
are the median voters, and these workers under permanent contracts also the target the labor
unions try to protect. By contrast, if the ratio is below 0.5, it means that temporary job
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workers and the unemployed become the union’s target group. Bentolila et al. (2008)
further argue that the first Spanish two-tiered employment promotion contract (EPC)
reforms in 1984 can be understood as the only politically feasible way to create more job
possibilities while the unions opposed altering the status quo; the indicator was well above
0.5 in 1984. After this reform, temporary contracts could be used almost without constraint
but only for seasonal or temporary needs. However, the indicator was lowest (0.48) in 1993
due to the widespread use of fixed-term contracts and the further increase in unemployment;
therefore, in 1994, EPCs were virtually eliminated and persisted only for workers older
than 45 and for long-term unemployment. It is argued that the government endeavors to
restore the “causality principle” 11 in Spanish labor law (Toharia and Malo, 2000). In
addition to political power, in 1997 the government attempted to make a new balance (or
trade-off) between greater flexibility for permanent workers 12 and less flexibility for
temporary ones.
Taken together, while neoliberal governments intentionally enhance the flexibility
of employment restrictions in the labor market to attack the high unemployment rate, most
European Union countries with long traditions of labor movements strongly defend labor
rights. In this context, the concept of flexicurity was proposed to reconcile more flexible
employment relationships and declining job security (Tangian, 2007).

While temporary contracts could be used almost without constraint in 1984, to restore the causality
principle means to restore stricter regulations on temporary contracts, so that only seasonal work or other
temporary work can adopt temporary contracts.
12
There is a new type of permanent contract with severance payments in cases of unfair dismissal lowered
to 33 days’ wages per year of service with a maximum of twenty-four months’ wages, but it is restricted to
workers under 30 or over 45, which can encourage more young and middle-aged workers into permanent
contract jobs. The trade-off is to impose stricter conditions on the use of temporary contracts and the
elimination of EPCs (Toharia and Malo, 2000; Bentolila et al., 2008).

11
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II. The Origins and the Debate: The Concept of Flexicurity
Origins and Definitions of Flexicurity
A number of scholars have contended that flexicurity was the European alternative
to the “Anglo Saxon flexibility of the labor market mantra” (Auer,2010, p.371), which can
serve as an alternative to US-styled flexibility and the neoliberal view of labor market
deregulation (Keune and Jepsen, 2007; Keune, 2008; Auer, 2010). As Keune (2008)
contends, the fallacy was that this perspective had become too apparent (which means the
OECD was aware that deregulation is not valid for fighting unemployment), and the
“OECD retracted many aspects of its radical stance” (95). (Compared with the OECD,13
which loudly advocated for deregulation in their 1994 Jobs Study). Even the European
Commission cited Wilthagen’s (1998) statement about flexicurity: “in response to the
dominant deregulation of 1980s, the notion of flexicurity claims that investment in social
policies is not a wasteful burden but instead constitutes an economic production factor”
(p.13). This statement aptly resonates with Esping-Andersen’s (2002) idea of the social
investment state.
As for the exact origins of the concept of flexicurity, most scholars agree that this
concept was first proposed and employed in speeches and interviews by the Dutch
sociologist and government policy adviser Hans Adriaansens in 1995—particularly in the
context of the preparation of the Flexibility and Security Act, the goal of which was to
allow employers greater use of temporary work while guaranteeing more equal rights and
social security for atypical workers (European Commission, 2006b; Wilthagen and Tros ,

Although the OECD 1994 Jobs Study strongly advocated deregulation, OECD has since changed its
stance.
13
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2004; Keune and Jepsen, 2007). As Barbier (2007) further argues, these endeavors to
reform the labor market pertained to a long-term process of reducing inequalities between
atypical and standard employees in the Dutch context, which only reemphasizes that the
innovation of flexicurity needs to be understood in a broader context as a response to the
consequences of the partial deregulation of the labor markets in the 1990s.
Afterward, Wilthagen (1998) took up and modified this concept in his 1998
discussion paper. Interestingly, until 2006, the European Commission (2006b) held that
“the relevant literature is still developing and there is no single definition of the concept
that is currently universally accepted.” That said, there is still an apparent consensus
regarding the two origins of flexicurity: in the Netherlands and in Denmark. Consequently,
the European Commission introduced two sets of definitions in their report Employment in
Europe 2006.
The Dutch scholar Wilthagen and his colleagues proposed the first set (Wilthagen
1998, 2002; Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; European
Commission, 2006b). Wilthagen was considered probably the main actor to contribute to
this word’s installation in Dutch policy forums, such as in academia (Barbier, 2007). For
example, he proposed flexicurity as a trade-off nexus (see Table 2-1), and this definition
was also cited in Employment in Europe 2006.

Table 2-1. Flexibility versus Security Trade-Offs (Source: Wilthagen and Tros 2004)
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According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004), a more comprehensive definition of flexicurity
is
a degree of job, employment, income, and “combination” security that facilitates
the labor market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively weak position
and allows for enduring and high quality labor market participation and social
inclusion, while at the same time providing a degree of numerical (both external
and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labor markets’ (and
individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in
order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and productivity. (170)
Furthermore, more detailed definitions of these four dimensions of flexibility and security
are provided below (Wilthagen et al. 2003; Wilthagen and Tros 2004):
• External numerical flexibility: the difficulty or ease of hiring and firing
employees and the extent to which fixed-term employment contracts can be used
• Internal numerical flexibility: the difficulty or ease of changing the quantity of
labor a firm uses without having recourse to either hiring or separations (through
changes in working hours, use of part-time or overtime work, etc.)
• Functional flexibility: the difficulty or ease of changing the working organization
or the ability of workers and enterprises to adapt to new challenges (multitasking,
job rotations, etc.)
• Wage flexibility: the degree of responsiveness of wage costs to economic
conditions
• Job security: expectations regarding the tenures of specific jobs
• Employment security: expectations regarding remaining in work (not necessarily
with the same employer)
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• Income security: the degree of income protection in the event that paid work
ceases
• Combination security: the ability to combine paid work with other private or
social activities
Furthermore, it is argued that one of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve
a shift from security within a job to security of a job—or a shift from job security (stability
of the current job) to employment security (lifelong employment opportunities and abilities)
(EMCO, 2006; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Origo and Pagani, 2009). Consequently, one of
the sections of this dissertation will explore the effects of flexicurity policies on job security
and employment security. In addition, it is interesting that when Wilthagen (2002) first
proposed this nexus, the title of this table was “Flexibility versus Security Trade-Offs in
the Netherlands,” whereas in a later paper, the title was retitled “Flexibility versus Security
Trade-Offs” (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004), which suggests the process of drawing from
empirical reforms in the Netherlands to portray a new regulatory approach that could be
promoted to EU member states and elsewhere.
As for the second set of definitions for flexicurity provided in Employment in
Europe 2006, there is Denmark’s “golden triangle” model, which includes relatively loose
employment protections, extensive unemployment benefits, and high spending on ALMP.
Denmark is also argued to be an originator of flexicurity; for example, research suggests
that the term was first employed in the 1990s by the country’s Social Democratic prime
minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, who commended his incumbency (1993–2001) as a
crucial period for the realization of flexicurity (Barbier, 2007).
In addition, while several scholars consciously note the need to distinguish between
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the dissemination processes in academia and the political arena (Barbier, 2007), we can see
that there is a clear pattern between these two spheres. First, flexicurity attracted
widespread attention in academia. While the concept was first proposed in the Netherlands
in the mid-1990s by a sociologist (also a policy adviser in the government) and in Denmark
(although they mentioned only the combination of the flexible labor market and individual
social security, not the exact word flexicurity), this concept was quickly developed by
Wilthagen14 and his colleagues (Wilthagen, 1998; 2002; Wilthagen and Rogowski, 2002;
Wilthagen and Tros, 2004) as well as by academics in other European countries, such as
Denmark (Madsen, 2003, 2004), Belgium (Peeters et al. 2008), and Germany (Tangian
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, this concept even spread widely beyond Europe—
for instance, to the United States (Kuttner, 2008), Australia (Belchamber, 2010), and Asia
(Lue and Park, 2013).
Second, politicians deliberately use this term to portray their labor market reform
policies. For example, besides Danish Social Democratic prime minister Poul Nyrup
Rasmussen (1993–2001), his Liberal successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–2009),
claimed he invented flexicurity, although a number of scholars commented that the
emergence of flexicurity is a policy strategy in a specific historical context, not a specific
person’s innovation (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Bredgaard and Daemmrich, 2012).
Third, the successful labor-market performance of the Netherlands and Denmark
in the 1990s and the intense discussion in academia both aroused interest in flexicurity
among policy makers at the EU level. In addition, while some scholars (such as Wilthagen)

He was later nominated as one of the seven members of the “Expert group on fexicurity” by the
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs in the European Commission, and he was also the
chair of this expert group (Barbier, 2007; Klindt, 2011).

14
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were “naturally” involved in the policy making process as both scholars and experts, it is
not surprising that this concept seems quickly to have become the consensus labor market
remedy at the EU level. In 1997, an EU Commission green paper made explicit reference
to flexicurity and described its aim as “strik[ing] the right balance between flexibility and
security in the field of modernizing work organization” (European Commission, 1997). In
2006, the pathways to flexicurity were the main theme of the green paper Modernising
Labor Law, and in 2007, the EU Council endorsed the publication Towards Common
Principles of Flexicurity, which the EU Commission had issued. Flexicurity was also
incorporated into European Employment Strategy 2007 (and the Lisbon Agenda): guideline
twenty-one calls for member states “to promote flexibility combined with employment
security” and to implement employment policies aimed at “achieving full employment,
improving quality and productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial
cohesion.” In 2008, the Commission launched a public initiative called Mission for
Flexicurity, which officially advocates for flexicurity as European labor market policy.
Although flexicurity is usually criticized for its openness and vagueness (Keune
and Jepsen, 2007; USLU, 2016), the EU level provides some clear flexicurity guidelines
for member states, such as these eight common principles:
(1) Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon
Strategy, create more and better jobs, modernise labor markets, and promote good
work through new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability,
employment and social cohesion.
(2) Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexible and reliable
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective
active labor market policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social
protection systems.
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(3) Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labor market or working
life model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the specific
circumstances of each Member State. Flexicurity implies a balance between rights
and responsibilities of all concerned. Based on the common principles, each
Member State should develop its own flexicurity arrangements. Progress should be
effectively monitored.
(4) Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive labor
markets overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out of
work. The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared work, in unstable
employment, or at the margins of the labor market need to be provided with better
probabilities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier access to
work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure
employment. Support should be available to all those in employment to remain
employable, progress and manage transitions both in work and between jobs.
(5) Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are equally
important and should be promoted. Sufficient contractual flexibility must be
accompanied by secure transitions from job to job. Upward mobility needs to be
facilitated, as well as between unemployment or inactivity and work. High-quality
and productive workplaces, good organisation of work, and continuous upgrading
of skills are also essential. Social protection should provide incentives and support
for job transitions and for access to new employment.
(6) Flexicurity should support gender equality, by promoting equal access
to quality employment for women and men and offering measures to reconcile work,
family and private life.
(7) Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among
all stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change with a
view to socially balanced policies. While public authorities retain an overall
responsibility, the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation
of flexicurity policies through social dialogue and collective bargaining is of crucial
importance.
(8) Flexicurity requires a cost effective allocation of resources and should
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remain fully compatible with sound and financially sustainable public budgets. It
should also aim at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially between
businesses, public authorities and individuals, with particular attention to the
specific situation of SMEs. (Auer, 2010, p.373–74)

In addition, the European Expert Group on Flexicurity also provided four
components for member states to operationalize the concept to “make flexicurity work”;
the four components are as follows (Bekker and Wilthagen 2008, p.70):
—Flexible and secure contractual arrangements and work organizations, both
from the perspective of the employer and the employee, through modern labor
laws and modern work organizations.
—Effective ALMP, which effectively help people to cope with rapid change,
unemployment spells, reintegration, and importantly, transitions to new jobs (the
element of transition security).
—Reliable and responsive lifelong learning (LLL) systems to ensure the
continuous adaptability and employability of all workers and to enable firms to
keep up productivity levels.
—Modern social security systems, which provide adequate income support and
facilitate labor market mobility; they will include provisions to help people
combine work with private and family responsibilities, such as childcare.
From the above official EU statements, we can see flexicurity is an ambitious policy
strategy. The major objective of flexicurity is to combat high unemployment rates by
loosening labor market regulations while enhancing individual workers’ employability
through ALMP that adapt to the flexible labor market situation. In addition to this major
goal, the EU official asserts that “flexicurity, as an integrated policy strategy, addresses
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many of these issues at the same time.”15 Furthermore, flexicurity, it is also argued, can
“combat asymmetries within the labor market obviously including the gender, age, and
ethnic dimensions . . . also aim at social cohesion and fighting poverty and exclusion by
spreading the benefits of safe employment and income security to all citizens” (European
Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007). To date, we can see that flexicurity not only has been
an ambitious policy strategy but was also argued to address (or need to address) many such
issues at the same time.
In addition, it is interesting that to make flexicurity seem a “fair” policy proposal
for workers and employers, the report argues that “flexicurity is in the interest of both
employees and employers.” For flexibility, they argue that “workers need ‘active’ flexibility
(i.e., flexibility geared toward their needs) to be able to combine work and private
responsibilities; companies need flexibility to anticipate and respond to changing markets
demands and circumstances” (European Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007, p.13).
Ironically, worker flexibility is usually ignored in discussions of flexicurity, while
employer flexibility, or the ease or difficulty of hiring and firing workers (also known as
EPL), becomes the major objective in debates on flexicurity. Although the EU report
actually developed indicators to measure the work-life balance for employees, this
dimension has still attracted little attention in academia. The developments of the indicators
will be reviewed more thoroughly in the next section.

Political Economy and the Critiques of Flexicurity
Flexicurity also needs to be understood in a broader economic and political context
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European Commission’s 2006 Annual Progress Report, January 25, 2006, COM (2006) 30; pp. 19–20.
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regarding the ESM and EES. Why is flexicurity being accepted so quickly in the EU-level
policy agenda? As Keune and Jepsen (2007) argue, in addition to the successful models in
Denmark and the Netherlands, flexicurity could be an alternative to the bankrupt neoliberal
discourse of the labor market, which dominated debate in the 1980s and 1990s. In other
words, the European Union accepted this concept so quickly because it “falls into the realm
of the EU’s European Employment Strategy” (Keune and Jepsen 2007, p.9). It seems a
rapid consensus, but it is still in a dynamic process of the interaction among the EU
Commission, Council, and Parliament; EU member states and social partners; Business
Europe (the employers’ organization); and the European Confederation and European
Trade Union Confederations (ETUC, the workers’ organization).
Furthermore, the EES is a main example of EU soft regulation, and soft regulation
is also known as the open methods of coordination (OMC) and includes EU guidelines and
recommendations, a set of indicators for monitoring, and policy-learning process. In
addition, the monitoring is mostly done by member states’ peer review and EU institutions’
surveillance (Ashiagbor, 2010). The most crucial drawback of soft regulation is the lack of
clear sanctions, and the soft regulation of the EES is usually contrasted with the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU); the latter sets clear sanctions of 0.2% of GDP as “noninterest-bearing deposit[s]” to the EU Commission as a type of fine (Mortensen, 2013).
However, soft regulation includes asking member states to translate the EU-level policy
agenda into national labor law. For example, the European Part-Time Work Directive was
agreed upon in 1997, the Fixed-Term Work Directive in 1999, and the Temporary Agency
Work Directive in 2008. The main ideas behind these directives are to ensure that atypical
workers have the same rights and benefits as regular workers and to attack the labor market
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segmentation associated with different forms of contracts (Fudge, 2013). Because
directives have vertical but not horizontal direct effects, Fudge (2013) argues that directives
could be viewed as being between soft and hard law measures. Furthermore, it was argued
that the 1957 Treaty of Rome left social and labor market regulations in the hands of
member states (Keune, 2008; USLU, 2016). Consequently, some researchers further argue,
compared to the EU’s concrete economic identities (such as the Euro and European Central
Bank), the lack of legitimacy and identity in the social policy field and member states’
reluctance to surrender their competencies to supranational authorities are the main reasons
for the “soft” character of the EES, the OMC, and policy concepts such as flexicurity
(Ashiagbor, 2005; USLU, 2016).
Actually, a number of studies focus on the interactions and even conflicts and
disagreements among different EU social actors (including the European Union
Commission, Council, and Parliament as well as EU member states and social partners).
For example, although the commission of the European Community’s role is usually
viewed as a disseminator of knowledge and a broker of divergent interests (Keune and
Jepsen 2007), it actually has its own preferred interpretation of flexicurity. According to
Keune (2007), the EU Commission’s view on flexicurity is quite clear:
Flexibility should be provided by low EPL and easy use of flexible contracts while
security should derive from employment security . . . Its call for modern social security
remains vague and underspecified . . . Hence the emphasis in the Commission’s
conceptualization is first of all on increasing flexibility, while security remains much less
developed.

As for the Council of the European Union, although it generally approved of the
eight principles proposed by the Commission, it still had minor revisions in its final version.
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For example, the reference to insiders and outsiders in the labor market in principles one
and four were removed. According to Mainland’s (2010) interviews with some important
decision-makers from EU-level actors, this change resulted from disapproval of this
dichotomy by some member states and the ETUC. Furthermore, the Council does not like
the connotations of “taken from the one and given to the other” (p.251). In addition, the
major difference between the Council and the Commission involves each’s perspective on
employment protection and flexibility: “The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared
work, in unstable employment, or at the margins of the labor market need to be provided
with better probabilities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier access to
work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure employment.”
According to Keune (2008), this paragraph represents a clear departure from the
Commission’s view on the need to loosen employment regulations and flexible contract
jobs. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Council contends that “Europe needs more
and joint GOOD WORK . . . Regular employment relationships are indispensable. . . . The
Member States are called upon to strengthen standard working relationships in accordance
with their national practice and to limit their circumvention by atypical employment
relationships” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a). We can see the Council
emphasizes more the strengthening of regular contract jobs, while the Commission is more
inclined toward the deregulation of the employment protection legislation.
The European Parliament also has positions that contradict those of the
Commission. For example, the Parliament has commented that “the interpretation of the
Commission’s flexicurity options is too one-sided.” It is fair to say that the Parliament’s
view is more in line with the Council’s: while the Council emphasizes the importance of
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“GOOD WORK” in capitals, the Parliament also calls for “the quality of employment.”
Furthermore, the Parliament has a more straightforward comment on the Commission’s
position related to the gender dimension: “the Commission’s communication completely
disregards the obligations and responsibilities” set out in its communications A Roadmap
for Equality between Women and Men (2006) and Tackling the Pay Gap between Women
and Men (2007). Compared to the Commission, the Parliament more strongly emphasizes
lifelong education and training to strengthen transition security, employment security, and
job security. While commenting that the Commission’s view on flexicurity was “too onesided,” the Parliament advocated “a more balanced” view on flexicurity. In other words,
while most mainstream flexicurity discourse argues that “one of the main ideas behind
flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security (stability of the current job) to employment
security (lifelong employment probabilities and abilities)” (EMCO 2006; Wilthagen 1998;
Wilthagen and Tros 2004), the Parliament still calls for improving job security (USLU
2016).
Similarly, just as there are disagreements among EU-level actors, European Union
member states also hold different perspectives on flexicurity. According to Mainland’s
(2010) analysis for the Council’s Employment Committee (EMCO), two coalitions in
EMCO that have been labeled as “minimalist” and “regulation.” Until 2006, the
“minimalist coalition” was led by the United Kingdom and associated with Denmark,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Spain.16 Poland joined this coalition after
2004. The major objective of this coalition is to minimize labor market regulations and

According to Mainland (2010), Spain joined the regulation coalition after the Socialist electoral victory
in April 2004, and this example suggests that the national election and political party inclination greatly
influenced their perspective on the EU level flexicurity debate.
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emphasize the creation of jobs over the quality of jobs. However, the “regulation coalition”
is more inclined to extensive labor market regulations and firmly insists on the balance of
flexibility and security in regard to the flexicurity debate. This coalition includes Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, Greece, and new members such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus
as well as—most importantly─the Directorate-General for Employment. According to
Mainland’s (2010) vivid analyses of the process of the development of flexicurity, it was a
painful process for the member states to reach consensus. Generally, one of the major
concerns of member states that remained skeptical about flexicurity was that the entire
flexicurity discourse overemphasizes the importance of external flexibility, or job security,
while barely mentioning the extent to which flexicurity will change the European
unemployment benefits system. Consequently, some Central and Southern European
governments and trade unions worried that flexicurity was just liberalization in disguise,
or “the sugar coating on a bitter liberalization pill” (p.242).
Mainland (2010) also mentions the influences of specific countries on the
development of flexicurity. For example, the German presidency in the first half of 2017
was highly skeptical of flexicurity and even sent a letter to the EU Commission (associated
with the Portuguese and Slovene presidencies), asking them to remove content regarding
numerical flexibility and job security (such as dismissals and terms of notice) in its work
in the communication. Although the Commission did not follow this advice, this action still
illustrates the tensions in the flexicurity debate during the process of reaching a consensus.
In addition, the Austrian presidency initiated flexicurity in the EU-level discussion; in
particular, as the United Kingdom quietly resigned from the leading position, Austria
became the most liberal one in the “minimalist coalition” (though more moderate than the
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United Kingdom, suggesting that the coalition’s position became more moderate) (Klindt
2011). The change in the French government, however, and its last-minute support of the
European social partner organizations were critical in the process of reaching the final
consensus.
Mainland (2010) concludes that reaching consensus was possible because the two
parties made mutual concessions. The supporters of flexicurity succeeded in providing a
set of concrete, common principles through the EU decision-making process, while the
skeptics succeeded in downplaying the initial emphases on the transition from job security
to employment security as well as on the divisions between insiders and outsiders.com
Consequently, due to the contested process of reaching consensus on flexicurity, it
is not surprising that one of the most common comments on flexicurity pertains to its
“vagueness,” “ambiguity,” and “openness” (Viebrock and Clasen 2009; Auer 2010; USLU
2016). However, there are two different views on its vagueness. Some scholars contended
that this vagueness is the one of the crucial shortcomings of flexicurity, because some
diametrically opposed views or policy strategies can be plausibly argued

to fit the

flexicurity logics. Consequently, Burroni and Keune (2011) doubt that flexicurity will
become an invalid policy guide 17 due to its inclusiveness to almost all types of labor
market practices, even contradictory ones. Furthermore, Burroni and Keune (2011) note
that ambiguity makes all EU-level policy actors endorse the importance of flexicurity at an
abstract level despite their having very different interpretations of and views on how to
translate flexicurity into practical policy strategies. For example, while Business Europe
and the ETUC both seem to approve of the importance of flexicurity, they actually have

17

It means it almost includes all types of labor market policies, even contradictory ones.
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very different policy preferences on how to “embody” belief in flexicurity. Regarding
employment protection legislation, Business Europe contends that labor market regulation
needs more flexible procedures to fulfill companies’ need to fiercely compete in the market,
while the ETUC asserts that the excessive flexibility of labor market regulation is the main
cause of precarious jobs. Furthermore, Business Europe argues that loosening EPL will
create more jobs and employment probabilities, while ETUC is concerned more that
employment protections can serve as a buffer to give redundant workers time to look for
new jobs. In regard to unemployment benefits, Business Europe advocates a more
“employment-friendly” social security system, which means the benefits should not be
generous enough to discourage rapid reentry into the labor market. Meanwhile, the ETUC
contends that a comprehensive social security system and generous unemployment benefits
could be important economic supports that help the unemployed to find suitable new jobs
(Business Europe 2007; ETUC 2007a, 2007b). We can see that these two social partners
still have very divergent interpretations of flexicurity; despite their both seeming to agree
on the broad concept of flexicurity, Business Europe presents most of the employers’
opinions, whereas ETUC adheres to labor’s rights and interests. Burroni and Keune (2011)
further argue that the flexicurity discourses from the two camps “have not overcome this
labor-capital divide or brought the two sides closer to each other” (79).
However, the advantage of this ambiguity is to allow everybody to place their
preferred versions under flexicurity’s broad umbrella (Auer, 2010), and USLU (2016)
argues that the Commission of the European Communities (2007b) has “deliberately
instrumentalized the concept’s ambiguity in order to absorb all the main actors into the
debate in line with its own policy preferences” (p.237).
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The ambiguity of the definition of flexicurity is also a double-edged sword (like the
flexicurity concept itself): it allows every important EU-level actor’s policy preferences to
be included under this big umbrella, but this vagueness also suggests that it is not enough
to serve as a concrete labor-market reform guideline. Consequently, Keune (2008) has a
more pessimistic comment on this situation: “today flexicurity is a contested concept that
is used by a variety of actors to promote their traditional views on labor market reforms”
(p.92).

Monitoring Flexicurity: Development of the Measurements of Flexicurity
Despite these conceptual debates about flexicurity, there are still expert groups
working diligently to develop many useful, comprehensive, and occasionally complicated
indicators and measurements to assess flexicurity. For example, in one report titled Towards
a Methodology to Monitor and Analyze Flexicurity (FLC) and Work-Life Balance (WLB)
Policies in the Member States of the EU, Muffels and his colleagues (2010) propose two
frameworks of measurements: “a Stock-Flow-Outcome approach (SFO),” which views
flexicurity as a “state of affairs,” and an “Effort-State-Challenges approach (ESC)” that
views flexicurity as a “policy strategy.” They further explain that an SFO can usually be
adopted to capture the agency or decisions of individual agents, while an ESC can usually
be adopted to capture the institutional dimension or structural part. They list many tables
of indicators, one of which I cite as an example (Table 2-2). In addition, many reports focus
on flexicurity policies’ development in specific countries, and they usually adopt the radar
chart to monitor flexicurity development in specific countries (see Figures 2-1–2-3).
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Table 2-2. EES Indicators and Indicators Proposed by the EMCO-Indicators
Group (2008, 2009)
Input Indicator
Process Indicator
Flexible contractual arrangements
EES
Access to flextime
Diversity and reasons
for contractual and
working arrangements
Employees with
overtime work
EMCO
OECD’s index of
% Workers in each
strictness of EPL
type of contract
Including wage
(permanent, voluntary
bargain indicators in
fixed term, part-time)
EPL
Monitoring of
contractual
arrangements
Lifelong learning
EES
Public spending on
Lifelong learning
human resources
(ages 25–64)
Investment by
Participation in
enterprises in training continuous vocational
of adults
training
EMCO
Access rules to LLL, Improved
rules for “second
participation measures
chance” education
in LLL/CVT
training
Active labor market policies (ALMP)
EES
Expenditure on LMP Activation/support
measures per person
(regular and assisted
wanting to work
activation)
Expenditure on LMP New start/prevention
measures as % of
Activation of
GDP
registered unemployed
Modern social security systems
EES
LMP expenditure on
supports per person
wanting to work
LMP expenditure on
supports as % of GDP
EMCO
Access rules to
benefits

Output Indicator
Transitions by type
Overtime hours

Transitions by type
of contract
Frequency of
persons with at least
the same employment
security as previous
year
Transitions (labor
status, pay level)
Educational
attainment of adults
E-skills

Follow-up of
participants in regular
activation measures
Public employment
services follow-up
indicator on training
measures

Activation/support

Poverty risk among
the unemployed

Coverage of certain
benefits for persons in
atypical contracts

In-work poverty risk
by type of contract
Dynamic measure
for transitions from
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Reconciliation of work and private life
EES
Childcare
Employment impact
Care of dependent
of parenthood
olderly (access to care (employment rates for
arrangements for
women and men
children and
without and with
dependent olderly)
young children)
Inactivity trap after
childcare cost (lone
parent with children)
EMCO

Lifecycle
arrangements

Source: Muffels et al. (2010)

Workers combining
parenthood and work
Workers combining
partial retirement and
work

work to inactivity
Lack of care for
children and other
dependents (share of
persons who do not
work or who work
less because of lack
of suitable care
facilities)
Drop in theoretical
replacement rates due
to career interruptions

Figure 2-1. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Input Indicators: Figures for the
Netherlands (Source: EMCO 2009)
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Figure 2-2. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Process Indicators: Figures for the
Netherlands (Source: EMCO 2009)

Figure 2-3. Radar Charts on Flexicurity Output Indicators: Figures for the
Netherlands (Source: EMCO 2009)
Moreover, Muffels et al. (2010) note that one of most crucial developments with
flexicurity measures is the increasing use of dynamic indicators, such as the rate of
transition from one state of employment to another status. In the past, by contrast, the
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majority of these indicators were static. Table 2-3 presents different types of transitions:=.
A type-one transition indicates a transition from permanent employment to permanent
employment, and it has a + sign, which means upward mobility or transition. A type-two
transition indicates the transition from permanent employment to self-employment, and it
has a − sign, which means downward mobility or transition. Following these types of
transitions, the tables can be illustrated by the percentage of transition types in Figure 2-4,

Table 2-3. Transitions Matrix Employment Transition Security (ETS) (Source:
Muffels et al. 2010)

Figure 2-4. Employment Transition Security (ETS) by Country EU26, 2005–2006
(Source: Muffels et al. 2010)
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which presents the percentage of upward and downward transitions in each country more
clearly. However, these types of descriptive statistics still cannot help us understand how
flexicurity policy indicators influence these labor market outcomes (such as transition
types). Consequently, further regressions or multilevel regressions need to be done to
untangle these puzzles.

III. Effects of Flexicurity
Effects of Flexibility
Although EPL’s effects on labor market performance is still a controversial subject
in both theory and empirical studies, a consensus has developed regarding the effects of
EPL in recent decades. First, EPL does not exert a significant effect on total unemployment,
and the main explanation of this result is that strict EPL has two opposite effects: to reduce
the separation rate from employment into unemployment and to decrease the exit rate from
unemployment into employment. Consequently, these effects may offset each other (OECD
2004, 2006; Nickell and Layard, 1999). However, EPL may have different effects on
different types of unemployment. Nickell (1997) determined that a higher EPL may
decrease total employment and short-term unemployment but will increase long-term
unemployment. The OECD (2004) has a similar observation: strict EPL increases longterm unemployment while reducing the flows into and out of unemployment. In other
words, employment protection tends to reduce employment fluctuations over the cycle but
also increases the length of unemployment spells. Consequently, Lazear (1990) argues
strict employment regulations, such as severance pay requirements, will reduce total
employment. According to Lazear (1990), moving from no severance pay to three months
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of severance pay for employees with ten years of service would reduce the employmentto-population ratio by 1 percent. Most scholars think that stricter EPL will result in “safer
jobs but longer spells,” and several economic scholars contend that strict EPL may be time
wasted (Nickell and Layard, 1999) and even damage labor-market performance (Heckman
and Pagés, 2000). Table 2-4 summarizes the effects of flexibility on labor market outcomes.
First, we see there are some different measurements that are adopted to capture the level of
employment protection legislation. While most studies adopted the composite EPL index
(from 0 to 6) created by the OECD, there are still other measurements, such as the EPL
index from 0 to 2 (Nickell et al., 2005) or 0 to 1 (Belot and Van Ours, 2000); one study
uses only the ranking number of twenty countries (from 0 to 20) (Nickell, 1997), while the
range between every country may not be equal. Therefore, this indicator seems not very
convincing.
For the effects of EPL, the empirical studies show mixed results. While some
studies do confirm the theoretical assumption that stricter EPL would increase
unemployment or decrease employment (Lazear, 1990; Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al.,
1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2000; Heckman and Pagés, 2000;
OECD, 2002), there are also some findings that suggest there is no significant effect of
EPL (Nickell 1997; Baker et al. 2005; Nickell et al. 2005). Stiglbauer (2006) reviews some
studies about the influence of labor market institutions on unemployment, and he also
found the mixed effects of EPL. In addition, while he considers the influences of other
labor market institutions to be more “clear” (such as more generous unemployment benefit
will increase unemployment, and active labor market policies reduce unemployment), he
even contends that the number of studies that finds no influences on unemployment
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“clearly outweighs the number of studies that finds that employment protection measures
raise unemployment” (p.68). Because this work reviews only five studies, the conclusion
may not be very decisive. However, these messages may help us understand that
deregulation orthodoxy is not always true.
To challenge this deregulation orthodoxy, Howell (2005) edited Fighting
Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy. In this book, he and other
contributors challenge the “OECD-IMF orthodoxy” by thoroughly reviewing
representative works in this area (which I also review in Table 2-2) and noting some of the
critical methodological and statistical issues in those works. Furthermore, while several of
the studies find only mixed effects of EPL, those authors excessively claim the benefits of
deregulation. For example, despite the rather weak findings in Elmeskov et al. (1998),
Baker et al. (2005)18 comment that this work is “less cautious and strongly argues for the
importance of labor market institutions in the explanation for high unemployment in the
OECD” (p.93). Additionally, according to Elmeskov et al. (1998), the deregulation
recommendations are “bitter and hard for many countries to swallow . . . as a result, there
is a natural tendency in many countries to delay needed reforms . . . or search for alternative,
sweeter remedies. It requires strong political will and leadership to convince electorates
that it is necessary to swallow” (p.242). This statement suggests that deregulation is the
one and only correct reform agenda for most countries; they also believe that deregulation
is a bitter remedy for most countries and that every country should (and must) swallow it.
Moreover, Howell’s book includes many other empirical works that challenge
deregulation orthodoxy. Although studies increasingly note that EPL may not be the only
Baker’s et al. (2005) work is chapter three in this book; the editor, David R. Howell, is also one of the
chapter’s authors.
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reason for high unemployment and deregulation not the only panacea, even the OECD
tempered or changed some of its original recommendations. While easing employment
regulations is the most important recommendation in its Job Study (1994), the OECD (2006)
now indicates that there are different combinations of labor market institutions, such as the
pairing of active or passive labor market policies with the easing of EPL. Consequently,
these combinations may be viewed as a type of flexicurity. Furthermore, the 2006 OECD
report mentions that although Anglo and Scandinavian labor market models have good
labor market performances (i.e., low unemployment and high employment rates), the latter
however presents more equal distribution. In other words, if we pursue not only good labor
market performances but also more equal distribution among different classes and genders,
then we need to pay more attention to the effects (both intended and unintended) of
different labor market reform agendas.

Effects of Flexibility on Different Groups
Thus, the next question will be: Who pays for safer jobs? There is considerable
evidence that a stringent EPL tends to worsen the employment prospects of minority groups,
such as young people, women, and the long-term unemployed. In other words, these
minority groups’ employment patterns are more affected than others by the extent of
employment protection regulation. A number of studies have suggested that EPL strictness
may negatively influence the young and prime-aged (25–54) women while having positive
effects on other groups’ employment rates (OECD, 2004). For example, Nickell (1997)
found that greater EPL exerts a positive effect on prime-aged male workers but has negative
effects on the entire working-age population and overall labor supply. At the same time,
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the OECD (2004) and Author (2006) found a negative impact of EPL on youth employment
rates. Autor et al. (2006) found that stricter employment regulations decrease the total
employment rate, but the effects strengthen in the case of female and less-educated workers.
Algan and Cahuc (2006) also found that EPL favors prime-aged males, who are usually
insiders in the labor market, but harms the employment prospects of the “outsiders,” who
are usually women and young people. In addition, Jaumotte (2004) found that strict
employment regulations exert a positive effect on female part-time participation, possibly
because a high EPL induces firms to resort to part-time contracts to achieve greater
flexibility. Furthermore, Estévez-Abe and Hethey-Maier (2015) found that strict
employment protection has negative effects on women’s economic positions compared to
their partners’, which suggests that greater EPL may decrease married women’s percentage
of contributions to family earnings and increase their economic dependence. They further
argue that these are the “gender implications” 19 of strict employment. Despite these
shortcomings of strict employment regulations, there is still little literature that focuses on
flexicurity’s effects on gender occupational inequality. Consequently, this research will fill
that gap, and in the following part, it will review how welfare state policies influence
gender occupational inequality.
Some feminist scholars still doubt this supposed negative relationship between EPL
and minority groups’ labor market outcomes. (2011) contends that the OECD’s (2006)
report, which suggests that labor market regulations will yield adverse effects on women’s
employment, refers to only three main studies. The first two are the OECD’s own studies—

This paper argues stricter EPL decreases married women’s contributions percentage in the household
and enhance their economic independence. So the “gender implication” is the author wants to argue the
lower EPL is more beneficial for gender equality in the household.
19
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namely, its 2004 and 2006 Employment Outlook studies and a single study by Bertola et al.
(2002). The OECD (2004, 2006) and Bertola et al. (2002) also argue that a higher level of
unionization decreases the employment-to-population ratios of young and older workers
relative to prime-aged workers and prime-aged women relative to prime-aged men and that
it even raises the unemployment rate of prime-aged women. Rubery (2011) further
criticizes Bertola et al.’s (2007) work for primarily focusing on the effects of union density
and for the fact that the OECD (2006) also cites this study as its main evidence. As Rubery
contends,
this study hypothesizes that unions will raise wages for groups who, if displaced,
will still find useful things to do outside the labor force and will not remain
unemployed. The authors deploy this argument to explain the lack of higher
unemployment for younger women relative to younger men but prime age women
do show higher relative unemployment even though many mothers fall into this age
category. At best the results are too ambiguous for these to form the basis for
support for policies of labor market deregulation [my emphasis]. (p.1108–1109)
Moreover, the only other main study quoted, by Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002),
mainly focuses on the effects on young people.
While deregulation orthodoxy states that EPL’s rigidities will reduce employment
probabilities for labor market returners and deter job creation in volatile sectors, Rubery
(2011) contends that EPL applied to female-dominated sectors will be beneficial for stable
employment and even promote women’s career continuity. Furthermore, Rubery notes, the
asymmetry between EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary jobs may exacerbate
the dualization of the labor market. To prevent this situation, the Dutch flexicurity
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legislation and EU directive that guarantee temporary or part-time workers the same rights
as regular contract workers and provide temporary workers with appropriate prospects for
moving to permanent contracts are important solutions to this possible dualization
(Wilthagen and Tros 2004).
Similarly, Cipollone et al. (2014) argue that greater EPL and ALMP will have
negative effects on females’ employment possibilities, but combining only a high degree
of flexibility with high-level social protection will lead to significant gains in female
employment possibilities; it is also the crux of flexicurity policies. This was the first study
to consciously examine the effects of flexicurity policies on women’s labor market
participation, but the authors did not further explore how flexicurity policies influence
gender occupational inequality. Consequently, one of the major purposes of this research
is to reveal how flexicurity policies influence gender occupational inequality.
Furthermore, Dieckhoff and Steiber (2015) challenge this deregulation orthodoxy
by noting that men benefited more clearly from stricter employment protection than women
did, while neoclassical theory asserts that protective labor market institutions are
detrimental for labor market outsiders (such as women). These researchers also observed
that the deregulation of temporary contracts did not affect women more adversely than men.
Howell (2004) also doubts the OECD Job Study’s (1994) labor market deregulation
orthodoxy, and he further argues that the simple flexibility story is not enough to explain
labor market performance in specific countries. We need to understand gender and labor
market regulations by using a more context-specific approach.

Effects of Security: Passive Labor Market Policies
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Compared to EPL, it seems that there is a more concrete consensus on the effects
of unemployment benefits (UB). A number of studies conclude that more generous
unemployment benefits correlated with higher unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov
et al., 1998; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and Van Ours, 2000; Bertola
et al., 2002).
While it might not be due to the moral hazards of UBs, because unemployment
benefits inhibit the ability to respond to adverse economic shocks, higher UB replacement
rates may be a result of—or remedy for—high unemployment. Considering this issue,
some authors have adopted a lagged unemployment rate as the dependent variable.
That said, there remain different detailed effects of different aspects of UBs. For
example, some studies note that UB replacement rates correlate with total unemployment
(Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1999; Bertola et. al, 2002), others suggest that UB duration
significantly increases unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000), and others yet do not
find that UB duration has a significant effect (OECD, 1999).
Nickell’s (1997) work finds that UBs exert different effects on different groups: the
UB replacement rate increases total unemployment but has no significant effect on longand short-term unemployment. UB duration shows a significant effect on long-term
unemployment only. In addition, both the UB replacement rate and UB duration do not
have significant effects on the labor supply (including all working-population and primeaged males), and only UB duration significantly decreases all working-age-population
employment rates. These findings remind us that some labor market institutions may have
unintended effects that exacerbate inequalities between insiders and outsiders—so that, for
instance, prime-aged males are usually less affected by these reforms.
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However, several scholars attempt to explore the interactions between different
labor market institutions. According to Elmeskov et al. (1998), there is a significant
interaction between ALMP and UBs in structural unemployment. As the authors contend,
this is because the joint effect of generous benefits and high spending on active programs
raises the reservation wage of the unemployed and may exert a stronger effect on
unemployment. Given this reasoning, the largest interaction would be expected in countries
with the highest ALMP. However, the results have not fulfilled this expectation—the
largest interaction was observed in low-level ALMP countries, followed by high-level
ALMP and intermediate-level ALMP countries. Consequently, the mechanisms of the
interaction between UB and ALMP must still be further explored.
Moreover, some scholars try to test the interactions between UBs and economic
shocks. For example, economic shocks are found to have a stronger effect on
unemployment when replacement is high and UB duration is long (Blanchard and Wolfers
2000), although some studies suggest that there is no significant interaction between the
UB replacement rate and duration with shocks (Bertola et al., 2002).
There are several exceptions, however, such as Nickell et al. (2005), who found that
the UB replacement rate and duration have no significant effect on structural
unemployment and that there are no significant interactions between labor market
institutions and economic shocks.
Finally, some studies present the counter-effect: UB replacement and duration are
found to significantly reduce unemployment in certain subperiods while increasing or
decreasing unemployment insignificantly in other periods (Baker et al., 2005).
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Gendered Effects of Passive Labor Market Policies
As Sainsbury (1999) suggests, different gender policy regimes result in different
utilizations of social benefits among men and women and further gender inequality.
Sainsbury (1999) analyzes men’s and women’s utilization of social benefits in the early
1980s in Scandinavian countries, and she finds that the strict requirements for old-age
occupational pensions made a relatively smaller percentage of women than men able to
receive those pensions. For example, the Norwegian requirement is forty years of
employment with minimum earnings, and the Swedish requirement is thirty years of
employment. As a result, only 40 percent of Norwegian and Danish female pensioners get
old-age occupational pensions, compared to 60–70 percent in Finland and Sweden.
Sainsbury argues that this is because Norway and Denmark are more in line with the male
breadwinner and separate gender role regimes, while Finland and Sweden are more
inclined toward the individual earner-carer model. Sainsbury also notes a tricky situation:
Norwegian welfare policies have entitled women to social rights as mothers and carers, but
these policies also make it less necessary for women to enter the labor market. In contrast,
according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) argument, low-income transfers in liberal countries
may lead to an “employment-forcing” effect. This tricky comparison reminds us that every
policy design must concern not only intended outcomes but also unintended or reverse
outcomes.
Generally, the security side of flexicurity usually includes passive labor market
policies (PLMP) (such as unemployment benefits) and ALMP (including training, lifelong
learning, job creation programs, and job-search assistance). Similarly, several scholars note
the inscribed gender relations in these two types of policies. In regard to unemployment
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benefits, we can see that many related policies imply the male breadwinner regime or a
separate gender role regime. For example, as Bosco (1996) suggests, it is usually half as
likely for unemployed women as for unemployed men to be able to obtain unemployment
benefits. Jepsen and Meulders (1997) analyze European unemployment benefit systems,
and they determine women are overrepresented in nonstandard work. As a result, women
have limited access to unemployment benefits. This is because many countries’
unemployment benefits require claimants to have specific work histories, and the duration
of unemployment benefits also depends on a person’s prior history in the labor market.
Jepsen and Meulders divide the EU member states into three categories according to their
degree of dependence on previous work histories and paid contribution. They that find most
countries (eight of fifteen) are located in the “moderate group,” which means they require
approximately 50 percent employment in the reference period (e.g., one year of
employment during the past two years). Women are usually more likely than men to have
short or discontinuous work histories, which results in limited entitlements for them. In
addition, unemployment insurance includes specific requirements about work intensity,
and women’s part-time work histories make them unable to be covered by unemployment
insurance. For example, in Luxembourg and Denmark, employees need to work in excess
of fifteen hours per week to receive unemployment insurance. Again, women’s part-time
work histories result in restricted access to unemployment insurance. In addition to their
limited access to unemployment benefits, women usually receive lower unemployment
benefits than men do. As Jepsen and Meulders (1997) suggest, this is firstly due to the
persisting gender wage gap; unemployment benefits are usually calculated as a specific
percentage of the previous wage. In addition, unemployment benefits for part-time work
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are usually for a limited duration or maximum amount.
Consequently, Jepsen and Meulders (1997) contend that social security should
insure individuals against the risk of unemployment but not adopt the family as a unit. This
argument resonates with the discussion about gender policy regimes: only in the individual
earner-carer model, where each person can be ensured social security as an independent
person, are these rights direct rights. In contrast, as Jepsen and Meulders (1997) suggest,
derived rights indicate a person’s access to entitlements as a spouse or dependent. For
example, Jepsen et al. (1997) suggest that in certain cases, certain unemployed persons
may claim higher benefits for their dependent spouses, and they contend that this may be
a crucial disincentive for women to enter into the formal labor market. As a result, they
contend that only the individualization of social security will lead to gender equality.
The logic of the “family wage” was a prevalent inscribed gender relation in some
countries’ unemployment benefits systems’ design. As Jepsen and Meulders (1997) argue,
these derived rights cause women to be viewed as dependents and thus lose access to direct
unemployment entitlements. In addition, the family wage further legitimates gender
inequality. For example, Pierson (1990) analyzes the gender debate about Canadian
unemployment insurance in 1930–1940, finding that the “family wage” was a powerful
factor in shaping that debate. The legislators contended that they had pursued “gender
equality” but that this equality “cannot evolve into injustice for men,” because they
“usually have more dependents than women.” Consequently, both the 1935 act and 1938
unemployment insurance bill included a dependent share allowance for the “wife.” From
the above, we can see there are substantial inscribed gender relations in PLMP, including
unemployment benefits and occupational pensions.
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Effects of Security: Active Labor Market Policies
Compared to EPL and UBs, there is a greater consensus on the effects of ALMP in
reducing unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Stiglbauer, 2006), even though
there are still studies that do not find a significant effect of ALMP (OECD 1999; Bertola et
al., 2002; Baker et al., 2005). Moreover, there is even one study suggesting that ALMP
significantly increase unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
In addition to those studies that focus on ALMP’ effects total unemployment, there
are still numerous studies exploring the efficiencies of individual ALMP programs. For
example, Kluve (2010) employs a meta-analysis to analyze 137 programs from ninety-five
different evaluation studies, and he finds that program type is the crucial factor for program
effectiveness. According to Kluve, direct employment programs in the public sector are
rarely positive because the created jobs are usually additionally generated. In other words,
these types of programs cannot effectively enhance individual workers’ employability,
because these jobs are not close to the ordinary labor market. In Kluve’s meta-analysis,
direct employment programs are even found to significantly decrease the program’s effect.
With regard to vocational training, which is usually viewed as the most traditional
and classic ALMP measure, as Bollens (2011a) suggests, most policymakers firmly believe
in the effectiveness of vocational training, even though few solid studies support this
conclusion. In particular, after the Great Recession in 2008, the harsh economic and
budgetary situation has required more effort to evaluate the results of ALMP. In fact,
Bollens (2011a) contends that the insight is much more “nuanced,” which means that the
results of current studies are still mixed. In addition, most studies suggest that training
courses can certainly have a positive long-term impact, whereas the short-term impact is
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less favorable. One of the shortcomings of the training program is the so-called “lockingin effect”: because they follow training courses, unemployed persons may stay unemployed
for longer periods of time on average than they would had they not followed the training
(Bollens, 2011b). However, this short-term negative effect may be compensated by the
positive long-term effect if the unemployed can find better or more-sustainable jobs after
these training programs. Kluve’s (2010) meta-analysis also confirms this claim: while only
a few nuanced positive results could be found in the short term, the positive effects of
training courses are much clearer in the long term.
Wage subsidies can also be understood as private sector incentive programs, which
are meant to encourage employers to hire new workers or to maintain jobs, particularly
during economic recessions or in hard times. As De Vos (2011) observes, in the 2008 Great
Recession, the major objectives of European governments’ subsidy mechanisms were
virtually to protect existing jobs and avoid redundancies but not to create more new job
possibilities for vulnerable groups. Consequently, these types of programs may sometimes
even widen the chasm between insiders and outsiders. To solve this problem, De Vos (2011)
particularly highlights that in times of crisis, ALMP should focus on creating new job
possibilities for outsiders or enhancing their employability rather than only keeping
insiders in their current jobs. Furthermore, wage subsidies may have a positive short-term
effect on enhancing employment, but these programs are often expensive, and their longterm effects are still not clear. Therefore, Bollens (2011a) suggests these types of programs
are less recommended for wide use and should focus only on disadvantaged groups that
have little chance of finding employment, such as disabled people.
Finally, a number of studies noted that employment search service and sanctions
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programs are particularly effective for employment, particularly for those with a qualifying
education, and are also more cost-effective. Furthermore, intensive job-search counseling
and guidance have been proven to considerably increase participants’ chances of outflow
from unemployment. For example, according to Denmark’s several natural experiments,
Andersen and Svarer (2012) concluded that intensive counseling is effective at increasing
participants’ employment prospects; they also found a shift from more expensive programs,
such as classroom training, to less expensive programs, such as job training (internship
with allowance or unemployment benefits).

Gendered Effects of Active Labor Market Policies
According to Rubery (2002), men have been traditionally viewed as prime
participants for ALMP. For example, these programs usually require specific eligibility,
such as status as a benefit claimant or employment in heavy industry or manufacturing.
However, after the implementation of the EU employment strategy in 1997, several
countries, including France, Germany, Greece, Austria, and Spain, have set minimum
quotas or targeted numbers for women. Take Greece as an example: it set a 60 percent
quota for women in ALMP in 1999, which is equal to the female percentage of the
unemployment population.
In addition, Friedlander et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1999) and Stanley et al. (1998)
all found that ALMP have positive effects on earnings and reemployment rates, and these
effects were particularly noticeable for adult women. Despite some ALMP’ specifically
focusing on women, these programs’ effects on gender equality are still mixed.
Furthermore, there is little consensus about whether ALMP can address unemployment or
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enhance employment numbers. Furthermore, there is still controversy about what types of
employment-enhancing programs can actually help enhance employment. A number of
studies examine individual programs’ effectiveness, but there is still little comparative
research that addresses gender aspects.
Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008) conducted a review survey about ALMP’
effects for women, and they found almost uniformly positive results for female workforce
participation. In addition, they found that these programs’ effects for women are greater
than for men, particularly in countries with relatively low female participation rates. In
contrast to Kluve’s work, Bergemann and Van den Berg contend that the strongest effects
are found in skill-training programs, but their paper reviews only sixteen studies, most of
the results of which were actually mixed; therefore, the most important contribution of
Bergemann and Van den Berg’s paper may be their noting that ALMP have more positive
effects for women than for men but only in areas with low female labor participation rates.
As a result, we can say that ALMP’ effectiveness for gender equality is still uncertain, and
there is still a lack of comparative studies and macro-level research to examine the different
effects in different countries and welfare regimes.
Despite the fact that the training programs may yield a potential risk of the lockingin effect, other research has found some reverse effects (or even beneficial effects) for
training programs. Lechner and Wiehler (2011) found that participation in training
programs is more effective for women than for men—particularly for young women,
because participation in training courses usually reduces or postpones pregnancies and
increases attachment to the labor force. This finding is similar to another observation: some
teenage girls choose nonmarital motherhood not only because of an “accident” or lack of
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contraceptive technology but also because they perceive a lack of economic opportunity
for advancement. For example, several scholars have observed that girls who are more
committed to greater academic and career success are more likely to prevent teenage
pregnancy (Kearney and Levine, 2012). Colen et al.’s (2006) finding also supports this
argument: in the US during times of economic expansion, African American women may
delay childbearing to take advantage of improved educational or job opportunities. In
addition, the decrease in the unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in African
American, but not Caucasian, female teenage childbirth. In other words, the expectation of
future career prospects and participation in training programs have similar effects on
female workers’ (and particularly women of childbearing age’s) reducing or postponing
their pregnancies, thus increasing their attachment to the labor force.

Effects of Flexicurity Policies: A More Comprehensive Assessment
To date, one of the shortcomings of current flexicurity evaluation and assessment
reports has been that assessments usually focus only on descriptive or correlative results
(despite some expert groups’ having already created many useful, comprehensive, and even
complicated indicators and measurements). In addition, many reports focus on flexicurity
policies’ development in specific countries, and they usually adopt radar charts to monitor
flexicurity development in specific countries. Although this type of data can help us trace
a specific country’s development deeply, it lacks a further, comprehensive explanation
about how flexicurity influences many important labor market outcomes.
However, there remain several important lessons that we can learn from these
evaluation reports. For example, in Evaluation of Flexicurity 2007–2010: Final Report
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(Smith et al., 2012), the authors adopt four indicators to trace the impacts of the
implemented flexicurity policies on labor market outcomes. These include increasing
employment security, facilitating employment transitions, reducing labor market
segmentation, and reducing gender disparities. Regarding employment security, this report
analyzed only some employment rates (including total, female, and youth employment
rates) and unemployment rates (including total, youth, and long-term unemployment rates).
The second is more interesting because one of the major goals of flexicurity is to facilitate
labor market transitions, including from education to the labor market, from unemployment
to employment, from job to job, and from one employment status to another (such as from
part-time work to full-time work). Here the focus is only on the shift from precarious
employment to more stable employment. This indicator is critical to the flexicurity debate
because while some scholars contend that flexible work can be a stepping-stone for stable
jobs, other scholars suggest that atypical jobs are usually dead-end jobs. According to this
report, in the post-2007 period, the highest levels of transition to more stable employment
were observed in the Eastern European cluster, while the lowest were found in the AngloSaxon cluster. However, the extent of precarious employment is also among the lowest in
the Anglo-Saxon cluster. Continental, Southern European, and Nordic countries occupy the
middle ground in terms of transitions.
There are only a few studies that have adopted multilevel methods to trace the
effects of flexicurity policies (rather than focus only on correlation or on macro labor
market outcomes, such as the unemployment rate), and Muffels’s (2013) work is among
the most important in this group. Muffels examines the impact of flexicurity policies on
labor market transitions, and he further defines two types of transitions: integrative
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transitions (referring to transitions from fixed-term jobs to permanent jobs and reentry into
employment) and exclusionary transitions (referring to exits from employment). EPL for
regular contracts is found to have a significant negative effect on voluntary job mobility
and on transitions from temporary jobs into permanent ones. However, EPL for temporary
contracts significantly increases the transitions from temporary jobs into unemployment.
At the same time, EPL for regular contracts significantly increases transitions from
unemployment to temporary jobs, while EPL for temporary contracts significantly
decreases transitions from unemployment into permanent jobs. Taken together, these
results seem to confirm the deregulation argument: that stricter EPL deters stable
employment and increases nonstandard employment. However, Muffels’s (2013) study
also found that the generosity of unemployment benefits increases transition probabilities
from temporary jobs into permanent jobs; this finding corresponds to the job-matching
argument, which suggests that more generous unemployment benefits serve as better
economic backups for job seekers and lead to better or matching jobs (Gangl, 2006).
In addition, several studies consciously examine the interactions between different
labor market institutions, such as between EPL and ALMP and between ALMP and PLMP.
As mentioned before, Cipollone et al. (2014) found that combining a high degree of
flexibility and a high level of security yields positive effects on female employment
prospects, and it is also the crux of flexicurity policies. At the same time, this research
clearly indicates the threshold effect: only when the flexibility indicator (EPL) is above
1.77 and the security indicator (percentage of expenditures on ALMP and PLMP by GDP)
exceeds 1.6620 will there be a positive effect on the female employment rate. However,

Because it is a composite indicator, it does not have substantive meaning. For further discussion, please
see chapter three, footnote 31.
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except for this study, most literature treats EPL and LMP as separate policy measures, and
the interactions between these two factors remain still less explored.

IV. The Welfare State Paradox21: The Welfare State Facilitates Women’s
Not Only Labor Force Participation but Also Gender Occupational
Inequality
While Esping-Andersen (1990) propose a threefold typology of welfare state
regimes, many feminist scholars contend that this framework makes no reference to gender
inequalities and ignores the family as an important dimension in welfare state analysis
(Orloff, 1993). Decommodification, the heart of his typology of welfare states, “occurs
when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.21–22); work is defined as paid
work and welfare as policies that permit, encourage, or discourage the decommodification
of labor. Lewis (1997) argues that this construct misses the importance of unpaid work, and
it resonates with Orloff’s (1993) emphasis on family. In other words, Esping-Andersen’s
notion of decommodification implies an assumption about women usually assuming
unpaid work in family, while only male workers can participate in the labor market and
enjoy the benefits that decommodifcation entails. In this context, feminist welfare scholars
contend that access to paid work give women more autonomy in marriage (Orloff, 1993).
In other words, “commodification” is potentially emancipatory (Orloff 1993, p.318). As a
result, participation in the labor market is crucial for women’s emancipation and economic

There are many different kinds of Welfare State Paradoxes, but this term only refers to that kind of
paradox related to gender in this research, such as Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) discussed.

21

60

independence.
To date, there much literature has focused on the contributors to female labor force
participation, and one heated debate concerns the effects of the welfare state on women’s
employment patterns. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that welfare regime types can
predict female employment patterns because the specific public policy features of different
regimes can shape women’s specific workforce participation trajectories. More precisely,
female employment levels should be highest in social democracies (due to the large
demand from the public sector and the extensive supply resulting from the generosity of
family policy), moderate in liberal countries (which are largely driven by market forces),
and lowest in conservative corporatist countries (due to the traditional gender labor division
in the household and maternal policies that encourage mothers to stay at home and take
care of their children).
However, several feminist scholars contend that Esping-Andersen’s welfare state
typology loses the ability to predict women’s part-time employment in different clusters,
and a number of studies note the variation in each cluster. For example, Norway has
reported lower levels of not only female employment but also public support compared to
other Nordic countries (Leira, 1992; Borchorst, 1994).
Furthermore, Gornick’s studies suggest that specific welfare state characteristics
exert a greater influence on women’s employment patterns than the overall welfare state
regimes do (Gornick, 1999; Gornick et al., 1998). For example, Gornick et al. (1998) note
that specific welfare characteristics, such as generous public childcare and parental leave,
lead to a decrease in the “child penalty,” suggesting that these work-family reconciliation
policies can efficiently relax women’s care responsibilities and enhance mothers’
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employment regardless of whether a country is socially democratic. Rønsen and Sundström
(2002) found that women who were entitled to paid leave had higher employment rates
than noneligible women. Cipollone et al. (2014) also found that institutional supports,
including family subsidies and parental leave, positively influence women’s employment
prospects.
At the same time, the welfare state can serve as an employer to enhance women’s
workforce participation by providing substantial employment opportunities in the public
sector. More specifically, the extension of the welfare state usually indicates the expansion
of the public sector in health, education, and social services, areas usually dominated by
female workers. This expansion is observed because the welfare state represents a
considerable part of the modern labor market in creating more public employment
opportunities through ALMP. Consequently, a number of studies have noted that the level
of welfare state extension positively influences women’s labor participation (Kolberg,
1991; Kolberg and Esping-Andersen, 1991). Therefore, to consider the effect of the welfare
state as an employer, the percentage of the total workforce employed in the public social
service sector will be part of the indicator to capture the availability of public services that
the state provides as well as the welfare state’s extent as an employer (Mandel and
Semyonov, 2006).
Despite these benefits for women’s employment, there is still a heated debate
regarding the generosity of the welfare state, which may result in negative outcomes in
terms of women’s labor participation. Specifically, different types of welfare state policies
may have different effects on women’s employment. For example, more publicly funded
childcare systems or higher-quality, more affordable childcare may release mothers’ caring
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burdens and afford women more choices and greater freedom to take market-paid work.
Consequently, a number of studies have suggested that more attractive childcare options
will increase maternal employment and that the higher cost of childcare has a negative
impact on maternal employment (Blau and Robins, 1988; Kimmel, 1995; Leibowitz et al.,
1992; Ribar, 1992).
By contrast, parental leave has more complicated effects on female employment,
and there are more controversial debates regarding this policy measure. For example, long
parental leave may result in unintended outcomes. More specifically, it may encourage
women to stay at home for a long time, and such lengthy career interruptions may harm
women’s human capital, even limiting their opportunities for training or promotion.
Furthermore, because women take longer parental leaves than men do, such long absences
may discourage employers from hiring women. Consequently, too generous a work-family
policy may actually worsen gender equality. As for empirical studies, the effects of parental
leave on women’s employment are still mixed. Paid maternity and extended parental leaves
are known to increase women’s labor market attachment (Ruhm, 1998; Ruhm and Teague,
1995; Jaumotte, 2004); in particular, family leave coverage increases women’s likelihood
of returning to employment after childbirth (Waldfogel et al., 1999). Furthermore, Gornick
et al. (1997) and Gornick and Meyers (2003) have found that the gender gap in employment
rates is lower in countries that provide paid leave.
By contrast, other studies have found that long-term maternity and parental leave
negatively effect gender equality in the labor market. Ruhm (1998) found that parental
leave is associated with reductions in women’s relative wages for extended durations.
Gupta et al. (2008) also found that long-paid maternity leave has an adverse effect on
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women’s wages; therefore, they argue that extensive family-friendly systems may become
a “system-based glass ceiling” for women’s career advancement. That said, most studies
have suggested that leave durations of up to six months are neutral in their effects on
relative wages (Bertrand et al. 2010; Ruhm 1998; Waldfogel 1999).
Furthermore, the other serious unintended outcome of lengthy family leaves is
occupational sex segregation. As Stier and Mandel (2009) contend, although paid parental
leave is likely to push more married women into the labor market, lengthy leaves might
lock them into “feminized sectors,” where wages are lower because the sectors are female
dominated. Additionally, an increase in the women’s labor supply in reaction to leave
policies may result in increased “crowding” in female-dominated jobs and a consequent
drop in wages (Summers 1989).
In addition, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) further examine welfare state
policies’ effects on the gender wage gap and occupational sex segregation. Regarding the
gender wage gap, Mandel and Semyonov (2005) found that gender-related earnings
disparities are less pronounced in countries with more developed family policies, but they
also argue that these lower earnings differentials should be attributed to these countries’
more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies. In other words, the
level of welfare state intervention does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the gender
wage gap. As for occupational sex segregation, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that
the welfare state has a crucial, twofold effect on female labor participation: the welfare
state facilitates women’s access to the labor market but not to powerful or desirable
positions. Furthermore, nations with more developed welfare policies and larger public
service sectors tend to have high concentrations of women in feminized occupations. This
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important reflection on welfare state policies reminds us that welfare state policies may
have many different unintended outcomes, and we need to be more cautious regarding these
diverse effects.

V. Wage Structure: An Alternative Explanation for the Gender Wage
Gap
As Blau and Kahn (1992) suggest, two factors can contribute to transnational
variations in the gender wage gap. One consists of gender-specific characteristics, such as
gender discrimination, indicating that women receive differential treatment even though
men and women are equally qualified. Gornick (1999) further interprets it as women’s
labor market “positions,” suggesting women’s labor market positions relative to men’s.22
The other factor is grounded in overall wage structures, particularly the magnitude of wage
dispersion. To clarify, wage structure can be defined as the returns to qualifications (skills)
and job sectors (occupations and industries), and it has different effects (Blau and Kahn
1992, 1996; Blau and Winkler 2017).
Generally, variations in the gender wage gap across countries largely confirm
Esping-Andersen’s threefold welfare state regimes: gaps are most pronounced in the liberal
market economies of English-speaking countries. However, corporatist (continental
European countries) and Social democratic economies (Nordic countries) have generally
reported lower gender wage gaps than the liberal countries have. It is argued that more
centralized wage-bargaining systems are associated with lower interfirm and interindustry
wage disparities, are often characterized by conscious policies to secure low-wage workers
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It means women’s earnings relative to men’s in the wage structure.
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(regardless of gender), and “may indirectly reduce the gender pay gap” (Blau and Kahn
1992, 1996).
This association can be observed clearly in Figure 5-1 (in the results section), which
presents the relationship between overall EPL and general wage dispersion (measured by
a ninety-to-ten ratio). The liberal market economies of English-speaking countries, such as
the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which are concentrated in
the left side of the figure, indicate lower overall EPL and greater wage inequality. However,
for the lower wage inequality group, although slightly cut across welfare state regimes, we
still can see loose clusters: Social democratic countries are in the middle of the area, while
the corporatist economies occupy the right area of the figure, which is characterized by
strong union traditions and stricter labor market regulations. As Blau and Kahn (1992, 2003)
contend, highly centralized wage-setting mechanisms, high union density, and strong
collective bargaining power can efficiently contribute to lower wage dispersion. And as
they reemphasize, American women have relatively higher human capital and wages than
women in other developed economies, but there remains a substantial gender wage gap,
which may be due to the unequal overall wage structure.
This division of the contributors to gender earning inequality is meaningful because
these two arguments may have different policy implications (Gornick, 1999). For example,
while American women enjoy higher wages than women in other countries and the United
States has had a stronger commitment to and legislation for antidiscrimination than most
other countries, the United States still reported the largest gender gap among advanced
countries, a result of the extremely unequal wage structure in the United States (Blau and
Kahn, 1996).
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In addition, Gornick and Jacobs (1998) argue that social policy affecting women’s
overall employment and policy that influences the overall wage structure may be more
promising avenues for promoting women’s situation in the labor market, particularly in
countries bearing a great magnitude of wage dispersion. Their argument resonates with
Gornick’s (1999), in which gender inequality is attributed to the overall wage structure and
to policies aimed at enhancing overall wage structure, such as strengthening union
bargaining, and creating more centralized wage-setting mechanisms. However, if gender
inequality can be attributed to women occupying lower positions than men in the labor
market, then we should focus on policy that specifically aims to raise women’s pay and
other workplace gender equality measures. However, as Whitehouse (1992) reveals,
centralized industrial relations and sustained expenditures on ALMP are more likely to
deliver relatively high earnings for women, while gender equality legislation did not have
clear effects on gender earning equality. Consequently, Whitehouse argues that the
emancipatory potential of gender equality legislation is best practiced within a collective
rather than liberal framework. This conclusion implies that wage structures have a greater
influence on gender earning equality than gender-specific factors do, even if we
acknowledge that the different reasons for the gender wage gap require us to adopt different
policies to handle it.
Moreover, as Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) argue, the welfare state
facilitates women’s access to the labor market but not to powerful or desirable positions.
In addition, these researchers contend that gender-related income disparities are less
pronounced in countries with more developed family policies, but it should be attributed
to these countries’ more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies.
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However, the effects of flexicurity on the gender wage gap remain less discussed.
Thus, the first purpose of this dissertation is to examine how flexicurity policies affect the
gender wage gap in different countries. The second purpose is to examine whether, when
lower gender income differentials emerge in countries with strong flexicurity policies the
results reflect developed flexicurity policies or egalitarian wage structures.

VI. Flexicurity and Job Security Perception
It is argued that one of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from
“security within a job” towards “security of a job”, or a shift from job security (stability of
the current job) to employment security (lifelong employment probabilities and abilities)
(EMCO, 2006; Wilthagen, 1998; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). Workers’ perceptions of
security are crucial for the successful implementation of flexicurity policies (Chung and
Oorschot, 2011). Job and employment security not only have vital consequences for mental
and physical health and well-being but also have a considerable influence on employees’
work motivation, organizational commitment, and even productivity (Ashford et al., 1989;
Clark et al., 2010; De Witte and Näswall, 2003; Ferrie, 2001).
However, it remains unclear whether this concept is achieved in practice.
Conventional wisdom holds that longer tenure leads to higher job and employment security;
however, some research finds adverse effects of this relationship. According to Auer and
Cazes (2003), in the Danish style of flexicurity, low employment protection may result in
lower job security (i.e., a higher risk of losing one’s job); however, strong, active labor
market policies guarantee higher employment security in the form of a higher probability
that an individual will find another job. Additionally, these authors find that Denmark’s
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workers have shorter average employment tenure than do workers of other EU countries,
although a higher share of Danish workers perceive their employment as secure. In contrast,
workers in Japan enjoy a long average tenure but report greater insecurity, which may be
due to their country’s lower levels of social protection. The relationship between tenure
and perceived security requires further exploration.
Gender is vital to understanding perceptions of work security due to the fact that
women are overrepresented in non-standard work, experience restricted access to many
important worker entitlements, and disproportionately suffer from the precarious work
conditions (Fredman, 2004). Jepsen (2004) contends that women are more often affected
by “bad” flexibility than men are. “Bad” flexibility refers to flexible jobs that are low
quality, dead end, and low wage. Although many official EU statements have firmly
asserted that flexicurity would enhance gender equality, Fredman calls this phenomenon
“the broken promise of flexicurity”. Lewis and Plomien (2009) contend that gendered
patterns in flexible employment tend to exacerbate sex segregation and gender inequality
and that flexicurity has not addressed men’s and women’s fundamentally different
experiences of the labor market.
Due to the importance of this topic, there is ongoing debate about how to achieve job
security and employment security as well as the type of policy measures necessary to
achieve this goal. Based on this heated discussion in both policy and academia, studies
have examined the determinants of perceptions of job security. However, some gaps remain
in this area. First, most studies focus only on job security or employment security and
overlook the shift from the former to the latter, which is the crux of flexicurity policies.
Second, many studies examine only individual-level or national-level factors, and few
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multi-level analyses have been conducted to explore the combined influence or interaction
of these two levels. Green’s (2009) ambitious work was the first study to include 32
countries in a comparison; however, it focused only on individual-level rather than
national-level predictors. Third, although some recent studies adopt multi-level methods,
most cross-national research in this area includes only small numbers of countries with a
strong focus on European countries (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot,
2011; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Erlinghagen, 2008). Fourth, the link between
perceptions of security and welfare state intervention or public caring resources remains
largely unexplored. As Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue, one of the main ideas of
flexicurity is to achieve “combination security”, which refers to “the certainty of being able
to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations”. Tros (2004)
further explains flexicurity as a type of work-family balance. However, this understanding
has been less frequently discussed and examined in research on flexicurity; Wilthagen and
Tros (2004) discuss “flexicurity strategies and policies, which are usually not referred to
as such by policy makers and legislators…”. Whereas most studies of flexicurity policies
concentrate on the impacts of EPL and LMP, Hansen (2007) argues that public care
facilities are crucial factors in the successful Danish flexicurity model. She notes that the
“flexicurity model lacks a perspective – public care facilities”. Furthermore, she strongly
suggests adding public care facilities into the Danish “golden triangle” and renaming
flexicurity “flexicArity” (p.88-91). This study, which is based on data from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2005, helps to fill these gaps in the
literature.
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Defining Job security, Employment Security, and Job-Loss Worry
Scholars of psychology have explored job security for several decades and have
divided job security into two categories: cognitive security and affective job security. In
the psychological research framework, “cognitive job security” indicates individuals’
estimate of the probability of losing their current job, whereas “affective job security”
refers to worry or anxiety about losing one’s job, including concerns about the expected
outcomes of losing one’s current job. As Anderson and Pontusson (2007) argue, in addition
to cognitive security, there are two expected consequences of losing one’s job: “the
prospects of finding another job and access to sources of income that do not depend on
finding another job” (p.214). Following Ebralidze’s (2012) research design, three outcome
variables can be examined: job security (also known as “cognitive job security” in
psychological terms), employment security, and job-loss worry (also known as “affective
job security” in psychological terms).
The first outcome variable is job security. Job security indicates the certainty of
retaining a specific job with a specific employer and the stability and certainty of holding
a current job. A typical survey question to examine job security is, “How satisfied are you
with your present job or business in terms of job security?” As Clark and Postel-Vinay
(2008) suggest, the respondent’s answer to this question involves at least two pieces of
information: “the probability of job loss and the cost of job loss” (p.210). To estimate job
security more precisely, following previous researchers’ designs (Anderson and Pontusson,
2007; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Ebralidze, 2012), the indicator for job security is the
level of agreement with the statement, “My job is secure”23, with five possible responses
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ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.
Employment security refers to lifelong employment probabilities and abilities. It
also indicates the certainty of remaining in work, although not necessarily with the same
employer. To gauge employment security, respondents are asked to rate their agreement
with the statement, “How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at
least as good as your current one?”24 The answer is provided on a four-point scale of
agreement from “very easy”, “fairly easy”, “fairly difficult” to “very difficult”.. For the
third outcome variable, job-loss worry, the indicator is the level of agreement with the
statement, “To what extent do you worry about the possibility of losing your job?”25, with
four possible responses ranging from “I do not worry at all” to “I worry a great deal”.

Perceptions of Security: Country-Level Influences
A number of studies have explored the relationship between national labor market
institutions and workers’ job security perceptions. EPL is the most heated debate focus of
the labor market because it is usually adopted as a “flexibility” indicator in the flexicurity
literature (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009; Tangian, 2007). EPL is usually considered a doubleedged sword: although it guarantees higher job stability, it also increases the associated
cost of dismissal and thus reduces employers’ willingness to hire (Clark and Postel-Vinay,
2008). Consequently, one study argues that stricter regulations may result in longer
unemployment duration (Nickell, 1997) despite the development of part-time and
temporary work (Buddelmeyer et. al, 2004; Dolado et.al, 2002; Polavieja, 2003). Thus,
more rigid EPL may lead to lower perceptions of job security.
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Empirical studies generally confirm the idea that stricter EPL has negative effects on
job security. Using bivariate analyses, Böckerman (2004) and Devicienti et al. (2008) find
a significant positive correlation between EPL and job security, though the OECD (1997)
reveals no significant correlation between perceptions of security and EPL. In multi-level
research, Böckerman (2004) finds negative effects of EPL on job security, whereas
Erlinghagen (2008) finds no significant effects of EPL on job security. Anderson and
Pontusson (2007) find that EPL has significant negative effects on job security but no
significant influences on employment security. However, most of these studies do not
distinguish EPL for regular contract jobs from EPL for temporary contract jobs and thus
cannot measure and discern the effects of these two different types of EPL. This distinction
is crucial in the specific historical context. Time-series data on the EPL indicators show an
overall declining trend for the stringency of dismissal regulations, but most of these
changes that occurred in the 1990s focused on temporary employment rather than regular
employment. Furthermore, it is argued that the loosening of temporary contract regulations
serves as a way to circumvent stringent rules on regular contracts, especially in countries
facing political deadlock for loosening EPL for regular jobs. In other words, the
deregulation of employment protection legislation is a partial reform that eases the use of
temporary contracts but maintains the existing provisions for regular jobs (OECD, 2004;
European Commission, 2006). Consequently, it is important to be sensitive to these two
different effects of EPL, especially the effects for different genders. Although women are
usually over-represented in non-regular employment, women are more likely to be
influenced by the loosening of regulations for temporary contracts. Thus, this paper is the
first to measure different influences on workers’ job security for different gender groups.
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Previous studies suggest that ALMP exerts positive effects on employment security
but does not influence job security. This research suggests a critical point in job security
research: different macro-level factors may have specific influences on different types of
job security. ALMP is usually adopted as “security” indicators in the flexicurity literature
(Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009; Tangian, 2007). They roughly indicate the level of government
endeavour in the area of labor market security, including occupational training programmes,
public employment programmes, employment search services, and wage subsidies. Higher
ALMP levels are argued to represent greater effort by the government to enhance workers’
employability and thus may also increase workers’ perceptions of employment security.
Anderson and Pontusson (2007) find that ALMP exerts positive effects only on
employment security but do not influence job security. Chung and Oorschot (2011) argue
that ALMP, which secures employability skills, is more important than EPL in providing
individuals with employment security.
In addition, a number of studies have revealed the positive effects PLMP on job
security perceptions. PLMP is a critical indicator of “security” in the flexicurity literature.
They usually refer to unemployment benefits (UB), which can be understood as the level
of government effort to provide economic supplements for the unemployed. Using
bivariate methods, a number of studies have suggested that the generosity of
unemployment benefits has a positive correlation with job and employment security
(Böckerman 2004; Devicienti et.al 2008). In a multi-level analysis, Anderson and
Pontusson (2007) found that more generous unemployment benefits lead to lower levels of
job-loss worry, although Ebralidze (2012) did not find a significant influence.
Despite these two critical labor market institutions, some research suggests that
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market forces are more important factors to predict individuals’ job security. With lower
unemployment rates or higher employment rates, workers may expect a more optimistic
labor market situation. Thus, market forces are also crucial factors in workers’ perceptions
of security. For example, Chung and Oorschot (2011) found that when market factors
(measured by average employment rate and GDP growth rate) are taken into account, both
institutional factors lose their significance. Similarly, Erlinghagen (2008) found that only
the long-term unemployment rate had significant effects on job security, whereas EPL,
social security spending, and average GDP growth did not have significant influences.
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2008) showed that the 6-year average of local unemployment
reduced perceived job security in temporary jobs but had positive effects on permanent
workers. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) found that unemployment rate changes from the
previous year have significant negative effects on job security and employment security,
whereas the 6-year average unemployment rate had significant effects on job security but
not employment security.
One of the main ideas behind flexicurity is to achieve a shift from job security to
employment security (EMCO 2006; Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen and Tros 2004). Auer and
Cazes (2003) found that Denmark’s workers with lower average work tenure but reported
higher security perceptions than workers in other EU countries, and it is because the more
developed Danish government to active and passive labor market policies in Denmark. In
contrast, workers in Japan have a high average tenure but also showed higher extent of job
and employment insecurity. However, the effects of average tenure are still mixed, so and
further exploration is needed.
Welfare state intervention is usually a crucial factor in female labor market outcomes.
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Gornick and her colleagues (1997) note that family policy is a more powerful predictor of
women’s employment patterns than Esping-Anderson’s welfare clusters are. Mandel and
Semyonov (2005; 2006) demonstrated that more developed welfare-state policy enhances
women’s employment probabilities (though not necessarily in powerful positions) and
reduces gender wage gaps. However, the effects of welfare state intervention on job and
employment security, especially the differences between the two genders, remains less
examined. It is necessary to explore further how welfare state intervention influences men’s
and women’s subjective job security. Whereas “welfare state generosity” in flexicurity
studies usually indicates only the scope of ALMP and PLMP, this study is the first work
that deliberately adopts the “welfare state intervention index” as an index of combination
security.
As Madsen (2006) argues, dynamic social dialogue and strong trade unions are vital
factors in the successful implementation of flexicurity. However, the relation between
union power and workers’ job security remains unexplored. Higher levels of trade-union
power may suggest better working conditions and stronger negotiation power, which may
be helpful to ensure higher perceptions of security among individual workers. In attempts
to measure the power of unions to affect working conditions, the collective agreement
coverage rate has been found to be a better measure than the union membership coverage
rate (Visser, 2006). With regard to the effects of unions, Lyness et al. (2012) assume that
higher collective agreement coverage ensures a higher level of job security, although they
did not find a significant correlation between these two factors. Few studies to date have
addressed the collective agreement coverage rate as a macro-level determinant of job
security. Thus, this paper contributes to filling this gap.
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Security Perceptions: Micro-Level Studies
Although Green (2009) found that women reported lower security perceptions than
men did, many studies have not found gender-specific effects with regard to job security
(Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen 2008; OECD 1997; Green et al.,2001).
Erlinghagen argues that this may be because women’s inferior job security perceptions are
“not mediated directly by the ‘gender’ characteristics” (p.190) but by lower tenure, higher
work-family conflict, or more precarious employment conditions. Due to the mixed results
of previous studies, this dissertation explores how gender influences individuals’
perceptions, with a particular focus on the interaction between gender and other important
factors, such as welfare state intervention.
The findings with regard to age remain ambiguous. Although the OECD (1997) finds
a positive correlation between age and job security, Green (2009) and Näswall and De Witte
(2003) suggest converse outcomes. Erlinghagen (2008) found that young workers (aged
20-39) reported lower security perceptions than did middle-aged workers (aged 40-54),
whereas older workers’ (age 55-67) perceptions were not significantly from middle-aged
workers. Anderson and Pontusson (2007) found that age has a positive effect on job
security but a negative effect on employment security. This finding may suggest that older
workers usually have longer tenure and are more confident about holding their current job,
but older workers may face inferior situations with regard to finding a new job in the labor
market.
With regard to family composition, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) assumed that
having an employed spouse is associated with lower worry about job loss, although they
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did not find significant effects. Ebralidze (2012) did not find that an employed spouse was
related to lower job-loss worry, although their samples included only young workers aged
18-33 years. Muñoz de Bustillo and De Pedraza (2010) found that an employed spouse had
a significant influence on lower job security in the Netherlands and Germany but not in
Spain, Belgium and Finland. They also found that the presence of children did not show
significant effects on security perceptions, and Green et al. (2000) found that mothers with
young children experienced lower job security than fathers with young children did.
For job characteristics, a number of studies have revealed that atypical employment
has negative effects on perceptions of security. For example, fixed-term workers and
temporary-contract workers report lower job security than do their permanent-contract
counterparts (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2008; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Erlinghagen
(2008) found part-timers didn’t present lower job security than full-timers, and it may
because they have different expectations for their work. However, he found fixed-term
employees report lower job security than workers on permanent contracts. Muñoz de
Bustillo and De Pedraza (2010) suggested that temporary-contract workers show lower job
security than permanent-contract workers do in five countries (Netherlands, Germany,
Spain, Belgium and Finland), whereas part-time workers show significant differences from
full-time workers only in Belgium and Germany. However, Erlinghagen (2008) found that
part-time workers did not show significant differences from their counterparts. The effects
of different types of atypical contracts require further exploration.
A number of studies have demonstrated that workers in the public sector report higher
job security perceptions than do their counterparts in the private sector (Anderson and
Pontusson 2007; Muñoz de Bustillo and De Pedraza, 2010). Furthermore, Clark and Postel-
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Vinay (2008) found that private sector workers’ perceptions of job security were
determined by EPL and PLMP, whereas public sector workers’ perceptions of security were
not influenced by these two labor market arrangements. With regard to the influence of
trade unions, Anderson and Pontusson (2007) noted that union membership had positive
effects on job security and employment security.
In the following chapter, the methodology, including the data, the research questions
and analytic strategy will be discussed. Also, the empirical findings on the effects of EPL,
PLMP, and ALMP are summarized in following Tables: 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6. In these three
tables, most of previous studies only explore the influences of EPL, ALMP and PLMP. On
employment rate or unemployment rate. However, the effects of these three country-level
factors on individual-level labor market outcomes are still less examined. Consequently,
this dissertation consciously adopts multilevel methods to examine the relationship
between these three factors and individual-level labor market outcomes.
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Appendix: The Effects of EPL, PLMP, and ALMP: Summaries of Empirical Findings
Table 2-4. The Effects of Flexibility (EPL): A Summary of Empirical Findings
Author and
Year

Main
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable

Results

Other control
variables

EPL (including
SEV = Number
of months of
salary given to
workers as
severance pay
upon dismissal
after ten years
of service,0-15
and NOTICE =
Number of
months' notice
required before
termination to
workers with
ten years of
service,0-10)

Employment rate

The stricer EPL (increased severance pay) will
reduce employment rate.

Scarpetta (1996)

EPL (0-6,
average of
regular contract
and fixed term
contract)

Structural unemployment

EPL is found to raise structural unemployment
and non-employment, especially exerts stronger
effects on youth and long-term unemployment.

80

Lazear (1990)

80

ALMP. UB replacement
rates, union density,
coordination index,
corporatism index, tax
wedge.

81

Nickell (1997)

EPL (ranking
number, 1-20)

Total unemployment, long-term
unemployment, short-term
unemployment, employment to
population ratio (overall and male-aged
males).

EPL doesn’t have significant effect on total
unemployment, short-term unemployment and
long-term unemployment. EPL is found to
reduce employment to population rate, but
doesn’t reduce prime-aged males’.

Elmeskov,
Martin, and
Scarpetta (1998)

EPL (0-6)

structural unemployment

EPL significantly increase structural
unemployment, especially in countries with an
intermediate level coordination system.

OECD (1999)

EPL (0-6)

Unemployment and employment rates

Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000)

EPL (0-6)

Unemployment

In most cases, EPL decreases unemployment and
employment rates but not significant. But EPL
only shows negative and significant effect on
prime-age men unemployment. EPL also shows
positive but not significant effect on prime-age
males employment and youth unemployment.
EPL is found to increase unemployment.
Furthermore, EPL also exacerbates the negative
effect of shocks on unemployment.

Belot and Van
Ours (2000)

EPL(0-1)

structural unemployment

EPL is found to have significant effect on
structural unemployment before introducing time
and country fixed effect.
Also, The authors also found positive interaction
between taxes and replacement rates, union
density and centralization, and negative
interaction between EPL and centralization.
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ALMP; UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, union coverage,
coordination index. Tax
wedge. Dummy for time
period.
EPL, ALMP, UB
replacement rate; UB
duration, union density,
coordination index,
corporatism index, tax
wedge, minimum wages.
ALMP, UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, coordination
index, centralisation
index, tax wedge.
TFP growth, labour
demand shocks, real
interest rate shocks.
ALMP.UB duration
index.
UB replacement rate.
Union density. Union
coverage. coordination
index. Tax rates.
Change in inflation, UB
replacement rates, union
density, union coverage,
coordination index, tax
rates.

EPL(0-6).the
authors create
EPL indicators
for Latin
American
countries with
OECD
estimates.

Employment and unemployment (by
gender and age) and incidence of longterm unemployment.

EPL shows negative and significant effect on
overall employment rates. Furthermore, the
impact on prime-age male employment is half of
the total employment, while the impact on youth’s
is almost two times larger. Though there is no
significant effect on the female workers.
As for unemployment, while OLS and random
effects shows positive and significant effect, fixed
effects shows negative and insignificant effect.
EPL is found to have significant interaction with
shocks on unemployment, which suggests the
institutions and shocks have interaction effect.
Furthermore, EPL exerts more stronger effect on
youth and the older groups.

GDP level, GDP growth,
minimum wages, union
centralization.

Bertola, Blau, and
Kahn (2002)

EPL (0-6)

Unemployment

Baker, Glyn,
Howell and
Schmitt (2005)

EPL(0-6)

Unemployment

EPL is found to have no effect on unemployment
rates, except for the sub-period 1980-99 when
EPL is found to reduce unemployment.

structural unemployment

EPL is found to have no significant effect on
structural unemployment, and there are also no
significant interaction between labour market
institutions and economic shocks.

Change in inflation, UB
replacement rates, UB
duration index, union
density, union coverage,
coordination index, tax
rates
Money supply shock,
change in TFP growth,
labour demand shock,
real import price shock,
real interest rates., UB
replacement rates, UB
duration index, union
density, coordination
index, tax wedge, owner
occupation rate.

Nickell, Nunziata
and Ochel(2005)

EPL (0-2)

82

Heckman and
Pagés (2000)

82

TFP growth, labour
demand shocks, real
interest rate shocks.
ALMP. UB replacement
rate. Union density.
Union coverage.
coordination index. Tax
rates.

Table 2-5. The Effects of PLMP: A Summary of Empirical Findings
Author and
Year

Main Independent
Variable

Scarpetta (1996)

UB index (including
average of replacement
rates for individuals with
different durations
unemployment spell,
different level earnings
and family types.
UB replacement rate; UB
duration

Structural unemployment

UB is found to significantly increase structural
unemployment.

EPL, ALMP, union density,
coordination index,
corporatism index, tax
wedge.

Total unemployment, long-term
unemployment, short-term
unemployment, employment to
population ratio (overall and
male-aged males).

EPL, ALMP, union density,
union coverage,
coordination index. Tax
wedge. Dummy for time
period.

Elmeskov,
Martin, and
Scarpetta (1998)

UB index (including
average of replacement
rates and duration)

structural unemployment

UB replacement rate is found to increase total
unemployment but no significant effect on longterm and short-term unemployment. UB
duration shows significant effect on long-term
unemployment only.
Both UB replacement rate and UB duration
didn’t show significant effect on labor supply
(including all working population and prime-age
males), only UB duration significantly
decreases all working age population
employment rates.
UB is found to significantly increase structural
unemployment. Also, there is a significant
interaction effect between UB and ALMP.

OECD (1999)

UB replacement rate
(%) ; UB duration
(months)

Unemployment

Nickell (1997)

Dependent Variable

Results

83

UB replacement rate is found to significantly
increase unemployment rates, while UB
duration doesn’t.

83

Other control variables

EPL, ALMP, union density,
coordination index,
corporatism index, tax
wedge, minimum wages.
ALMP, UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, coordination
index, centralisation index,
tax wedge.

UB replacement rate(%) ;
UB duration (months)

Unemployment

Both UB replacement rate and duration is found
to significantly increase unemployment rates.
Also, economic shocks are found to have
stronger effect on unemployment when the
replacement is high and the duration is long.

Belot and Van
Ours (2000)

UB replacement rate (%)

structural unemployment

UB is found to have significant effect on
structural unemployment before introducing
time and country fixed effect.

Bertola, Blau,
and Kahn
(2002)

UB replacement rate(%)

Unemployment

UB replacement rate is found to have significant
effect on unemployment.
Though there is no significant interaction
between UB replacement rate and duration with
shocks.

OECD (2002)

UB replacement rate (%)

Employment rate

In some cases UB is found to significantly
decrease employment rates.

Baker, Glyn,
Howell and
Schmitt (2004)

UB replacement
rate(%) ; UB duration
(months)

Unemployment

Nickell,
Nunziata and
Ochel(2005)

UB replacement rate(%) ;

structural unemployment

UB replacement and duration are found to
significantly reduce unemployment in some
sub-periods, while increases or decreases
unemployment but not significant in other
periods.
UB replacement and duration are found to have
no significant effect on structural unemployment,
and there are also no significant interactions
between labour market institutions and economic
shocks.

84

Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000)

UB duration index

84

EPL, TFP growth, labour
demand shocks, real interest
rate shocks. ALMP. Union
density. Union coverage.
coordination index. Tax
rates.
EPL, Change in inflation,
union density, union
coverage, coordination
index, tax rates.
EPL, TFP growth, labour
demand shocks, real interest
rate shocks. ALMP. Union
density. Union coverage.
coordination index. Tax
rates.
EPL, union density, product
market regulation index.
EPL, change in inflation, ,
union density, union
coverage, coordination
index, tax rates.
EPL, money supply shock,
change in TFP growth,
labour demand shock, real
import price shock, real
interest rates., union density,
coordination index, tax
wedge, owner occupation
rate.

Table 2-6. The Effects of ALMP: A Summary of Empirical Findings
Author and
Year
Scarpetta (1996)

Main
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable

Results

Other control
variables

ALMP
(expenditures for
ALMP per
unemployed person
relative to GDP per
capita)
ALMP

Structural unemployment

In some cases ALMP is found to decrease
structural unemployment and non-employment.
(while UB is almost significant in all models, so
the author argues the UB generosity have more
stronger effect than ALMP).

EPL. UB replacement
rates, union density,
coordination index,
corporatism index, tax
wedge.

Total unemployment, long-term
unemployment, short-term
unemployment, employment to
population ratio (overall and maleaged males).

Elmeskov,
Martin, and
Scarpetta (1998)

ALMP

structural unemployment

ALMP is found to significantly decrease total
unemployment and long-term unemployment, but
not short-term unemployment. ALMP doesn’t
exert significant effect on employment to
population rate, no matter for the total working
age population or prime-aged male.
ALMP is only significantly decreases structural
unemployment in some cases. Besides, there is
significant interaction between ALMP and UB on
structural unemployment.

OECD (1999)

ALMP (% spending
as GDP)

Unemployment and employment rates

ALMP is found to have no significant effect on
unemployment and employment rates.

Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000)

ALMP (% spending
as GDP)

Unemployment

ALMP is found to increase unemployment.
However, there is no significant interaction
between ALMP and economic shocks.

EPL; UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, union coverage,
coordination index. Tax
wedge. Dummy for time
period.
EPL, UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, coordination
index, corporatism
index, tax wedge,
minimum wages.
EPL, UB replacement
rate; UB duration, union
density, coordination
index, centralisation
index, tax wedge.
EPL; TFP growth,
labour demand shocks,
real interest rate shocks.
UB duration index.
UB replacement rate.
Union density. Union

Nickell (1997)

85

85

coverage. coordination
index. Tax rates.
Bertola, Blau, and
Kahn (2002)

ALMP (% spending
as GDP)

Unemployment

ALMP is found to have no significant on
unemployment, no interaction with shocks on
unemployment, either.

Baker, Glyn,
Howell and
Schmitt (2005)

ALMP (% spending
as GDP)

Unemployment

ALMP is found to have no significant on
unemployment.

86
86

EPL, TFP growth,
labour demand shocks,
real interest rate shocks.
UB replacement rate.
Union density. Union
coverage. coordination
index. Tax rates.
EPL, Change in
inflation, UB
replacement rates, UB
duration index, union
density, union coverage,
coordination index, tax
rates

Chapter 3. Methodology: Research Questions and Methods

I. Data and Sources
Micro-level data
Data employed in this dissertation are drawn from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS) Database26 and the 2005 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).
LIS is an archive of comparable micro-datasets for a large number of countries and
provides important individual demographic features (age, education level, marital
status, and gender) and labor-market status variables (employed/not employed, in parttime/full-time work, occupation, and annual earnings).
The proposed research sample comprises people of prime working age, 15-6527,
from 20 countries, including 17 Western countries and three East Asian countries. The
Western countries can be further divided into four groups: Nordic (Sweden, Finland,
Norway, and Denmark); Continental European (Germany, France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands); South European (Spain and Italy); Anglophone (Australia, Canada, the

Due to the data comparability, I will use data from wave 6 and wave 7; they are collected from
2005-2008.
27
Previous studies found young workers (aged 15-24) and old workers (aged 55-65) have higher job
and employment insecurity perceptions than prime aged workers, so I include young workers in
Chapter 6. For the consistency, Chapter4, 5, and 6 all adopted three age groups: young workers (aged
15-24), old workers (aged 55-65), and prime aged workers (25-54) is the reference group.
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United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States); Eastern European (Hungary and the
Czech Republic), and East Asian (Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea).28 Despite Holliday
(2000) having proposed the concept of “productivist welfare capitalism” as a fourth
type of welfare-state regime identifiable in East Asian countries, few comparative
studies in this area have included East Asian data. As a result, this dissertation will make
an important contribution to our understanding of this fourth type of welfare state.
The ISSP is an open-ended collaborative program of annual surveys on
important research topics in the social sciences, which has covered a different survey
topic each year since 1985. In 2005, the survey topic was “work orientation”, which
included questions about the respondents’ subjective perceptions regarding three kinds
of security. The 2005 ISSP provides indices of subjective perceptions of job security,
employment security, and job-loss worry.

Macro-level data
The macro-level data are from a variety of sources, such as the OECD
Employment database 29 , which includes EPL, ALMP, and PLMP. The first index
Italy is only in Chapters 4 and 5, based on the LIS Database, and Belgium is only in Chapter 6,
which draws from the ISSP. Moreover, due to the lack of annual earnings data for Korea in 2006,
Chapter 5 does not include Korea, so there are only 18 countries in Chapter 5, but 19 countries in
Chapter 4 and 6 The total number of countries have been adopted in this research (including Chapters
4,5, and 6) are 20.
29
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=EPL_OV
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measures the flexibility of labor market regulation, and I have followed a number of
scholars (e.g., Tangian, 2007; Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2009) in using the OECD’s EPL,
which measures the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups
of workers30 (OECD, 2013). As for the Modified Welfare State Intervention Index, the
maternity leave measure (full paid weeks) is from OECD Social Protection and Wellbeing dataset31, public spending on early childhood education and care as % of GDP
are from OECD Family Database32, and public employments33 are also from OECD
Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation dataset34. This dissertation’s data on
collective agreement coverage rates come from the ILO report Social Dialogue
Indicators: International Statistical Inquiry 2008-2009 (Hayter and Stoevska, 2011).
II. Measures
Individual characteristics
In Chapters 4 to 6, the following individual worker characteristics are included:

30
Overall EPL includes three parts: job protection of workers in regular contracts, collective dismissals,
and provisions regarding fixed-term contracts and temporary work. As for job protection of workers in
regular contracts, three main areas are considered, such as 1) what reason for dismissal is viewed as
“justified” or “fair”; 2) procedural inconveniences that the employer may face, such as sending notice to
local labor office; 3) notice and severance pay provisions, such as the notice period before dismissal, and
the level of severance pay. As for the provisions of fixed-term work, it also measures the maximum
number of successive contracts and maximum cumulated duration. (OECD, 2013)
31
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54760
32
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm
33
The percentage of workers who employed in public sectors as a share of total employed workers.
34
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=66856
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gender, coded as female (1=yes, 0=no), age 35 , education measured as completed
bachelor’s degree (1=yes, 0=no), family composition coded as partnered

36

(1=yes,

0=no), presence of pre-school aged child37 (1=yes, 0=no), and number of children38. It
is because the presence of children under the age of six in the household is an important
factor that may influence the employment patterns of parents (particularly mothers).
In addition, a number of studies have noted that some job characteristics are
highly influenced by worker’s job security perception, so the following job
characteristics will also be included in Chapter 6: part-time work status (1=yes, 0=no),
public sector employee (1=yes, 0=no), union membership (1=yes, 0=no), and
managerial position (1=yes, 0=no).
Country-level characteristics
To measure the strictness of legally mandated employment protection, first, the
OECD’s composite overall EPL will be adopted, which measures the procedures and
costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers (OECD, 2005). The

Age will be coded as 15-24, 55-65, and 25-54 as the reference group in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
In LIS data, when “marital status” is coded as 1, it includes married and in consensual union. In
ISSP, “partnered” means an answer of “yes” for the statement: “Do you have or live with a partner?”
Thus, cohabitation or being partnered are the main concern here, but not formal marriage.
Consequently, I use “partnered” to substitute “married” in all three result chapters.
37
The presence of children under the age of six in the household is an important factor that may
influence the employment patterns of parents (particularly mothers)，and only LIS has data on
“number of children”, so only Chapter4 and 5 include this variable.
38
Including all aged of children (under 18) and live together.
Only LIS has the data of “number of children”, so only Chapters 4 and 5 include this variable.
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index

39

covers three distinct dimensions: (1) regulations regarding individual

dismissals of workers with regular contracts, (2) additional restrictions for collective
dismissals, and (3) regulations for temporary employment. The OECD Secretariat also
annually compiles an overall flexibility index that includes these four aspects. Moreover,
due to the different types of EPL exerting different effects on labor market outcomes
(particularly after the partial deregulation in the 1990s as mentioned before), the effects
of EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary contracts are also examined. As for
the indices for measuring security, ALMP and PLMP are measured by the percentages
of GDP that are expended on and that roughly indicate levels of government endeavor
in the area of labor-market security. ALMP includes training, lifelong learning, job
creation programs and job-search assistance, while PLMP usually refers to
unemployment insurance benefits (UB).
Following Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006), I will measure work-family
policies using their Welfare State Intervention Index (WSII). This composite index
includes three indicators to represent the scope of family policies in each country: (1)
the number of fully paid weeks of maternity leave, i.e., the number of paid weeks
multiplied by the replacement rate during the leave; (2) the percentage of pre-school
There are total 18 basis measures for the composite index EPL, including 8 measures for the first
part, 4 measures for second part, and 6 measures for the third part, and the 18 measures are not given
equal weight. But for more details, please see the Employment outlook (OECD,2004).
91
39

aged-aged children in publicly funded childcare facilities (indicating the generosity of
a specific nation’s public childcare systems); and (3) the percentage of the total
workforce that is employed in the public social service sector (as a measure of the
availability of public services provided by the state, as well as the extent of the welfare
state as an employer).40 However, due to data availability, I slightly adjust two of the
indicators. As for the percentage of pre-school aged-aged children in publicly funded
childcare facilities, due to the lack of suitable comparative cross-national data, I
substitute the percentage of GDP spent on early childhood education and care, because
it also can represent the generosity of a specific nation’s public childcare system.
Similarly, as for the percentage of the total workforce that is employed in the public
social service sector, due to data availability, I substitute the percentage of workforce
in the public sector relative to total employment of the working age population. Public
employment in health, education, and welfare as a percentage of the working age
population is a good indicator to measure the level of a specific country’s endeavor on
welfare state policies, but Huber and Stephens (2000) found it is not complete in the
Welfare State Exit Entry Project (WEEP) data. But they also found that civilian
government employment is highly correlated with the percentage of public employment

According to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the Welfare State Intervention
Index=0.828*maternity+0.721*child care+0.845*public services.
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in health, education, and welfare from total working age population. Consequently, I
adopt civilian government employment to substitute the percentage of public
employment in health, education, and welfare in total working population. Due to these
two slightly adjustments, I call it the Modified Welfare State Intervention Index
(MWSI).
As Madsen (2006) argues, the political environment and the dynamic between
social partners (including trade unions) are factors that are crucial to the success of
flexicurity implementation. Higher levels of trade union power may suggest more
concentrated wage negotiation mechanisms, which would tend to result in more
compact wage structures and more equal earnings between male and female workers.
When seeking to measure the power of unions to affect working conditions, the
collective agreement coverage rate has been found to be a better measure than the union
membership coverage rate (Visser, 2006). The collective agreement coverage rates
indicate the number of employees covered by the collective agreement, divided by the
total number of wage and salary-earners.

Dependent Variables
In the first section (Chapter 4), the dependent variables will be five labor-
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market status variables. Those are separately coded as employed (1=yes, 0=no), in parttime41 (1=yes, 0=no), in temporary work (1=yes, 0=no), in managerial position (1=yes,
0=no), and in female-type occupation (1=yes, 0=no). As for the definition of a femaletype occupation, the construction used here draws on Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006)
work on how welfare state interventions influence women’s employment probabilities.
According to Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) definition, a female-type occupation is
one in which the proportion of women exceeds 150% of the female proportion of a
country’s work force. For example, if the total female labor force is 40% in Germany,
and over 60% of accountants in Germany are female, we can say that accountancy in
Germany is a female-type occupation.
As for the second section (Chapter 5), there are two different dependent variables
in this part: the first one is the natural log of wage (annual earnings), and the second
one is the percentile of wage (annual earnings), which can present the relative wage
structures in different countries. In other words, the dependent variable (annual earnings)
will be defined in nominal terms and once in standardized terms to differentiate the
flexicurity and welfare state policy effects from the wage structure effects. The
standardized measure indicates a percentile ranking scale on which individuals are
Due to self-reported part-time working status having a high variability between countries, working
fewer than 35 hours per week in total will be treated as working part time for the purposes of this
research.
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ranked in each country according to their relative earnings within a specific country’s
earnings ladder (Gornick, 1999). This division of the contributors for gender earning
inequality is meaningful because these two arguments may lead to different policy
implications.
With regard to the third section (Chapter 6), there are three workers’
subjective perceptions that will be measured. To estimate job security, the indicator is
the level of agreement with the statement, “My job is secure”, with five possible
responses: (5) “strongly agree”, (4) “agree”, (3) “neither agree nor disagree”, (2)
“disagree”, and (1) “strongly disagree”. For the purposes of analysis, “strongly agree”
and “agree” are coded as 1 in a new dummy variable, job security, whereas the other
responses are coded as 0.42
To assess employment security, the respondents are asked to provide the extent of
their agreement with the statement, “How difficult or easy do you think it would be for
you to find a job at least as good as your current one?” The answer is provided on a
five-point scale of agreement: (1) “very difficult”, (2) “fairly difficult”, (3) “neither
easy nor difficult”, (4) “very easy” and (5) “fairly easy”. For the purposes of this
research, the answers “very easy” and “fairly easy” are coded as 1 for a new dummy

At first, I interested in ordinal response, but I found that violated the parallel lines/proportional odds
assumption. Thus, I recoded it as dummy variable.
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variable, employment security, whereas the other possible answers are coded as 0.
With regard to the third outcome variable, job-loss worry, its indicator is the
level of agreement with the statement, “To what extent do you worry about the
possibility of losing your job?” with four possible responses: (1) “I worry a great deal”,
(2) “I worry to some extent”, (3) “I worry a little” and (4) “I do not worry at all”. “I do
not worry at all” is coded as 0 for the new dummy variable, and any level of job-loss
worry is coded as 1.

III. Analysis Strategy
A multilevel model will be adopted to evaluate the effects of national-level
characteristics on individual-level outcomes while controlling for variation of
individual-levels. It is important to note that, for ease of discussion, throught this
dissertation, I use the terminology of institutional/policy “effects”. However, I am
aware that the research design does not allow drawing strong conclusions about
causality.
For the first section (Chapter 4), there are a total of five labor market outcome variables
that will be estimated: employed (1=yes, 0=no), in part-time job (1=yes, 0=no), in
temporary work (1=yes, 0=no), in managerial position (1=yes, 0=no), and in female96

type occupation (1=yes, 0=no). The model includes micro-level worker and job
characteristics that prior research inidicates are associated with labor market outcomes.
Macro-level factors are also included because the prime objective is to explore how
country-level factors, particularly flexicurity policies and welfare state interventions,
influence individual labor market outcomes. Also, it should be noted that, because of
the limited number of countries included in this project, the macro-level variables will
be introduced one at a time after controlling for GDP per capita.43
However, due to some limitations of the models (such as the not concave
iterations), I follow Möhring’s (2012) suggestion, which is to adopt the fixed effects
approach as an alternative to multilevel models for cross-national analyses. According
to Möhring (2012), multilevel modelling originated from educational research, in which
pupils are typically nested in classes and sometimes in schools as a third level. As for
multilevel analyses in social policies or social sciences, there is usually no random

As Möhring (2012) suggests, multilevel modeling originated from educational research, and here,
pupils typically nested in classes (and sometimes nested at schools at the third level) are analyzed, but
in social policy or sociology research, multilevel models are usually applied to analyze individuals
nested in countries. The application of multilevel models for this type of research is confronted with
some problems. First, the country selection is usually not a random sample in these surveys. Second,
these datasets often include only 25 countries or less. Consequently, multilevel models on the basis of
international surveys have a low number of degrees of freedom on the country-level. According to
Möhring (2012), “If models are correctly specified paying regard to the small country-level N, only a
low number of macro-level indicators can be controlled for”.
Furthermore, following Lyness, Gornick, Stone and Grotto’s (2012) research, due to the limited
number of countries included in this paper, they suggest, ”the macro-level data will be introduced one
at a time” after controlling one major macro-level indicator. Taken together, due to the limited number
of countries (19) in this project, I will use a similar research design.
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sample at the upper level, and there is usually a small N at the upper level. Consequently,
Möhring suggests adopting fixed effects regression models to substitute for multilevel
models, and, in practice, this is done by including dummy variables for N-1 countries
in the model. Also, Möhring argues that the main drawback of fixed effect models is
that country-level variables cannot be estimated, because after the inclusion of N-1
country dummies there is no variance left to be explained by additional country-level
variables. However, this shortcoming can be fixed by including interactions between
micro-level and macro-level variables (Möhring, 2012),. Furthermore, Möhring also
provides an example, indicates that the pseudo R-squared in a fixed effect model is
equal to the Interclass Correlation (ICC) of the multilevel null-model. Due to the not
concave iterations, I will estimate fixed effect models for all five outcomes, and also
multilevel analysis for temporary jobs, and will compare the results of these two
methods.
As for the second part (Chapter 5), macro-level factors are also included
because the prime objective is to explore how country-level factors, particularly
flexicurity policies and welfare state intervention, influence the gender earning gaps. If,
as official EU statements have claimed, flexicurity policies can guarantee female
workers with higher earnings and lower gender earning gaps, then we should expect to
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observe lower gender earning disparities in countries with more prominent labor market
policies endeavors. Furthermore, to measure the effects of wage structure on gender
earnings differentials, in addition to the natural log of wage (annual earnings), the
percentile of wage (annual earnings) will be adopted as the second dependent variable,
which can present the relative wage structures in different countries.
At the micro-level, based on the foregoing literature review, I hypothesize that
females and younger respondents will report a lower level of earnings (annual earnings).
I also hypothesize that having a partner and completion of higher education (college or
more) will be positively related to the earnings (annual income), but the presence of
children and number of children will be negatively related to the earnings.
At the country-level, I examine the effects of many important macro-level factors,
including the level of labor market “flexibility” (measured by overall EPL, regular job
EPL, and temporary job EPL), and the level of government labor market policy effort,
which can be conceptualized as the level of labor market “security” (measured by
ALMP), and the level of combination security (measured by MWSI). I hypothesize that
all of these macro-level contextual features will be positively associated with the natural
log of earnings. However, following Mandel and Semyonov’s (2005, 2006) research
design, I hypothesize that these macro-level factors will exert different effects on
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individual worker’s earnings percentiles. By examining the two different dependent
variables (one in nominal terms and one in standardized terms), we can differentiate the
flexicurity and welfare state policy effects from the wage structure effects more clearly.
From a theoretical point of view, this division of the contributors for gender earnings
inequality is meaningful because these two arguments may lead to different policy
implications (Gornick, 1999).
With regard to the third section (Chapter 6), a multilevel model is adopted to
evaluate the effects of national-level characteristics on individual-level outcomes while
controlling for variation at the individual-levels. Three outcome variables are estimated:
job security, employment security, and job-loss worry. The model includes micro-level
worker and job characteristics, which have been found to be associated with security
perceptions. Macro-level factors are also included because the prime objective is to
explore how country-level factors, particularly flexicurity policies and welfare state
intervention, influence the three types of job security.
If, as supporters have claimed, flexicurity policies can guarantee workers higher
security perceptions and higher levels of gender equality, then we should expect to
observe higher levels of subjective security perception in countries with more
prominent labor market policy efforts. Furthermore, we should expect lower levels of
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disparity between the genders with regard to perceptions of security. Table 6-1 shows
the analysis model, which includes micro-level and macro-level factors.
At the micro-level, based on prior the literature, I hypothesize that women will
report lower levels of security perceptions. I hypothesize that young workers and older
workers will perceive less security than middle-aged workers and that having a partner
and completing higher education will be positively related to perceptions of security.
However, the presence of children will be negatively related to security perceptions.
Furthermore, having an employed partner will decrease the extent of job-loss worry.
For job characteristics, I hypothesize that part-time work will be negatively related to
perceptions of security, whereas being employed in the public sector and being a union
member will show positive effects on security perceptions.
At the country-level, I examine the effects of many important macro-level factors,
including standard of living (GDP per capita), the level of labor market “flexibility”
(measured by EPL), and the level of government labor market policy efforts,
conceptualized as the level of labor market “security” (measured by ALMP and PLMP),
the labor market situation (measured by the unemployment), the average tenure, the
level of combination security (measured by MWSI), and union power (measured by
collective agreement coverage). I hypothesize that all of these macro-level contextual
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features will be positively associated with security perceptions, with the exception of
EPL and the average unemployment rate. Again, because women usually suffer more
than men do from work-family conflict, I hypothesize that the level of welfare state
intervention influences women’s security perceptions more than those of men.
Also, as for the covariance structure, I use the Stata default, which is an
independent covariance structure. An independent covariance structure allows for
distinct variance for each random effect within a random-effects equation and assumes
that all covariances are 0.44 As for the standard errors, I use vce(robust) in Stata, which
refers to the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator.
Also, at the end of each chapter, I want to present margins effects of three
country-level factors (overall EPL, ALMP, and MWSI) on each dependent variable
while setting the values of other factors at their means.

44

From Stata manual “mixed” p.3.
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Chapter 4: The Effects of Flexicurity on Women’s
Employment Probabilities in 19 Countries
I. Correlations between Macro-level Factors and Labor Market
Outcomes
Figure 4-1 presents the relationship between overall EPL and the total female
employment rates45. The liberal market economies of English-speaking countries (such
as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom) are concentrated in
the left side of the figure, which indicates lower overall EPL and higher female
employment rates,

Figure 4-1. Overall EPL and Female Employment Rates

45

The total employment rate includes full-time and part-time employment.
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while the corporatist economies and Social democratic countries occupy the right area
, and Social democratic countries (such as the Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden)
perform better on female employmentthan the corporatist countries (such as Germany,
France, Italy, and Spain). Generally speaking, this pattern seems to confirm the
deregulation orthodoxy argument: stricter labor market regulation is harmful for
minority groups (such as women) in the labor market because employers may be
reluctant to hire women with potentially higher labor costs. However, there is only a
weak (-0.27) and insignificant correlation between these two factors, so following the
deregulation orthodoxy logic, the correlation between regular EPL and female part-time
employment rate is further tested. If the deregulation argument were true, then we
would anticipate that a higher regular EPL will yield a higher minority group atypical
employment rate, such as the female part-time employment rate.

Figure 4-2. Regular EPL and Female Part-time Employment Rates
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However, there is only a weak (0.12) and insignificant correlation between these two
factors. Consequently, Figure 4-2 does not seem to support the deregulation argument
on this point. Subsequently, the correlation between ALMP and the female employment
rate was tested. As reviewed in the previous section, there were almost uniformly
positive results for female employment rates, and these program effects for women are
larger than for men, particularly in countries with low female employment rates
(Bergemann and Van den Berg, 2008; Lechner and Wiehler, 2011). The result in Figure
4-3 generally confirmed these studies: the correlation is moderately high (0.47), and it
is significant. In addition to these two critical policy factors in flexicurity, this research
also intends to identify how welfare state interventions influence women labor market
outcomes, particularly how welfare state interventions influence occupational sex
segregation.

Figure 4-3. ALMP and Female Employment Rates
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According to Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006), there is a crucial twofold effect of
the welfare state on female labor force participation: the welfare state facilitates
women’s access to the labor market, but not into powerful and desirable positions. In
other words, more intense welfare state interventions may yield a higher percentage of
workers in female-type occupations. However, these two factors are only slightly
correlated (0.07), and the correlation is insignificant. Consequently, Figure 4-4 seems
to not support the “welfare state paradox”46 argument.

Figure 4-4. MWSI and % of Worker in Female-Type Work

II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Five Labor
Market Outcomes
Table 4-1 shows the results of fixed effects models testing micro and macro

Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “welfare state paradox” to refer to a specific gendered
paradox: the possibility that work-family policies may have some unintended, negative consequences.
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determinants of individual employment rates. In the first null model, the pseudo Rsquared47 is on 0.024, which suggests only 2.4% of the variability can be explained by
the country differences. In Model 1, I test the effects of six individual-level factors on
the employment probabilities. Being female significantly decreases the employment
probabilities compared to male workers, and young workers (aged 15-24) and older
workers (aged 55-65) both have lower employment probabilities than prime aged
workers. Holding bachelor degree or higher degree and being partnered both
significantly increase the employment probabilities. In contrast, the presence of a preschool aged child decreases the likelihood of being employed. Furthermore, the number
of children also significantly decreases the likelihood of being employed. Also, the
pseudo R-squared in Model 1 becomes 0.138, which suggests these individual factors
explain 10% of the variability of the outcomes. In the following model, the interaction
between gender and partnered, gender and the presence of pre-school aged children,
and gender and the number of children are tested. All three interactions are significantly
negative, which suggests being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged children, and
the number of children have more negative influences on female workers’ employment
probabilities

than

male

workers’.

R-squared in an ordinary OLS means the proportion of the total variability of the outcome that is
accounted for by the model. However, in a logistic regression, there is no R-squared, and the pseudo Rsquared can serve as a similar function as the R-squared.
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Table 4-1. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Employed Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable
Individual-Level Factors

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

1.200***
(0.029)

1.376***
(0.039)

0.944***
(0.045)

0.852***
(0.050)

0.842***
(0.050)

0.703***
(0.048)

0.991***
(0.048)

1.133***
(0.051)

-1.404***

-1.404***

-1.682***

-1.627***

-1.587***

-1.985***

-1.449***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.095)

(0.075)

(0.061)

(0.065)

(0.060)

Age 15-24

-0.942***

-0.942***

-0.916***

-0.917***

-0.916***

-0.916***

-0.916***

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.033)

Age 55-65

-1.302***

-1.302***

-1.245***

-1.245***

-1.248***

-1.250***

-1.250***

Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Bachelor Degree or higher
degree
Partnered
Preschool Children
Numbers of Children
Female × Partnered

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

0.645***
(0.008)

0.655***
(0.008)

0.655***
(0.008)

0.655***
(0.008)

0.654***
(0.008)

0.654***
(0.008)

0.656***
(0.008)

0.128***
(0.012)
-0.380***
(0.011)
-0.123***
(0.006)

0.441***
(0.024)
0.192***
(0.022)
-0.017
(0.013)
-0.396***

0.332***
(0.024)
0.207***
(0.023)
-0.011
(0.013)
-0.252***

0.332***
(0.024)
0.207***
(0.023)
-0.011
(0.013)
-0.253***

0.334***
(0.024)
0.216***
(0.023)
-0.010
(0.013)
-0.251***

0.295***
(0.024)
0.224***
(0.023)
-0.012
(0.013)
-0.203***

0.268***
(0.024)
0.225***
(0.023)
-0.012
(0.013)
-0.167***

(0.027)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

Female × Preschool
Children

-0.758***

-0.782***

-0.782***

-0.796***

-0.810***

-0.811***

(0.026)

(0.026)

(0.026)

(0.026)

(0.025)

(0.026)

Female × Numbers of
Children

-0.143***

-0.154***

-0.154***

-0.157***

-0.154***

-0.153***

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

Country-Level Interaction
Female × GDP per capita
Female × Overall EPL
Female × Regular EPL
Female × Temporary EPL
Female × ALMP
Female × MWSI

0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** -0.000003*
(0.0000001) (0.0000001) (0.0000001) (0.0000001) (0.0000001)
0.031
(0.030)
0.009
(0.021)
-0.161***
(0.013)
0.693***
(0.033)
0.012***
(0.0006)

0.024
0.138
0.143
0.144
Pseudo R-squared
Note: N = 19 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

0.144

0.145

0.146

0.146

Following, five country-level characteristics are tested, including important contextual
factors, flexicurity policies indicators, and the MWSI, while controlling for the six
micro-level indicators. Due to the limited number of countries (19 countries), macrolevel factors are introduced one at a time. In the following models, the interaction
between gender and some vital flexicurity policy indicators are tested.
In Model 3,4, and 5, three types of EPL and the interaction between gender and
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EPL are tested separately. Only temporary EPL presents significantly negative
interaction with gender, which suggests stricter temporary EPL is more negatively
associated with female workers’ employment probabilities. This finding seems to
confirm the “deregulation orthodoxy”: the strictness of labor market regulation is not
beneficial for increasing employment probabilities, especially for women. Furthermore,
this finding also resonates with the “partial deregulation” phenomenon, which suggests
easing temporary job regulation while keeping existing regular job security provisions
unaltered. In other words, this finding suggests the partial deregulation is more
negatively associated with women’s employment prospects, as I assumed.
On the other hand, ALMP is found to be positively associated with gender,
which means that a higher level of ALMP expenditures are more positively associated
with female workers’ employment probabilities than male workers’ probabilities. This
finding confirms previous studies, such as that of Bergemann and Van den Berg (2008),
who found that ALMP programs’ effects for women are larger than for men, especially
in countries with relatively low female employment rates, and Lechner and Wiehler
(2011), who found that participation in training programs is more effective for women
than for men, especially for young women because the participation in training courses
usually reduces or postpones pregnancies and increases attachment to the labor force.
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As for the MWSI, it also shows a positive and significant interaction effect between
gender and welfare state interventions, which suggests that a higher MWSI is more
positively associated with female workers’ employment probabilities than with male
workers’. This result corresponds to Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) finding: the
welfare state facilitates women’s employment by raising public service employment
and providing more family-friendly support measures.
Table 4-2 shows the results of fixed effects models testing the micro and macro
determinants of probabilities for employment in a part-time job. In the first null model,
the pseudo R-squared is 0.05, which suggests only 5% of the variability can be
explained by the country differences. Also, the pseudo R-squared in Model 1 becomes
0.141, which suggests these individual factors explain 9% of the variability of the
outcomes.
With regard to individual-level factors, being female, being a young or older
worker, and the presence of pre-school aged children are positively and significantly
related to the likelihood of holding a part-time job. In contrast, being a prime-aged
worker, holding a bachelor or higher degree, being partnered, and the number of
children are negatively associated with the probabilities of being employed in a parttime job.
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Model indicates a positive and significant interaction effect between being
female and overall EPL, which suggests that higher EPL is positively associated with
part-time job probabilities for women than men, and it confirms the literature’s
prediction: higher EPL is more harmful for minorities or other outsiders in the labor
market, such as women. As for Model 2 and Model 3, we find that stricter regular EPL
also is positively associated with women’s probabilities of holding a part-time job more
than for men, while the strictness of temporary job EPL is negatively associated with
women’s probabilities of holding part-time jobs more than for men. These results seem
to confirm the previous studies’ conclusions: the strictness of EPL is harmful for
“outsiders” of the labor market, while “insiders” (usually meaning prime-age men) are
better protected by the strict employment regulations. However, why is temporary EPL
more negatively associated with women’s probabilities of holding part-time jobs than
for men? This finding still needs to be further explored.
Model 4 demonstrates a negative and significant interaction between being
female and ALMP, which means that higher ALMP is negatively associated with
women’s probabilities of holding a part-time job compared to men. As for Model 5, it
shows a negative and significant interaction effect between gender and welfare state
interventions, which suggests that the MWSI is negatively associated with women’s
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probabilities of holding a part-time job compared to men.
Table 4-2. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Part-Time Employment Probabilities with Individualand Country-Level Variables
Variable
Individual-Level Factors

Model 0

Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-8.97***

-9.97***

-9.66***

2.83*

-9.17***

-10.67***

(0.038)

(0.028)

(0.235)

(1.28)

(0.205)

(0.215)

2.56***

3.41***

Worker Characteristics
Female
Age 15-24
Age 55-65
Bachelor Degree or
higher degree
Partnered
Preschool Children
Numbers of Children

0.738*** 1.135*** 1.135***
(0.056)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.038)

(0.053)

1.318**

1.318**

1.318**

1.318**

1.318**

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

0.054**

0.054**

0.054**

0.054**

0.054**

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

(0.0007)

-0.217*** -0.252*** -0.252***
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)

-0.248***
(0.008)

-0.259***
(0.008)

-0.300*** -0.092*** -0.092***

-0.074***

-0.072***

(0.017)
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.562*** 0.365*** 0.365***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
-0.052*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)

(0.013)
0.381***
(0.016)
0.063***
(0.005)

(0.013)
0.381***
(0.016)
0.067***
(0.005)

Country-Level Interaction
Female × Overall EPL

0.202***
(0.024)
0.033
(0.018)

Female × Regular EPL

-0.349***
(0.014)

Female × Temporary
EPL

-1.47***
(0.036)

Female × ALMP

-0.030***
Female × MWSI

(0.0006)

Pseudo R-squared
0.05
0.141
0.1407
0.1428
N = 19 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

0.1516

0.1534

It seems surprising to find this outcome because previous studies (Mandel and
Semyonov, 2006) find that higher welfare state intervention will lead to unintended
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outcomes, such as more women holding non-regular contract jobs. Consequently, this
result also needs to be further explored.
Table 4-3 48 adopted a fixed effect model to test individual factors and the
interaction between country and individual-level factors on the probabilities of holding
a temporary job. The null model is significant, while the pseudo R-squared is only 0.02,
adding individual-level factors increases the pseudo R-squared to 0.05 (although the
pseudo R-squared is still 0.05 after adding country-level interactions). With regard to
the individual-level factors, being female, being a young or older worker, the presence
of pre-school aged children and the number of children are positive and significantly
related to the likelihood of holding a temporary job. In contrast,completing a bachelor
degree or higher degree, and being partnered, are negatively associated with the
likelihood of holding a temporary job. As for the gender interactions, only the number
of children is more positively associated with female workers’ probabilities of holding
a temporary job than male workers’. With regard to country-level factors, both regular
EPL and temporary EPL are more positively associated with female workers’
probabilities of holding a temporary job than male workers’.

48

Table 4-3 includes only the 11 countries that have the variable of temporary or permanent contract

jobs.
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Table 4-3. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Temporary Job Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable
Individual-Level Factors
Intercept

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

-1.834***
(0.042)

-1.673***
(0.081)

-1.497***
(0.106)

-1.541***
(0.109)

-1.549***
(0.108)

-1.491***
(0.101)

-1.501***
(0.106)

-1.532***
(0.109)

0.716***

0.443***

-0.231

-0.521

0.036

0.238

0.412

(0.030)

(0.100)

(0.347)

(0.345)

(0.229)

(0.219)

(0.265)

0.644***

0.648***

0.647***

0.648***

0.646***

0.645***

0.646***

(0.109)

(0.108)

(0.108)

(0.108)

(0.108)

(0.109)

(0.109)

0.192***

0.190***

0.191***

0.192***

0.191***

0.189***

0.189***

Worker Characteristics
Female
Age 15-24
Age 55-65
Bachelor Degree or higher
degree
Partnered
Preschool Children
Numbers of Children
Female × Partnered
Female × Preschool
Children
Female × Numbers of
Children

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

-0.297***
(0.023)

-0.297***
(0.023)

-0.298***
(0.023)

-0.297***
(0.023)

-0.300***
(0.023)

-0.298***
(0.023)

-0.297***
(0.023)

-0.205***
(0.037)
0.370***
(0.032)
0.079***
(0.018)

-0.218***
(0.073)
0.355***
(0.049)
-0.005
(0.029)
0.009

-0.211**
(0.073)
0.356***
(0.049)
-0.005
(0.030)
0.002

-0.223**
(0.073)
0.358***
(0.049)
-0.004
(0.030)
0.019

-0.202**
(0.073)
0.355***
(0.049)
-0.005
(0.030)
-0.009

-0.208**
(0.074)
0.355***
(0.049)
-0.004
(0.030)
-0.003

-0.194*
(0.075)
0.353***
(0.049)
-0.006
(0.030)
-0.020

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.084)

(0.084)

(0.086)

0.024

0.019

0.016

0.020

0.023

0.026

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

0.141***

0.142***

0.141***

0.142***

0.139***

0.142***

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.037)

0.00001
(0.0000006)
0.104
(0.065)

0.00001**
(0.000007)

0.000009
(0.000006)

0.000007
(0.000006)

0.000007
(0.000006)

Country-Level Interaction
Female × GDP per capita
Female × Overall EPL

0.144**
(0.053)

Female × Regular EPL

0.065*
(0.032)

Female × Temporary EPL

-0.065
(0.097)

Female × ALMP

-0.002

Female × MWSI

(0.002)

0.022
0.051
0.051
0.051
Pseudo R-squared
Note: N = 11 countries.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

0.052

0.051

0.051

0.051

Table 4-4 adopted multilevel models to test individual factors and the
interaction between country and individual-level factors on the probabilities of
holding a temporary job. The null model is significant, which suggests the variation
among the countries is significant. Basically, the individual-level results in Table 4-4
are very similar to the results in Table 4-3. However, the results of the country-level
factors are different: as Table 4-4 shows, only the MWSI is negatively associated with
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Table 4-4. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Temporary Employment Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

-0.909

-0.650

-1.364***

-0.911

0.173

(0.055)

(0.848)

(0.263)

(0.548)

(0.625)

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

-0.839

-0.561

-1.321*

-0.933

0.063

(0.997)

(0.848)

(0.622)

(0.550)

(0.631)
0.606***

Individual-Level Fixed Effects
Intercept

-2.078*** -1.956*** -1.784***
(0.122)

(0.327)

(0.303)

Worker Characteristics
Female

Age 15-24

Age 55-65
Bachelor Degree or higher degree

Partnered

Preschool Childrn

Numbers of Children

Female × Partnered

Female × Preschool Childrn

Female × Numbers of Children

0.716*** 0.443*** 0.444***

0.444***

0.444***

0.444***

0.442***

0.326

0.294*

0.367**

0.478***

(0.108)

(0.068)

(0.099)

(0.099)

(0.099)

(0.099)

(0.099)

(0.171)

(0.139)

(0.108)

(0.119)

(0.146)

0.644***

0.649*

0.649***

0.649***

0.650***

0.649***

0.648***

0.650***

0.652***

0.651***

0.649***

0.647***

(0.271)

(0.269)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

(0.111)

0.193

0.190

0.191**

0.191***

0.191***

0.190***

0.190***

0.192**

0.192***

0.192***

0.190***

0.190***

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.251)

(0.251)

-0.297*

-0.297*

-0.297*** -0.297***

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

-0.296***

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297*** -0.296***

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

-0.297***

-0.297***

-0.297***

(0.120)

(0.121)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

-0.203***
(0.055)

-0.215*
(0.092)

-0.214**
(0.072)

-0.214**
(0.072)

-0.214**
(0.072)

-0.215**
(0.072)

-0.217**
(0.072)

-0.214**
(0.072)

-0.220**
(0.072)

-0.205**
(0.072)

-0.210**
(0.073)

-0.192**
(0.074)

0.369*** 0.355*** 0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.354***

0.354***

0.353***

(0.067)

(0.058)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

0.079**

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

-0.006

-0.006

-0.007

-0.005

-0.007

(0.028)

(0.036)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.028)

0.008

0.007

0.007

0.007

0.007

0.009

0.007

0.016

-0.003

0.001

-0.022

(0.100)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.083)

(0.084)

(0.086)

0.024

0.024

0.024

0.024

0.024

0.025

0.024

0.025

0.024

0.026

0.030

(0.101)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.063)

0.141**

0.141***

0.141***

0.141***

0.141***

0.141***

0.143***

0.143***

0.144***

0.141***

0.144***

(0.040)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

(0.036)

-0.00002

-0.00002

-0.00002

-0.00002 -0.00003**

-0.00002

-0.00002

-0.00002

-0.00002 -0.00003**

(0.00001) (0.00001)

(0.00001)

(0.00001)

(0.00001) (0.00001)

(0.00001)

(0.00001)

Country-Level Fixed Effects
GDP per capita

Overall EPL

Regular EPL

(0.00001)

-0.021
(0.255)

(0.257)
-0.097
(0.189)

Temporary EPL

-0.136
(0.191)
0.191
(0.165)

0.159
(0.166)
-0.306
(0.372)

ALMP

-0.276
(0.377)
-0.016**
(0.006)

MWSI

-0.014**
(0.006)
0.046

Female × Overall EPL

(0.055)
0.062
(0.041)

Female × Regular EPL

0.054
(0.031)

Female × Temporary EPL

-0.048
(0.095)

Female × ALMP
Female × MWSI

0.042
0.054
0.054
0.045
0.044
N = 11 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

ICC (Interclass Correlation)

(0.00001)

-0.050

0.040

0.0563

0.028

0.045

0.044

0.040

0.043

-0.003
(0.002)
0.028

the likelihood of holding a temporary job, but no gender interactions with regular EPL
and temporary EPL. This result also suggests only the pseudo R-squared in Table 4-3
is similar with the ICC in Table 4-4 (about 0.4 or 0.5), but the coefficient is relatively
different. Consequently, these differences still need to be further explained in the
future.
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Table 4-5. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Female type Job Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable
Individual-Level Factors

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

-2.107***
(0.031)

-2.740***
(0.046)

-2.663***
(0.049)

-2.456***
(0.051)

-2.528***
(0.051)

-2.668***
(0.050)

-2.629***
(0.050)

-2.595***
(0.049)

1.698***

1.576***

2.870***

2.499***

1.578***

1.516***

1.231***

(0.018)

(0.031)

(0.173)

(0.162)

(0.144)

(0.109)

(0.116)

Age 15-24

0.321***

0.325***

0.321***

0.322***

0.325***

0.325***

0.326***

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.031)

Age 55-65

-0.064**

-0.058**

-0.061*

-0.059*

-0.057*

-0.058*

-0.057*

Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Bachelor Degree or higher
degree
Partnered
Preschool Children
Numbers of Children
Female × Partnered
Female × Preschool
Children
Female × Numbers of
Children

(0.034)

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.024)

-0.199***
(0.010)

-0.197***
(0.010)

-0.196***
(0.010)

-0.197***
(0.010)

-0.197***
(0.010)

-0.196***
(0.010)

-0.199***
(0.010)

-0.053**
(0.019)
0.046
(0.024)
-0.035***
(0.008)

-0.069
(0.036)
0.059
(0.041)
-0.109***
(0.016)
0.027

-0.041
(0.036)
0.046
(0.041)
-0.111***
(0.016)
-0.011

-0.050
(0.036)
0.048
(0.041)
-0.109***
(0.016)
0.003

-0.071*
(0.036)
0.058
(0.041)
-0.110***
(0.016)
0.029

-0.061
(0.036)
0.053
(0.041)
-0.110***
(0.016)
0.015

-0.105**
(0.036)
0.075
(0.041)
-0.109***
(0.016)
0.076

(0.040)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

-0.007

0.015

0.008

-0.007

0.0003

0.039

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.050)

(0.051)

(0.051)

0.107***

0.109***

0.106***

0.108***

0.107***

0.107***

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

-0.00001**
(0.000003)
-0.406***
(0.039)

-0.00001**
(0.000003)

0.0000005
(0.000003)

0.000004
(0.000003)

0.0000006
(0.000003)

Country-Level Interaction
Female × GDP per capita
Female × Overall EPL

-0.255***
(0.030)

Female × Regular EPL

-0.013
(0.018)

Female × Temporary EPL

-0.159**
(0.057)

Female × ALMP

0.006***

Female × MWSI

(0.0009)

0.036
0.131
0.132
0.133
0.132
Pseudo R-squared
Note: N = 14 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

0.132

0.132

0.132

Table 4-5 reports the results of fixed effects models, estimating the micro and
macro determinants of the probabilities of employment in female-type occupations. The
null model is significant, suggesting that the variation among countries is significant.
The pseudo R-squared for the null model is only 0.03, and it becomes about 0.13 after
adding individual-level factors, though the pseudo R square still stays about 0.13 after
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adding interactions between gender and country-level factors. As for individual-level
factors, both being female, and being a young worker, are positively associated with the
likelihood of holding a female-type job. On the contrary, completing a bachelor degree
or higher degree, being an older worker, being partnered, and the number of children,
are all negatively associated with the chances of holding a female-type job. With regard
to gender and individual-level interactions, the number of children is positively
associated with females’ likelihood of holding a female-type occupation more than for
men.
As for gender interactions with country-level factors, overall EPL and regular
EPL all both significantly and negatively associated with females’ chances of holding
a female-type occupation, which does not confirm the deregulation orthodoxy. There is
a negative and significant interaction between being female and ALMP, which suggests
that higher ALMP does not necessarily push women into female-type occupations. In
other words, more developed flexicurity policies (such as higher EPL and ALMP) may
not necessarily be harmful for women’s employment prospects in the labor market.
Consequently, perhaps the higher level of flexicurity policies is not necessarily harmful
for gender equality in the labor market. Finally, Model 7 shows a positive and
significant interaction effect between gender and welfare state interventions (measured
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by the MWSI), which suggests that higher welfare state interventions are positively
associated with the probabilities for women more than for men of holding a femaletype occupation, which again confirms Mandel and Semyonov’s (2006) findings and
predictions about the “welfare state paradox”. In other words, a higher level of welfare
state intervention will increase women’s employment probabilities but not into
desirable and powerful positions.
Table 4-6 shows the results of fixed effects models, estimating the micro and
macro determinants of the probabilities of employment in a managerial position. The
pseudo R-squared for the null model is only 0.06, and it becomes about 0.10 after
adding individual-level factors, though the pseudo R-squared still stays about 0.10 after
adding interactions between gender and country-level factors. As for individual-level
factors, being female, being a young worker, and the presence of pre-school aged
children all are negatively associated with the chances of holding a managerial position.
On the contrary, being an older worker, completing a bachelor or higher degree, being
partnered, and the number of children all are positively associated with the likelihood
of holding a managerial position.
However, though being partnered and the number of children are both positively
associated with the probabilities of having a managerial position, the negative gender
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interactions suggest these two variables are significantly and negatively associated with
female workers’ chances of holding managerial positions more than men’s.
Table 4-6. Fixed Effect Models Predicting Managerial Positions Probabilities with Individual-and Country-Level
Variables
Variable
Individual-Level Factors

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

-2.808***
(0.039)

-3.762***
(0.054)

-3.904***
(0.055)

-3.853***
(0.056)

-3.852***
(0.055)

-3.917***
(0.055)

-3.886***
(0.055)

-3.907***
(0.055)

-0.807***

-0.364***

0.197

0.252

0.098

-0.504***

-0.438**

(0.017)

(0.033)

(0.184)

(0.168)

(0.169)

(0.140)

(0.142)

Age 15-24

-1.318***

-1.328***

-1.329***

-1.329***

-1.328***

-1.328***

-1.328***

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

Age 55-65

0.200***

0.179***

0.177***

0.177***

0.178***

0.178***

0.179***

Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Bachelor Degree or higher
degree
Partnered
Preschool Children
Numbers of Children
Female × Partnered
Female × Preschool
Childrn
Female × Numbers of
Children

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

0.462***
(0.013)

0.462***
(0.013)

0.457***
(0.013)

0.457***
(0.013)

0.458***
(0.013)

0.457***
(0.013)

0.457***
(0.013)

0.374***
(0.021)
-0.220***
(0.023)
0.058***
(0.008)

0.374***
(0.021)
-0.220***
(0.023)
0.058***
(0.008)
-0.426***

0.535***
(0.026)
-0.244***
(0.028)
0.092***
(0.010)
-0.433***

0.536***
(0.026)
-0.244***
(0.028)
0.091***
(0.010)
-0.435***

0.533***
(0.026)
-0.242***
(0.028)
0.090***
(0.010)
-0.428***

0.536***
(0.026)
-0.245***
(0.028)
0.092***
(0.009)
-0.435***

0.533***
(0.027)
-0.242***
(0.028)
0.093***
(0.010)
-0.427***

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.041)

0.056

0.067

0.068

0.061

0.070

0.058

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

-0.139***
(0.017)

-0.138***
(0.017)

-0.137***
(0.017)

-0.134***
(0.017)

-0.140***
(0.017)

-0.140***
(0.017)

-0.000003
(0.000003)
-0.209***
(0.038)

-0.000006
(0.000003)

-0.000008*
(0.000004)

0.000008*
(0.000003)

0.000003
(0.000003)

Country-Level Interaction
Female × GDP per capita
Female × Overall EPL

-0.211***
(0.028)

Female × Regular EPL

-0.124***
(0.022)

Female × Temporary EPL

-0.261***
(0.046)

Female × ALMP

-0.0006

Female × MWSI

(0.0007)

0.06
0.102
0.104
0.104
0.104
Pseudo R-squared
Note: N = 14 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

0.104

0.104

0.104

All three types of EPL are found to have negative interactions with gender,
which suggest that the higher EPL is not helpful for women’s probabilities for holding
managerial positions compared to mens’, these findings resonate Mandel and
Semyonov’s (2006) findings and prediction about the “welfare state paradox” again.
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Besides, Model 6 suggests that higher ALMP is negatively associated with women’s
likelihood of holding a managerial position compared to men, and in Model 7, more
generous MWSI is also negatively associated with women’s likelihood of holding a
managerial position compared to men; these findings also resonate with Mandel and
Semyonov’s (2006) findings and prediction about the “welfare state paradox” .

Table 4-7. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment

Probabilities by Gender
In Tables 4-7 to 4-11, three types of country-level factors’ margins effects on
five labor market outcomes by gender are provided; significant gender differences are
indicated in red. As presented in Table 4-1, there is a significant interaction between
gender and ALMP, so ALMP has a higher positive association with females’
employment probabilities than males’. Females’ employment probabilities increase 9%
while males’ only increase 1% when ALMP increases from 0.24 % to 0.85% (see Table
4-7). Also, the MWSI also has a similar impact: females’ employment probabilities
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increase about 7% while males’ only increase about 1% when the index increases from
33.65 to 65.68.

Table 4-8. Three Types of Country-Level Factors’ Margins Effects on Part-time
Job Probabilities by Gender
As for part-time job probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to be more positively
associated with females’ than males’, because females’ part-time job probabilities
increase 23% while males’ only increase 14% when overall EPL increases from 1.91 to
2.76, and this finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and overall
EPL in Table 4-2. As for ALMP, it seems have greater positively association with
females’ than males, because females’ part-time job probabilities increase 12% while
males’ only increase 8% when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%. This finding
confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP in Table 4-2. Also, the
MWSI seems to have a stronger positive association with females’ than males, because
females’ part-time job probabilities increase 11% while males’ only increase 8% when
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MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68. This finding is consistent with the significant
interaction between gender and the MWSI in Table 4-2.

Table 4-9. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Temporary
Job Probabilities by Gender
With regard to temporary job probabilities, none of the three country-level show
significant associations with gender in Table 4-9. These findings are consistent with the
results in Table 4-3 and 4-4; there were no significant gender interactions found in these
two tables.

Table 4-10. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Female-type

Job Probabilities by Gender
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As for female-type job probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to have a
greater positive association with females’ than males, because females’ female-type job
probabilities increase 1.5% while males’ only increase 0.05% when overall EPL
increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction between
gender and overall EPL in Table 4-5. As for ALMP, it seems to have a more positive
association with females’ than males, because females’ female-type job probabilities
decrease 1.33% while males’ only decrease 0.09% when ALMP increases from 0.24%
to 0.85%. This finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP
in Table 4-5. Besides, the MWSI seems to have a sronger positively association with
females’ than males, because females’ female-type job probabilities decrease 2.17%
while males’ only decrease 0.67% when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68, and this
finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and the MWSI in Table 45.

Table 4-11. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Managerial

Position Probabilities by Gender
123

As for managerial position probabilities, higher overall EPL seems to have
greater negative association with females’ than males, because females’ managerial
position probabilities decrease 1.7% while males’ only increase 0.09% when overall
EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction
between gender and overall EPL in Table 4-6. As for ALMP, the association operates in
different directions for females’ and males’. Females’ managerial position probabilities
decrease 1.44% but males’ increase 2.57% when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%.
Besides, the MWSI association with gender operate in different directions for females’
and males. Females’ managerial position probabilities decrease 2.49% while males’
increase 8% when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68. This finding is consistent with
the significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 4-6.

III. Discussion
First of all (from Table 4-1 to 4-6), temporary EPL negatively influences women’s
employment probabilities more than men’s. But regular EPL and temporary EPL are
found to be positive associated with females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job,
which means females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job is greater than males’.
Besides,

higher overall and regular EPL are negatively related to the probability of

employment in female-type jobs for women compared to men. In other words, it is not
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necessary that a higher EPL will push women into female-type occupations. This
challenges the previous literature, which finds that a higher EPL will be harmful for
women and other outsiders in the labor market. Finally, for the probability of holding a
managerial position, it is not surprising that all three types of EPL negatively interact
with being female. In other words, stricter labor market regulation is negatively
associated with women’s probabilities of holding managerial positions.
As for gender interactions with ALMP, the results indicate positive associations
with females’ employment probabilities more than males’. In addition, ALMP is
negatively associated with females’ chances of holding female-type jobs more than
males’. Judging from these results, we can say that ALMP seems to be beneficial for
gender equality because it is negatively associated with female probabilities in atypical
work (not on permanent contracts or full-time jobs) and female-type jobs. However,
ALMP is also negatively associated with females’ chances of holding managerial
positions. Taken together, the effects of ALMP on gender equality in the labor market
are still mixed and need to be further explored in the future.
Finally, the effects of the MWSI seem to confirm the Mandel and Semyonov’s
(2006) findings and predictions about the “welfare state paradox”. In other words, a
higher level of welfare state interventions will increase women’s employment
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probability, but also increase women’s probability of holding a female-type occupation,
which suggests ower earnings and worse employment conditions.
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Chapter 5. Gendered Flexicurity: The effects of
Flexicurity on Gender Wage Gaps in 18 countries

I. Correlation between important institutional factors and the gender
earnings ratio49

Figure 5-1 presents the relationship between overall EPL and general
earnings dispersion (measured by the 90/10 ratio). The liberal market economies of the
English-speaking countries (such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the
United Kingdom) are concentrated in the left side of the figure, which indicates lower
overall EPL and higher wage inequality, while the corporatist economies (such as
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) occupy the right area of the figure, characterized by
strong union system traditions and more strict labor market regulations. As Blau and
Kahn (1992; 2003) contend, a highly centralized wage setting mechanism can
efficiently contribute to lower wage dispersion and thus indirectly to lowering gender
earnings disparities. Basically, these results are very similar to Kahn’s (2012) findings:
the wage inequality is particularly high in the US, the UK and Canada, while it is

There many different definitions of gender earning ratios, I include here all employed workers (no
matter in full-time or other type jobs). I calculate the ratio of mean female annual earnings to the mean
male annual earnings, with no controls for education or other variables.
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relatively low in the Social democratic (such as the Denmark, Norway, Finland, and
Sweden) countries. In addition, it is worth noting that extremely low EPL is usually
related to higher levels of wage inequality, as Figure 5-1 presents. While the core value
of “flexicurity” is to enhance labor market flexibility (through the deregulation of EPL)
and in the meantime enhance employment security (through ALMP), higher flexibility
(lower EPL) and higher security (higher ALMP) were usually praised as a successful
labor market institution paradigm (such as Denmark). However, this analysis reminds
us that the extremely high level of flexibility (or the extremely high level of
deregulation of EPL) is related to relatively high wage inequality. In other words,
setting an appropriate level of EPL is a critical issue for flexicurity researchers and
policymakers.

Figure 5-1. 90/10 Earning Ratio by Overall Employment Protective Legislation
50
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To illustrate the different welfare regime type clusters, this figure adopts different colors.
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To illuminate the role of wage structure, Figure 5-2 presents gender earnings
ratios, while Figure 5-3 presents female median annual earnings in the males’ annual
earnings distribution. As Blau and Kahn (1996) clarify, “gender-specific” factors,

Figure 5-2. Gender Earnings Ratios (All Employed Labor Force)

Figure 5-3. Female Median Earning in Males’ n’s Earning Distribution Percentile
including differences in qualifications and the impact of labor market discrimination,
are viewed as determining the percentile ranking of women in the male earnings
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distribution, while “the overall wage structure determines the wage penalty or reward
associated with this position in the wage distribution (p. 32)”. Generally speaking,
liberal market economies (such as the US, the UK, Canada and Australia) report lower
gender earnings ratios than the Social democratic countries (such as Denmark, Finland,
and Sweden). While the ratios in Figure 5-2 present only the nominal differences in
gender earnings ratios, the differences in the rankings in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3
illuminate the importance of the wage structure in determining the level of gender
earnings disparities. For example, Blau and Kahn (1992; 2003) emphasize that
American women have relatively higher human capital and higher wages than women
in other developed economies, but substantial gender wage gaps still exist, perhaps due
to the unequal overall wage structure. In Figure 5-2, the US ranking is 11 of 18 in all
countries; however, in Figure 5-3, it ranks the second highest among 18 countries. In
other words, the relatively high gender earnings gap in the US is not attributed to the
low ranking of women in the men’s wage distribution (or gender-specific factors) but
should be attributed to wage dispersion being larger than in other countries (which
means the differences in rewards or penalties for specific occupations or industries are
larger, suggesting a relatively unequal wage structure).
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Figure 5-4. Gender Earning Ratios by Overall EPL

Figure 5-5. Gender Earning Ratios by ALMP
Figure 5-4 presents the correlation between EPL and gender earning ratios. As
mentioned before, EPL is a composite indicator from 1 to 6, where a higher score
indicates more strict regulation of the labor market, and it usually serves as the
“flexibility” indicator in flexicurity research. In this figure, we can see that the EPL
index is positively related to the gender earnings ratio, which means that higher EPL
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may result in lower gender earning differentials and higher gender wage equality.
However, these results indicate only a weak correlation coefficient. Figure 5-5 presents
the correlation between ALMP and the gender earning ratios. ALMP indicates the
percentages of GDP that are expended on active labor market policies; this usually
serves as the “security” indicator in flexicurity research. From this figure, we can see
that ALMP is positively related to the gender earnings ratios, which means that workers
in countries with more developed active labor market policies may present lower gender
earnings gaps. However, similar to the previous figure, the correlation coefficient is
only at a weak level. Figure 5-6 presents the correlation between the MWSI and gender
earnings ratios, and it shows a positive relationships between these two indicators.
However, as mentioned before, a higher level of welfare state intervention will result
in higher female employment rates and lower gender wage gaps, but that association
should be attributed to the more equal wage structure, not the more developed welfare
state policies.
In Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, Japan seems to be an obvious outlier. The original
correlation in Figure 5-4 is 0.20, but it becomes 0.13 after removing Japan. In Figure
5-5, the original correlation is 0.26, but it becomes only 0.06 after removing Japan. On
the contrary, in Figure 5-6, the original correlation is 0.46, but it becomes 0.40 after
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removing Japan. According to an OECD (2017) report, there is a sharp division of paid
and unpaid work between the genders in Japan, and despite Japanese women’s
increasing participation in the labor market, Japan still has the third highest gender pay
gap in the OECD countries. Furthermore, Japan ranks among the lowest countries,
regarding the women’s share in managerial positions among OECD countries, and
Japanese women also comprise a very low percentage on boards of directors, and in
leadership positions in the public sector. Taken together, Japan faces more rigid gender
inequality in the labor market, compared with other countries.

Figure 5-6. Gender Earnings Ratios by MWSI
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II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’
Earnings and Earning Percentile
Table 5-1 shows the results of HLM51 analyses testing the micro and macro
determinants of individual workers’ natural log of earnings. First of all, the null model
is significant, suggesting that the variation in outcomes among the countries is
significant, and worthy of further analysis. Among the micro determinants, being a
female, being a young or older workers, the presence of pre-school aged children, and
the number of children, are all negatively associated with individual workers’ natural
log of earnings. In contrast, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree, and
being partnered, are both significantly positively associated with individual workers’
annual earnings. Besides, being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged children,
and the number of children are all negatively associated with female workers’ earnings
more than males’.
As for country-level factors, none of the five country-level factors show
significant effects on workers’ annual earnings. As for gender and macro-level indicator
interactions, only the MWSI is positively associated with workers’ earnings, which
suggests that the higher effort of one country’s MWSI facilitates workers’ entry (with

HLM analysis is only adopted in this chapter (Chapter 5) due to its linear structure, while Chapter 4
and Chapter 6 adopt multilevel logistic regression.
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most effects on women) into the labor market and thus is positively associated with the
individual workers’ earnings.
In Table 5-2, standardized earnings (the percentiles of earnings) are adopted as
a dependent variable to re-estimate the HLM regression. The percentile refers to where
individuals are ranked in each country according to their relative position in the wage
distribution on a standardized ladder. The null model is significant, suggesting that the
variation in outcomes among the countries are significant and worth further analysis.
As for individual-level indicators, the results are similar to the first set of analyses:
being female, being a young or older worker, the presence of pre-school aged children,
and the number of children, are negatively associated with the relative position of one’s
earnings percentile. In contrast, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree,
and being partnered, are positively associated with individual workers’ earnings
percentile. As for gender interactions, being partnered, the presence of pre-school aged
children, and the number of children all are negatively associated with female workers’
earnings percentiles more than males’.
As for the country-level predicators, overall EPL, regular EPL, ALMP, and
MWSI all are positively associated with workers’ earning percentiles. However, all five
country-level factors (overall EPL, regular EPL, temporary EPL, ALMP, and MWSI)
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are negatively associated with females’ earnings percentiles more than males’. In other
word, stricter labor market regulation is negatively associated with women’s relative
positions in the earning ladder compared to men’s.
Table 5-1. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Natural Log of Earnings with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12

Individual-Level Factors
Intercept

11.268*** 10.987*** 10.841*** 14.372*** 13.436*** 12.581*** 13.038*** 12.311*** 14.422*** 13.471*** 12.614*** 13.089*** 10.681***
(0.379)

(0.417)

(0.427)

(3.239)

(2.837)

(2.063)

(1.658)

(2.008)

(3.235)

(2.836)

(2.067)

(1.654)

(1.066)

Worker Characteristics
-0.590*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.329*** -0.432*** -0.399*** -0.392*** -0.436*** -0.457***

Female

(0.036)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.086)

(0.058)

(0.052)

(0.072)

(0.075)

Age 15-24

-0.450*** -0.434***
(0.037)

(0.046)

(0.046)

(0.046)

(0.046)

(0.046)

(0.046)

(0.045)

(0.045)

(0.045)

(0.044)

(0.044)

Age 55-65

-.081***

-.070***

-.070***

-.070***

-.070***

-.070***

-.070***

-.069***

-.069***

-.069***

-.069***

-.069***

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.011)

Bachelor Degree or higher
Degree
Partnered

(0.015)

(0.011)

0.271***

0.273***

(0.039)

(0.038)

0.068***

0.126***

(0.012)

(0.034)

-.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -.432*** -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.431*** -0.432***

0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.038)

0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.011)
0.273***
(0.038)
0.126***
(0.034)

0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.038)

0.126*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.118***
(0.034)

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.031)

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.273***

0.273***

(0.038)

(0.038)

0.118***

0.111***

(0.030)

(0.030)

-0.186*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.091***
(0.030)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)

Preschool Childrn
Numbers of Children

-0.012

0.017***

(0.007)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.094*

-0.094*

-0.094*

-0.094*

-0.094*

-0.094*

-0.090*

-0.087*

-0.083*

-0.085*

-0.072*

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.035)

Female × Partnered
Female × Preschool Children

0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

-0.195**

-0.195**

-0.195**

-0.195**

(0.059)

(0.059)

(0.059)

(0.059)

0.017***

0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017***

-0.195*** -0.195**
(0.059)

(0.059)

0.016***

0.017***

(0.040)

(0.040)

(0.035)

-0.195**

-0.195**

-0.195** -0.201***

-0.200**

(0.059)

(0.059)

(0.059)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.035)

-0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.065***

Female × Numbers of
Children

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.017)

Country-Level Factors
-0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004)
-0.558
-0.580
(0.641)
(0.638)
-0.276
-0.293
(0.484)
(0.483)
-0.006
-0.020
(0.424)
(0.427)
-0.984
-1.067
(1.044)
(1.028)
0.005
0.003

GDP per capita
Overall EPL
Regular EPL
Temporary EPL
ALMP
MWSI

(0.017)

(0.016)
0.046
(0.037)

Female × Overall EPL

0.035
Female × Regular EPL
(0.022)
0.031
(0.017)

Female × Temporary EPL

0.176*
(0.080)

Female × ALMP
Female × MWSI
ICC (Interclass Correlation)

0.805

0.835

0.836

0.821

0.824

0.826

N = 18 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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0.818

0.825

0.821

0.824

0.826

0.818

0.001***
(0.0009)
0.836

Table 5-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Earnings Percentiles with Individual-and Country-Level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

50.307***

36.661**

31.942**

24.288***

26.604***

29.826*** 30.261***

(0.082)

(0.709)

(0.727)

(4.774)

(3.926)

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

29.451**

20.376***

23.750***

27.808***

29.927***

26.494**

(2.951)

(4.748)

(3.898)

(3.081)

(2.894)

(2.941)

-9.354***

-11.700***

-13.559***

(0.425)

(0.337)

Individual-Level Factors
Intercept

(3.097)

(2.897)

Worker Characteristics
-26.000*** -17.388*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.387*** -17.386***

Female

(0.092)

(0.263)

(0.263)

(0.263)

(0.263)

(0.263)

(0.263)

(0.306)

(0.300)

(0.349)

Age 15-24

-13.204*** -12.864*** -12.862*** -12.862*** -12.863*** -12.863*** -12.863*** -12.994*** -13.010***
(0.400)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

(0.399)

Age 55-65

-2.868***

-2.571***

-2.572***

-2.571***

-2.572***

-2.571***

-2.570***

-2.639***

-2.648***

-2.639***

-2.577***

-2.627***

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.172)

Bachelor Degree or Higher
Degree
Partnered
Preschool Childrn
Numbers of Children

(0.173)

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.172)

12.148***

12.204***

12.204***

12.203***

12.204*** 12.203*** 12.203***

-12.932***

-16.685*** -11.333***

-12.883*** -12.960***

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.172)

(0.172)

12.202***

12.202***

12.211***

12.205***

12.211***

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.064)

2.715***

4.490***

4.490***

4.491***

4.490***

4.492***

4.493***

4.789***

4.919***

4.959***

4.543***

5.190***

(0.109)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.165)

-6.911***

-4.463***

-4.463***

-4.463***

-4.463***

-4.463***

-4.464***

-4.439***

-4.448***

-4.436***

-4.475***

-4.532***

(0.100)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

(0.135)

-0.271***
(0.055)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.880***
(0.074)

0.916***
(0.074)

0.911***
(0.074)

0.873***
(0.074)

0.885***
(0.074)

0.870***
(0.074)

-2.883***

-2.884***

-2.884***

-2.884***

-2.885***

-2.885***

-3.235***

-3.430***

-3.546***

-2.944***

-3.917***

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.214)

(0.215)

(0.215)

(0.216)

(0.215)

(0.218)

-5.070***

-5.070***

-5.070***

-5.071***

-5.070***

-5.070***

-5.069***

-5.048***

-5.053***

-5.031***

-4.835***

Female × Partnered
Female × Preschool Childrn
Fmale × Numbers of Children

(0.193)

(0.193)

(0.193)

(0.193)

(0.193)

(0.193)

(0.192)

(0.192)

(0.192)

(0.193)

(0.193)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.518***
(0.108)

-2.599***
(0.108)

-2.585***
(0.108)

-2.509***
(0.108)

-2.528***
(0.108)

-2.497***
(0.108)

Country-Level Fixed Effects
GDP per capita

0.00006

0.00005

0.00001

-0.000008

-0.00001

0.00006

0.00005

0.00001

-0.000008

-0.00002

(0.00008)

(0.00008)

(0.00007)

(0.00007)

(0.00007)

(0.00008)

(0.00008)

(0.00007)

(0.00007)

(0.00007)

2.371*

Overall EPL

4.088**

(1.192)

(1.187)
1.703*

Regular EPL

3.064***

(0.869)

(0.864)
1.156

Temporary EPL

2.049***

(0.649)

ALMP

(0.647)
3.521*

4.075*

(1.688)

(1.689)
0.059*
(0.026)

MWSI

0.095***
(0.026)
-3.649***
(0.151)

Female × Overall EPL

-2.860***
(0.106)

Female × Regular EPL

-1.890***
(0.077)

Female × Temporary EPL

-1.166***
(0.241)

Female × ALMP
Female × MWSI
ICC (Interclass Correlation)

0.00004

0.013

0.014

0.011

0.011

0.012

0.011

0.010

0.011

0.011

0.011

.011

-0.077***
(0.002)
0.010

N = 18 countries.or market policy.*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

Comparing Table 5-1 and Table 5-2, particularly the interaction between
gender and those five country-level factors, there are some interesting and important
findings. First, none of the three types of EPL (overall EPL, regular EPL, and temporary
EPL) are found to have a significant effect on log of earnings. They are found to have
negative interactions between being female and earning percentiles. As for ALMP and
MWSI, these two factors are positively associated with females’ log earnings but
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negatively associated with women’s earnings percentiles. These results are consistent
with the major hypothesis of this research: differences in wage structures among
countries are a vital factor shaping gender earnings differentials, and these differences
are correlated with flexicurity policies and welfare state interventions. These
relationships can be observed clearly in Figure 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, which suggest that
more developed flexicurity (higher EPL and ALMP) and MWSI are related to lower
gender earnings differentials, but these factors do not increase women’s positions in the
wage structure relative to men. By being sensitive to relative ranks rather than the
absolute wage, this procedure reemphasizes the importance of wage structure in
determining gender earnings differentials. In other words, the level of flexicurity
policies and the generosity of welfare state policies reduce the gender earnings gap, but
they do not increase women’s relative position in the men’s wage distribution.
To illustrate this relationship more clearly, Figure 5-7 presents the relationship
between differences in ranks and the MWSI. Generally speaking, the Social democratic
countries occupy the upper and right side of the area, while the liberal market
economies occupy the left and lower side. This means that the Social democratic
countries have relatively higher gender earnings disparities when measured in
standardized terms. In contrast, the liberal countries’ gender earnings gaps present
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lower gaps in standardized terms but higher disparities in nominal terms. These results
are in line with the major theoretical concern of this paper: the Nordic countries have
more egalitarian wage structures. These countries are also characterized by more
centralized wage setting systems and more developed flexicurity policies and welfare
state interventions. Table 5-3 presents the country-level factors used in this chapter (see
columns 1 to 4); column 5 and 7 indicate the net gender gap after controlling for marital
status, age, education, the presence of pre-school aged children, and the number of
children. Column 6 is the ranking of column 5, and column 8 is the ranking of column
7. Finally, column 9 is the difference between column 6 and 8.

Furthermore, the

correlation between the 90/10 ratio (column 1) and differences in ranks (column 9) is
negative and strong (-0.65), which also confirms the hypothesis: a more equal wage
structure is negatively related to the differences in ranks.

Figure 5-7. Differences in Rank by MWSI52
52

To illustrate the different welfare regime type clusters, this figure adopts different colors.
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(1)

COUNTRY
Hungary

90/10
ratio

3.31
2.83
Denmark
4.22
Italy
4.16
Taiwan
3.21
Finland
Czech Republic 2.97
3.53
France
4.31
Spain
2.82
Sweden
2.92
Norway
3.84
Ireland
4.17
Canada
4.50
Australia
5.73
United States
United Kingdom 4.37
3.11
Netherlands
3.46
Germany
3.94
Japan

(2)

(3)

(4)

Overall
EPL

ALMP

MWSI

2.40
2.35
3.15
1.95
2.08
2.79
2.73
2.76
2.58
2.38
1.91
1.51
1.65
1.00
1.72
2.92
2.95
1.91

0.33
1.26
0.46
0.02
0.83
0.24
0.90
0.77
1.16
0.54
0.61
0.28
0.33
0.12
0.30
0.99
0.85
0.11

65.20
92.69
48.67
15.15
65.68
41.82
81.67
42.04
83.47
99.92
44.75
33.65
38.28
28.62
61.02
59.36
38.65
27.18

Table 5-3. Distribution of

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Rank of
Rank of
Net Gaps Net Gaps
Net Gaps Differenc
in Log
es in
in
in Log Net Gaps in
Wage Percentiles Percentiles
Wage
Rank

0.18
0.29
0.32
0.35
0.37
0.38
0.38
0.39
0.41
0.46
0.46
0.49
0.49
0.50
0.56
0.68
0.76
1.19

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

8.814
18.9
17.73
17.66
18.6
19.68
16.32
15.92
21.05
25.14
15.78
17.1
19.94
17.38
20.44
29.59
24.4
36.39

1
10
8
7
9
11
4
3
14
16
2
5
12
6
13
17
15
18

0
8
5
3
4
5
-3
-5
5
6
-9
-7
-1
-8
-2
1
-2
0

MWSI and Gender Earnings Gaps

Table 5-4. Three Types of Country-level Factors Margins Effects on Log Wage by

Gender
Table 5-4 indicates that the MWSI seems to have a greater positive
association with females’ log wage than males’, because females’ log wage increase

140

0.22 while males’ increase 0.48 when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68, and this
finding confirms the significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 5-1.

Table 5-5. Three Types of Country-level Factors Margins Effects on Wage

Percentile by Gender
As for wage percentiles, higher overall EPL affects women and men in
different directions; females’ decrease 3.12 while males’ increase 3.49 when overall
EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76. This finding confirms the significant interaction
between gender and overall EPL in Table 5-2. As for ALMP, it too seems to affect
women and men in different directions; females’ wage percentile decrease 0.02 but
males’ increase 2.48 when ALMP increases from 0.24% to 0.85%. This finding
confirms the significant interaction between gender and ALMP in Table 5-2. At the
same time, MWSI also shows gender association in different directions; females’ wage
percentile and males, because females’ wage percent decrease by 4.43 while males’
increase by 3.04 when MWSI increases from 33.65 to 65.68. This finding confirms the
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significant interaction between gender and MWSI in Table 5-2.

III. Discussion
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of flexicurity policies on
gender earnings gaps. For this purpose, I introduce two bodies of literature: one is on
the gendered effects of flexicurity policies on labor market outcomes, and the other
concerns the importance of the wage structure in determining gender earnings
differentials. In conclusion, according to the findings in Table 5-1, I argue that gender
earnings differentials are less pronounced in countries with more developed MWSI
countries, while three types of EPL and ALMP do not have significant effects on log
earnings. However, when estimating gender earnings using percentiles of earnings, the
effects of ALMP and MWSI become negative (see Tables 5-2). Furthermore, three types
of EPL all present negative interactions with gender, suggesting that stricter EPL is
negatively associated with females’ earning percentile more than males’. In other words,
more developed MWSI is positively associated with women’s earnings relative to
men’s, but that result should be attributed to their more egalitarian wage structures. On
the other hand, stricter EPL not only does not increase women’s annual earnings,it also
decreases women’s earning percentile relative to men’s. Being aware of the different
contributors to gender earnings differentials is important because the different causes
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may result in different policy implications to reduce the gender earnings disparities.
If the gender inequalities are mainly attributed to the overall wage structure,
policies should be aimed at enhancing the overall wage structure, such as strengthening
union bargaining, or a more centralized wage setting mechanism. However, if gender
inequality is more attributed to women occupying lower positions than men in the labor
market, then we should focus on policies specifically aimed at raising women’s pay or
other gender-equality efforts.
Taken together, the more developed MWSI seems to lower less gender earnings
disparities. However, this research also finds that flexicurity policies (including EPL
and ALMP) and MWSI do not efficiently increase women’s relative positions in the
males’ wage distribution. A number of studies have already confirmed the importance
of centralized wage setting structures, which not only can yield a more equal wage
structure but can also indirectly contribute to gender earnings equality. Consequently,
researchers and policymakers should be aware of the importance of centralized wage
setting structures while enhancing labor market flexibility and security.
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Chapter 6. Flexicurity, Gender and Job Security:
Determinants of Job Security in 19 Countries

I. Correlation between important institutional factors and job
security perception53
As predicted, Figure 6-1 presents a negative and insignificant correlation
between overall EPL and job security perception. However, overall EPL is found to be
significantly correlated with employment security perception; these two factors are
moderately correlated (-0.56) as reported in Figure 6-2. This comparison implies that
EPL is more related to employment security perception than to job security perception.
This finding is particularly important because the literature generally focuses only on
the effects of EPL on job security, and of ALMP on employment security (Anderson
and Pontusson, 2007). In addition, Figure 6-3 indicates a strong (-0.72) and significant
correlation between regular EPL and job security, and the correlation is even stronger
than that in Figure 6-1, which suggests that regular EPL exerts a greater influence on
individual workers’ job security perception. However, ALMP and employment security

The correlation between job security and employment security is 0.29 (insignificant), the correlation
between job security and job-loss worry is -0.16 (insignificant), and the correlation between
employment security and job-loss worry is -0.52 (significant).
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are not correlated (-0.08), which does not confirm Anderson and Pontusson’s (2007)
finding about ALMP exerting a significant influence on individual workers’
employment security perception.

Figure 6-1. Overall EPL and Job Security Perception

Figure 6-2. Overall EPL and Employment Security Perception
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Figure 6-3. Regular EPL and Employment Security Perception

Figure 6-4. ALMP and Employment Security Perception

II. Histograms of Three Types of Security Perceptions by Countrylevel Factors
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Figure 6-5. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by Overall EPL
In Figure 6-5, almost all countries show a similar pattern of security perceptions:
job security scores are highest, followed by employment security, and then job-loss
worry. Furthermore, country on the left in the figure, with relative lower overall EPL
(United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland and Australia), present similar job
security with other countries, which suggests that lower EPL may not necessarily lead
to lower job security. On the other hand, Denmark reports the highest job security scores;
it is ranked eighth among 19 countries. As for job-loss worry, countries with higher
overall EPL report higher job-loss worry, such as Czech Republic and Spain.

147

Figure 6-6. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by ALMP in the 2000s
Figure 6-6 presents the histogram of three types of security perceptions by ALMP.
The highest employment security is presenting in Denmark (ranked 1st in ALMP),
Ireland and UK (both ranked in the middle in ALMP), and the US (ranked near the
bottom in ALMP). In other words, ALMP seems not to be a critical factor shaping
employment security.
Denmark ranked first in PLMP. Denmark also shows relatively low job-loss worry.
However, workers in Ireland report the lowest job-loss worry, while Ireland is ranked
in the middle (9th) of these 19 countries. On the other side, the highest job-loss worry
was found in Spain (2.78), it was also relatively high in Germany (2.03), while Spain
was ranked 7th and Germany got the 3rd with respect to PLMP. Taken together, it
suggests that PLMP may not be a suitable or sufficient factor to explain variation in
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job-loss worry perceptions among these countries.

Figure 6-7. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by PLMP

Figure 6-8. Means of Three Types of Security Perceptions by MWSI
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According to Figure 6-8, there seems to be no special pattern associating
welfare state intervention and the three types of security perceptions. Consequently,
multilevel analysis will be adopted in the following section to untangle the relationship
between these country-level factors and individual workers’ security perceptions.

II. Results of Multilevel Analysis: Determinants of Workers’ Security
Perceptions
Table 6-1 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro
determinants of individual workers’ job security perceptions. The null model is
significant, which suggests that the differences between the countries is significant.
Therefore, the multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. Among workers’
characteristics, only the completion of bachelor degree or more shows positive and
significant effects on job security, which suggests that human capital is a crucial factor
in determining workers’ perceptions of job security. As for individual worker
characteristics and job characteristics, the only significant finding is that civil servants
show higher security perceptions than do workers in private sector. This finding is
consistent with most previous studies (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Muñoz de
Bustillo, and De Pedraza, 2010).
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Seven macro-level characteristics are tested while controlling for the eight
micro-level indicators. Due to the limited numbers of countries(19 countries), macrolevel factors are introduced one at a time after controlling for GDP per capita. As
predicted by previous literature, stricter EPL is negatively associated with individual
workers’ job security perceptions. However, in Model 2 to Model 4, only EPL for
temporary contracts exerts significantly negative effects on workers’ job security. This
important finding resonates with the literature on the change to EPL in the 1990s. Most
countries did not change EPL for regular jobs but loosened employment regulations for
temporary contract jobs. On the other hand, no other country-level factors show
significant effects on job security perceptions.
As for the interaction between gender and country-level factors, it is surprising
that overall EPL presents a positive interaction with gender, which suggests that stricter
EPL is positively associated with female workers’ job security perceptions more than
male workers. However, while the major coefficient of overall EPL is still negatively
associated with workers’ job security perceptions, the magnitude of decline in female
workers’ job security is smaller than male workers’ (as shown in Figure 6-9).
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Figure 6-9. The effect of Overall EPL on Job Security by Gender54

54

It is the effect of overall EPL on Job Security perception by gender from Model 8 in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job Security Perception with Individual and Country-level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12

0.528***

0.797

0.277

0.242

0.025

0.130

0.722

0.172

1.048

0.108

0.367

-0.475

0.093

(0.082)

(1.258)

(0.804)

(0.562)

(0.026)

(0.596)

(1.044)

(0.672)

(0.612)

(0.870)

(0.570)

(0.673)

(0.615)

-0.129

-0.126

-0.132

-0.125

-0.132

-0.135

-0.132

-0.623

-0.157

-0.454

0.389

-0.066

(0.136)

(0.130)

(0.129)

(0.130)

(0.130)

(0.130)

(0.130)

(0.701)

0.584

0.262

0.346

0.264

-0.095

-0.072

-0.072

-0.061

-0.076

-0.062

-0.065

-0.095

-0.075

-0.077

-0.056

-0.075

(0.217)

(0.206)

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.205)

(0.206)

(0.206)

(0.205)

(0.206)

(0.206)

0.132

0.159

0.120

0.153

0.177

0.153

0.157

0.121

0.167

0.115

0.153

0.179

(0.174)

(0.167)

(0.266)

(0.267)

(0.266)

(0.267)

(0.267)

(0.267)

(0.267)

(0.266)

(0.267)

(0.267)

0.082

0.114

0.136

0.124

0.137

0.121

0.127

0.083

0.115

0.138

0.122

0.135

(0.221)

(0.142)

(0.135)

(0.140)

(0.138)

(0.140)

(0.139)

(0.158)

(0.142)

(0.135)

(0.140)

(0.138)

-0.182

-0.151

-0.037

-0.060

-0.122

-0.167

-0.140

-0.166

-0.140

-0.002

-0.008

-0.115

(0.603)

(0.443)

(0.416)

(0.438)

(0.428)

(0.440)

(0.438)

(0.476)

(0.444)

(0.408)

(0.441)

(0.430)

-0.234

-0.232

-0.233

-0.237

-0.217

-0.232

-0.233

-0.234

-0.236

-0.240

-0.244

-0.219

(0.133)

(0.128)

(0.127)

(0.128)

(0.128)

(0.128)

(0.128)

(0.130)

(0.128)

(0.127)

(0.128)

(0.128)

0.263

0.270

0.256

0.271

0.261

0.286

0.277

0.269

0.275

0.272

0.289

0.257

(0.185)

(0.176)

(0.174)

(0.176)

(0.179)

(0.177)

(0.176)

(0.184)

(0.177)

(0.175)

(0.176)

(0.176)

Individual-Level Factors
Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Age 15-24

Age 55-65
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Bachelor Degree and more

Partnered

Children
Job Characteristics
Part-Time

Civil Servant

Union Member

0.556**

0.560*** 0.576*** 0.554***

0.581*** 0.564*** 0.566***

0.550*

0.558*** 0.562*** 0.566*** 0.566***

(0.175)

(0.157)

(0.156)

(0.157)

(0.157)

(0.157)

(0.157)

(0.161)

(0.157)

(0.157)

(0.158)

(0.158)

0.272

0.281*

0.263*

0.261

0.340*

0.286*

0.298*

0.278*

0.280*

0.276*

0.269

0.343*

153

Managerial Position

(0.141)

(0.136)

(0.130)

(0.137)

(0.141)

(0.136)

(0.139)

(0.137)

(0.136)

(0.130)

(0.137)

(0.142)

-0.118

-0.100

-0.109

-0.086

-0.110

-0.100

-0.098

-0.108

-0.099

-0.093

-0.076

-0.109

(0.213)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.211)

(0.212)

(0.211)

(0.211)

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00002

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

0.00001

Country-Level Factors
GDP Per Capita

Overall EPL

Regular EPL

Temporary EPL
ALMP
154
MWSI

(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
-0.322

-0.462

(0.329)

(0.401)
-0.080

-0.099

(0.151)

(0.206)
-0.197**

-0.299**

(0.061)

(0.094)
0.224

0.550

(0.227)

(0.306)
-0.007

-0.006

(0.003)

(0.004)
-0.052

Average Tenure

(0.061)
-0.002

Union Coverage

(0.003)

Gender Interaction
0.236*

Female × Overall EPL

(0.068)
-0.122

Female × Regular EPL

(0.246)
154

0.173

Female × Temporary EPL

(0.122)
-0.582

Female × ALMP

(0.362)
-0.001

Female ×MWSI
ICC (Interclass Correlation)

(0.004)
0.036

0.009

0.009

0.000

0.007

0.003

Note: N = 19 countries. *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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0.007

0.008

0.009

0.008

0.003

0.007

0.004

Table 6-2. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Employment Security Perception with Individual and Country-level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12

-1.119***

-1.980

-1.409

-2.231

-2.314*

-2.199*

-2.261*

-2.202*

-1.792

-2.290*

-2.756**

-2.412*

-2.410*

(0.123)

(1.092)

(1.222)

(0.983)

(0.963)

(0.992)

(0.966)

(1.124)

(1.293)

(0.989)

(0.996)

(1.014)

(0.977)

0.003

0.003

0.002

0.004

0.001

0.002

0.399

0.597

0.145

0.650

0.311

0.340

(0.146)

(0.146)

(0.146)

(0.146)

(0.146)

(0.146)

(0.483)

(0.639)

(0.287)

(0.390)

(0.317)

(0.303)

-0.009

-0.017

-0.006

-0.004

-0.005

-0.005

-0.009

-0.022

-0.004

-0.004

-0.003

-0.004

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.238)

(0.239)

(0.238)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.239)

(0.238)

-0.720*

-0.717*

-0.718*

-0.720*

-0.718*

-0.719*

-0.708*

-0.701*

-0.714*

-0.722*

-0.730*

-0.712*

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

(0.347)

0.161

0.147

0.164

0.167

0.164

0.164

0.164

0.152

0.166

0.161

0.165

0.156

(0.166)

(0.167)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.167)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.166)

(0.166)

0.109

0.064

0.110

0.132

0.104

0.108

0.102

0.094

0.096

0.198

0.133

0.094

(0.478)

(0.480)

(0.479)

(0.480)

(0.480)

(0.479)

(0.479)

(0.481)

(0.480)

(0.480)

(0.480)

(0.479)

0.064

0.065

0.064

0.063

0.063

0.063

0.063

0.054

0.066

0.049

0.060

0.055

(0.142)

(0.142)

(0.142)

(0.142)

(0.142)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

(0.143)

0.160

0.159

0.164

0.162

0.165

0.165

0.153

0.168

0.156

0.174

0.169

0.144

(0.196)

(0.195)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.196)

(0.197)

0.108

0.105

0.107

0.105

0.107

0.106

0.114

0.103

0.113

0.115

0.113

0.125

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.163)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.164)

(0.164)

-0.275

-0.271

-0.275

-0.283

-0.273

-0.278

-0.284

-0.275

-0.281

-0.274

-0.271

-0.263

(0.161)

(0.160)

(0.161)

(0.162)

(0.161)

(0.162)

(0.161)

(0.160)

(0.161)

(0.162)

(0.161)

(0.162)

Individual-Level Factors
Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Age 15-24

Age 55-65
Bachelor Degree and more
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Partnered

Children
Job Characteristics
Part-Time

Civil Servant

Union Member
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Managerial Position

0.352

0.35

0.354

0.357

0.354

0.355

0.345

0.355

0.347

0.380

0.369

0.363

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

(0.229)

0.00002

0.00002

0.00003

0.00002

0.00003

0.00002

0.00002

0.00002

0.00003

0.00002

0.00003

0.00002

Country-Level Fixed Effects
GDP Per Capita

Overall EPL

Regular EPL

Temporary EPL

ALMP
PLMP

(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
-0.109

0.007

(0.234)

(0.271)
-0.259

-0.104

(0.253)

(0.302)
-0.005

0.040

(0.154)

(0.173)
0.218

0.616

(0.429)

(0.483)

157

-0.029

0.085

(0.202)

(0.228)

MWSI

0.001

0.005

(0.008)

(0.008)

Gender Interaction
-0.193

Female × Overall EPL

(0.224)
-0.261

Female × Regular EPL

(0.274)
-0.078

Female × Temporary EPL

(0.135)

Female × ALMP

-0.701
157

(0.391)
-0.211

Female × PLMP

(0.192)
-0.006

Female × MWSI
ICC (Interclass Correlation)

(0.004)
0.078

0.072

0.066

0.073

0.072

0.073

Note: N = 19 countries. *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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0.073

0.072

0.067

0.073

0.071

0.073

0.074

Table 6-2 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro
determinants of individual workers’ employment security perceptions. The empty
model is significant, which indicates that variation between the countries is significant,
so multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. For the influence of age, older
workers reported significantly lower employment security than prime-aged workers.
This may be because older workers usually have longer tenure, and labor market history,
and higher salary. Consequently, it is more difficult for them to find a comparable job
if they lose their current job. This finding is consistent with Anderson and Pontusson
(2007)’s study, which found that age has a negative effect on employment security.
However, they also found that the increase of age is positive in associated with job
security perception. In contrast, my research does not find significant effects of age on
job security perception.
For job characteristics, my research does not find significant differences between
part-time workers and full-time workers, while Marcel (2008) found part-time workers
report higher employment security, and Erlinghagen (2008) found that part-time
workers did not show significant differences from their full-time counterparts. Taken
together, the results are still mixed. As for union membership, my research does not
find a significant association with employment security, while Anderson and Pontusson
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(2007) noted that union membership had positive effects on employment security.
As for country-level factors, there are no country-level factors showing
significant effects on employment security. As mentioned before, ALMP is argued to
be useful to enhance workers’ skill and employability, and thus can enhance workers’
employment security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011;
Ebralidze, 2012). However, ALMP does not show significant effects on employment
security here, which suggests ALMP may not be that useful as the previous studies
claimed.
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Table 6-3. Multilevel Analyses Predicting Job-loss worry with Individual and Country-level Variables
Variable

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

0.137

1.837*

1.491*

2.189***

2.328***

2.337***

1.842*

1.550*

2.169**

2.363*

2.370*

(0.150)

(0.714)

(0.729)

(0.624)

(0.551)

(0.559)

(0.716)

(0.730)

(0.625)

(0.551)

(0.572)

-0.035

-0.035

-0.035

-0.035

-0.035

-0.045

-0.156

0.004

-0.110

-0.245**

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.051)

(0.126)

(0.138)

(0.092)

(0.079)

(0.087)

-0.039

-0.038

-0.039

-0.039

-0.039

-0.039

-0.039

-0.038

-0.040

-0.037

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

(0.160)

-0.274***

-0.275***

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

-0.135*

-0.134*

-0.136*

-0.138*

-0.138*

-0.135*

-0.134*

-0.137*

-0.140*

-0.140*

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

-0.050

-0.048

-0.053

-0.057

-0.055

-0.050

-0.047

-0.053

-0.057

-0.056

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

(0.082)

0.093

0.093

0.093

0.094

0.094

0.094

0.095

0.093

0.098

0.105

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

(0.065)

-0.051

-0.051

-0.050

-0.050

-0.050

-0.051

-0.051

-0.050

-0.051

-0.050

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

(0.052)

-0.156*

-0.158*

-0.156*

-0.156*

-0.157*

-0.156*

-0.161*

-0.158*

-0.162*

-0.148*

Individual-Level Factors
Intercept
Worker Characteristics
Female

Age 15-24
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Age 55-65

Bachelor Degree and more

Partnered

Employed Spouse

Children

-0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.272*** -0.272***

Job Characteristics
Part-Time
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Civil Servant

Union Member

Managerial Position

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

-0.499***

-0.499***

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

0.177**

0.175**

0.178**

0.181**

0.181**

0.177**

0.174**

0.178**

0.181**

0.181**

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

-0.124

-0.124

-0.123

-0.122

-0.123

-0.124

-0.126

-0.123

-0.124

-0.126

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

-0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.503*** -0.517***

Country-Level Factors

GDP Per Capita

-0.00005** -0.00005** -0.00005**
(0.00001)

Overall EPL
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Regular EPL

Temporary EPL

(0.00001)

(0.00001)

0.00005**

-0.00005**

0.00005**

-0.00005** -0.00005** -0.00005**

(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)

0.149

0.146

(0.165)

(0.168)
0.238

0.207

(0.158)

(0.161)

(0.00001)

0.027

0.039

(0.119)

(0.122)

PLMP

MWSI
Gender Interaction
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0.00005**

(0.00001) (0.00001)

-0.127

0.161

(0.143)

(0.146)
-0.003

-0.005

(0.005)

(0.005)

0.005

Female × Overall EPL

(0.064)
0.063

Female × Regular EPL

(0.066)
-0.024

Female × Temporary EPL

(0.046)
0.069

Female × PLMP

(0.056)
0.004**

Female × MWSI
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ICC (Interclass Correlation)

(0.001)
0.06

0.065

0.061

0.068

0.065

Note: N = 19 countries. *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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0.066

0.065

0.06

0.068

0.073

0.074

Table 6-3 shows the results of analyses testing the micro and macro
determinants of individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry. The null model is
significant, which suggests that the differences between the countries are significant.
Therefore, multilevel analyses are necessary and meaningful. As mentioned, scholars
of psychology divide job security into two categories: cognitive security and affective
job security. “Cognitive job security” indicates an individual’s estimate of the
probability of losing his or her current job, whereas “affective job security” refers to
worry or anxiety about losing one’s job, including worry about the expected outcomes
of losing one’s current job. As Anderson and Pontusson (2007) argue, in addition to
cognitive security, there are two expected consequences of losing one’s job: “the
prospects of finding another job and access to sources of income (livelihood) that do
not depend on finding another job” (p.214). In other words, economic resources and
support (or pressure) from the government or their household highly influence
individuals’ job-loss worries. Consequently, in addition to EPL, passive labor market
policies (also known as unemployment benefits) are tested in this section. Additionally,
family support highly influences individuals’ job-loss worries. Therefore, spousal
employment status (employed or not) is also considered in this section.
With regard to the influence of age, older workers report lower levels of subjective
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job-loss worry than do prime-aged workers. It is interesting that older workers report
higher anxiety about finding their next compatible jobs (lower employment security),
but they also present higher confidence about holding their current job (lower job-loss
worry).

Besides, the completion of higher education or higher significantly decreases

job-loss worry. As for spousal employment status, the effect is insignificant. This result
is consistent with Anderson and Pontusson (2007)’s finding: they also assumed that
having an employed spouse is associated with lower worry about job loss, but they did
not find significant effects.
As for job characteristics, part-time workers show lower job-loss worry than
full-time workers. This finding is consistent with Erlinghagen (2008)’s study: part-time
workers did not show significant differences compared to their full-time counterparts.
On the other hand, employment in the public sector and union membership both
significantly decrease job-loss worry, and these findings also confirmed previous
studies’ conclusions (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Muñoz de Bustill and De Pedraza,
2010).
With regard to country-level predictors, all country-level factors are not found to
have significant effects on job-loss worry. However, PLMP is argued to be the most
critical factor to decrease job-loss worry, such as Anderson and Pontusson (2007) found
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PLMP significantly decreases workers’ job-loss worry. As for the interaction between
gender and country-level variables, only the MWSI shows significant interaction with
gender. In other words, higher welfare state intervention is positively associated with
females’ job-loss worry more than men’s. This finding is in line with the “welfare state
paradox”: higher levels of welfare state interventions will increase women’s
employment probabilities but not into desirable and powerful positions, and these kinds
of jobs may lead to higher job-loss worry.

Table 6-4. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job Security
by Gender

Table 6-5. Three Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Employment
Security by Gender
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Table 6-6. Two Types of Country-level Factors’ Margins Effects on Job-loss worry
by Gender
Table 6-4 to 6-6 present the effects of three country-level factors on three types
of security perceptions. Overall EPL decreases job security, and it is also more
negatively related to males’ job security perceptions. While males’ job security declines
0.0402 when overall EPL increases from 1.91 to 2.76, females’ job security only
declines 0.0225, due to the positive interactions between female and overall EPL in
Model 8 from Table 6-1 (as showing in Figure 6-9). As for employment security, none
of the three country-level factors show significant interactions with gender, consistent
with the findings in Table 6-2 and 6-5.
As for job-loss worry, it is not surprising that the increase of overall EPL
increases the level of worry, and the levels are also similar. On the other hand, the
MWSI is more positively associated with female workers’ job-loss worry more than
with males (which confirmed the finding in Table 6-3), and it means higher levels of
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welfare state interventions are positively associated with females’ job-loss worry more
than males’. This finding suggests that women’s care responsibilities are still greater
than men’s, and that more developed welfare state policies may lead to more employer
discrimination against female workers than male to workers.

III. Discussion
At the individual-level, the empirical findings of the multilevel logistic
regression analyses reveal that older workers have more confidence in maintaining their
current job, although they report greater worries about finding a compatible new job.
As expected, the completion of a bachelor’s degree or higher degree is negatively
associated with job-loss worry, but does not have significant effects on the other two
types of security perceptions. Being a civil servant is the most decisive predictor on job
security and job-loss worry, though it does not have a significant influence on
employment security. This is plausible because employment in the public sector
provides greater protection than does employment in the private sector. Furthermore,
union membership also has positive effect on job security and job-loss worry
perceptions, while it does not have an effect on employment security. Besides, this
research consciously introduces spousal employment status to explain job-loss worry,
because previous studies argue that economic support (no matter from the government
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or their household) highly influences individuals’ job-loss worries. However, this effect
is insignificant, while Anderson and Pontusson (2007) also have the same finding.
At the country-level, this research intends to distinguish EPL for regular
contracts from EPL for temporary contracts, while most previous studies addressed only
the influences of overall EPL. Furthermore, the gender interaction with EPL was only
found in the interaction between female and overall EPL. Besides, ALMP and PLMP
were not found to have significant effects on any of the three types of security
perceptions, while previous studies find that argue ALMP can increase employment
security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011), and PLMP can
decrease job-loss worry (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). However, Ebralidze (2012)
also did not find a significant influence of PLMP on job-loss worry. Taken together, the
results are still mixed and the further studies are needed.
Finally, this research is the first to investigate the effects of “combination security”
(measured by MWSI) on individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry. This
research finds a significant interaction between MWSI and gender, which suggests that
higher welfare state interventions are more positively associated with females’ job-loss
worry more than men’s. This finding partly confirmed the “welfare state paradox” again:
higher levels of welfare state intervention increase women’s employment probabilities
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but not into desirable and powerful positions; less desirable jobs may lead to higher
job-loss worry. Furthermore, this finding may also indicate that women’s caring
responsibilities remain greater than those of men, and that more developed welfare state
polices result in greater employer discrimination against women (Nordli Hansen, 1995;
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Bergmann, 2008).
The “flexibility” side of the labor institution exerts more negative effects on
female workers’ security perceptions, whereas the “security” side of the labor
institution still does not function well enough to improve workers’ security perceptions.
Due to the potential link between women’s precarious employment situation and their
job security perceptions, researchers and policy makers would be advised to consider
how to address men’s and women’s “fundamentally different experiences” of the labor
market (Lewis and Plomien, 2009). Although this research begins to investigate the
effects of more diverse “security” policies on workers’ security perceptions (such as the
welfare state index rather than only ALMP and PLMP), future researchers should
explore more contextual or policy factors and other cultural mechanisms that may
influence individual workers’ job security perceptions.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion

I. The Classification of Flexicurity

Table 7-1. Flexicurity Matrix by the Level of Flexibility and Security
Table 7-1 provides a three by three matrix of flexicurity, according to the level of
flexibility and security (divided at the 25th percentile and 75th percentiles of EPL and
LMP55) ; this matrix presents nine possible flexicurity combinations. From this table, it
is interesting that only the Netherlands and Finland are located in the high flexibilityhigh security cell. On the other hand, while Denmark and the Netherlands are usually
identified as the two successful models for flexicurity, Denmark is actually located in

LMP indicates the total amount of ALMP and PLMP, which suggests a country’s total expenditures
as a share of GDP.
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the medium flexibility-high security type. This classification also reminds us of one
important result: though high flexibility-high security is argued to be beneficial for
labor markets outcomes (such as total employment rates and individual employment
probabilities), moderate flexibility may be more advantageous for earnings equality.
For example, as shown in Figure 5-1, very low EPL is negatively associated with high
wage dispersion (measured by a 90/10 ratio). In contrast, countries with moderate
flexibility or low flexibility seem to perform better in regard to earnings equality. This
matrix also indicates us that a more refined classification of flexicurity systems need to
be developed in the future.

II. A Summary of Findings
Flexicurity is a major labor-market strategy adopted by the European Union (EU)
Commission. While EU Commission staff members have firmly asserted that
flexicurity will enhance gender equality, there is still little literature that has addressed
this issue with quantitative methods. Consequently, the major purpose of this study is
to examine the effects of flexicurity on gender equality using quantitative methods.
Therefore, this research intends to identify the effects of flexicurity policies on
gender equality in the labor market. Most deregulation orthodoxy discourse contends
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that stricter labor market regulation will hurt females’ (or other outsiders’) employment
prospects because the employee usually is reluctant to hire these groups with higher
labor costs. Following this logic, the deregulation will even be beneficial for gender
equality, because the looser labor market regulation will encourage employers to hire
females and other minority groups. Consequently, the most important theoretical
question in this research that needs to be answered is: does flexibilization (or
deregulation) hurt or benefit females’ employment prospects compared to males’?
In the first section, the effects of flexicurity policies on five labor market
outcomes are examined. Though overall EPL is positively associated with females’
probability of holding a part-time job more than males’, and regular EPL and temporary
EPL are positively associated with females’ likelihood of holding a temporary job (as
predicted), but overall EPL and regular EPL reduce women’s chance of holding a
female-type job more than men’s. Taken together, EPL does not necessarily exacerbate
gender inequality in labor market.
As for the gender interaction with ALMP, it is positively associated with females’
employment probabilities more than it is for males’, is negatively associated with
females’ probabilities of holding part-time jobs more than males’, and is negatively
associated with females’ probabilities of holding female-type jobs more than males’.
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Judging from these results, ALMP seems beneficial for gender equality because it
decreases females’ probabilities of engagement in atypical work and female-type jobs.
Taken together, these findings suggest that more protective regulation is not necessarily
as harmful for female employment prospects as the deregulation discourse predicted.
In other words, the deregulation camp cannot advocate deregulation in the name of
pursuing gender equality. These findings also lend support to Dieckhoff and Steiber’s
(2015) work; they found that men benefited more clearly from stricter employment
protection than did women, while the neo-classical model asserts that protective labor
market institutions are detrimental for labor market outsiders (such as women). They
also found that the deregulation of temporary contracts does not more adversely affect
women than it does men. However, the MWSI is positively associated with employment
and female-type job possibilities (as predicted by the welfare state paradox), but
negatively associated with part-time jobs probabilities. Taken together, the effects of
MWSI are still mixed.
As for the second part, I found that gender earnings differentials are less
pronounced in countries with more developed MWSI. However, when estimating
gender earnings with percentiles of earnings, the effects of MWSI become negative. In
other words, more developed MWSI is positively associated with women’s earnings
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relative to men’s, but not is positively associated with women’s relative position in the
earnings distribution compared to men. On the other hand, stricter EPL did not
positively associated with women’s annual earnings compared to men’s, and is even
negatively associated with females’ earning percentile relative to men. Being aware of
the different contributors to gender earnings gaps is important because the different
causes may result in different policy implications. Consequently, creating a more equal
wage structure, such as strengthening the negotiating power of unions, is the most
critical measure for enhancing gender equality with regard to earnings’ ranks.
As for the third part, job security perception, this research intends to distinguish
EPL for regular contracts from EPL for temporary contracts. Most previous studies
addressed only the influences of overall EPL. Only temporary EPL has significant
effects on job security perceptions. Furthermore, the gender interaction with EPL was
only found in the interaction between female and overall EPL. However, while the
major coefficient on overall EPL is still negatively associated with workers’ job security
perceptions, the magnitude of decline in female workers’ job security is smaller than
male workers’.
Besides, ALMP was not found to be significantly associated with any of the
three types of security perceptions, while previous studies suggest ALMP can increase
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employment security (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Chung and Oorschot, 2011), and
PLMP can decrease job-loss worry (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). However,
Ebralidze (2012) also did not find a significant influence of PLMP on job-loss worry.
Taken together, the results are still mixed and further studies are needed.
Furthermore, this research is the first to explore the effects of “combination
security” (measured by MWSI) on individual workers’ perceptions of job-loss worry.
This research finds a significant interaction between MWSI and gender, but it suggests
that more developed welfare state policies are related to higher females’ job-loss worry
compared to males’. This finding seems consistent with the “welfare state paradox”
again: higher levels of welfare state intervention is positively associated with women’s
likelihood of employment, but not into desirable and powerful positions. At the same
time, this may also be because women’s caring responsibilities remain greater than
men’s, and more developed welfare state polices result in greater employer
discrimination against women (Nordli Hansen, 1995; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006;
Bergmann, 2008). The “flexibility” side of the labor institution exerts more negative
effects on female workers’ security perceptions, whereas the “security” side of the labor
institution still does not function well enough to improve workers’ security perceptions.
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III. Concluding Remarks and Future Research
Besides, there are still some questions that need to be addressed. First, this
research is intended to introduce some East Asian countries (i.e., Korea, Japan, and
Taiwan), while most of the research in this area has only included European countries.
However, this research does not find that those East Asia countries are significantly
different from other welfare regimes, although most of them present relatively low
welfare state interventions, low ALMP and PLMP, and moderate EPL. Consequently,
the effects of flexicurity policies on different welfare regimes need further investigation
in the future.
Second, due to data limitations, this research can not capture transition types or
discrete different of transitions, such as integrative transitions (referring to job-to-job
transitions, from a fixed-term job to a permanent job and re-entry into employment), or
exclusionary transitions (referring to exit out of employment). While a number of
assessments report transition rates with descriptive statistics, more extensive research
and more complex methods would be necessary to consider the effects of flexicurity
policies on transition rates. Subsequently, because the effects of ALMP on labor market
outcomes with regard to gender equality remain still being mixed and inconsistent, it
would be beneficial to investigate the effects of different types of ALMPs.
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In conclusion, this dissertation is the first work to consciously examine how
flexicurity policies influence gender equality in labor market policies using two very
high quality micro datasets: the LIS and ISSP data. Also, this dissertation found that
more developed flexicurity policies (such as higher EPL and ALMP) may not
necessarily be harmful for women’s employment prospects in the labor market. This
conclusion also can challenge previous literature on the deregulation orthodoxy, which
suggests that a higher EPL is not necessarily harmful for women and other outsiders in
the labor market. Finally, this work is also the first work to consciously examine the
effects of flexicurity policies on the gender earnings gaps, and found that higher level
flexicurity policies are correlated with lower gender earnings differentials. Gender
earnings differentials are less in countries with moderate EPL (such as Denmark and
the Netherlands) than in the liberal countries, suggesting that moderate levels of EPL
are beneficial for gender equality in regard to earnings.
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